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Assembly Judiciary Committee
Hearing on
FAMILY LAW ISSUES
RELATING TO SB 1296, SB 1306, and SB 1341
(and SB 13)
December 14, 1987

ASSEMBLYMAN PHIL ISENBERG: We give you our thanks.
This is, I can't remember, maybe the fifteenth hearing on one or
another of eight million bills that have come out of the State
Senate on family law this year.
And largely, I suspect, because the earlier hearings
were so frustrating, at least to some Committee members, myself
included, the Chairman agreed that during the interim we would
try to put together a few individuals who are -- certainly you're
free to have any opinion you want on the bill to advocate or
oppose legislation -- but individuals who were not totally
involved in advocating or opposing the legislation in front of us
but whose background, training, and experience is such that you
might be able to give us some independent comments and
observations on the proposals; more importantly, their likely
affects.
Justice King and I were talking about this.
In
legislation, we often pass laws without any idea of what the
effect actually is going to be and, of course, rarely if ever
take a look later on to see what it has been. But, we merrily
proceed to untangle what we think is going on.
So, this is a little different than what we've done
before and I appreciate your bearing with us on an experiment.
We'll see if this works; we'll see if it gets to be any better.
The pattern we'd like to take is we've got three bills
up for discussion today and that is not in any way to imply that
you should feel restricted. There are many other bills floating
around and you may have some comments that would be relevant on
those pieces of legislation, but we have two by Senator Hart and
one by Senator Morgan that we particularly wanted to concentrate
on this morning. And what we'd like to do is to start by having
the author of the legislation make a brief comment.
Senator Hart
particular has been spending hours and
hours and hours on his pieces of legislation. And I believe,
also, we have some modifications in the legislation.
Have the panelists been given copies of the
modifications? OK, all right. So if you don't mind, I think
what we'll do is just start. Senator Hart, if you would be good
enough to come forward and jawbone us a bit, please.

Also, I think we spent what was it, sixty or eighty
million dollars rehabilitating the Capitol. Nonetheless, you
must speak carefully and closely into the microphones or else no
one can hear you at all. And the odds are no one can hear you
anyway even if you speak closely and carefully. But we'll do the
best ••. Senator Hart.
SENATOR GARY HART: Thank you very much, Assemblyman
Isenberg.
I want to begin by thanking the Committee for holding
this interim hearing, particularly to thank you for your many
hours.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
of months ago.

That isn't what you said a couple

SENATOR HART: We're dealing with an area that is
difficult, it's complex but I think it's very important. I'm
very pleased that the Committee is holding a hearing.
I do not
serve on the Judiciary Committee in the Senate.
I am not an
attorney.
It's been a very interesting education for me to be
involved in some of these matters.
It's been at times
frustrating, but I don't have any real regrets because I think
the issues are terribly important. I got involved in this issue
largely from reading Lenore Weitzman's book. That's a
thought-provoking book that anyone who reads it, I think, comes
away with having some feelings one way or another about the issue
of no-fault divorce in the State of California.
As I read Weitzman's book, her basic point is that there
is some unintended consequences of divorce that may or may not
have been foreseen with the passage of "no fault" in the early
seventies in this state. And she documents what some of those
unintended consequences are, particularly for women and for
children of divorce.
And as a result of her study and conversations that I
had, I introduced a number of bills that responded to some of the
concerns that were expressed in her book. As a result of the
ongoing discussion that occurred, we felt it was appropriate in
the Senate to establish a task force to take a look at the
findings and the recommendations that Weitzman is putting forward
and to make a determination as to whether or not her basic
findings were on the mark and to make recommendations to the full
Senate as to changes in law that might be appropriate.
And so, some of the legislation that is before you today
is a result of the work of the Senate Task Force that was made up
of a number of people from the Bar, other interested parties
including four Senators, myself included.
I think it's important to emphasize in these matters
that what the Senate Task Force is attempting to do -- its
legislative approach to this problem -- is to not to roll back
- 2 -

laws.
I think that basically the approach
Legislature in the early seventies was
there are some problems. There is some
to
place. And that's what the bills
, that I'm carrying, seek to do.
of those bills is SB 1296 and it's my
format is going to be to take each of

1296
panel's
if we

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
If we could, we'd like to do SB
you on that, then deal with members of the
SB 1296, and then move to your second bill

SENATOR HART:
SB 1296 basically deals with the issue of
spousal
I think it's a fairly simple and
straight
11 that attempts to establish the standard for
a look at in making these determinations based
the courts
on the
living established during the marriage.
It's
sort
, a starting point under which we will be
trying to
whether or not spousal support is appropriate
and what
ought to be. There is a mock-up version of
the bill
sume that the members of the committee and
panelists
ISENBERG: There's a one page cover memo
al Support- Hart." That's your cover memo,
SENATOR HART:
and do
mock-up
about?

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: OK. Do all the panelists have it
1
members have this memo which is the
current draft that Senator Hart's talking

SENATOR HART:
Speaking generally, the general concern
that the members
the Senate Task Force I think had is that the
facts of
matter are that over 85% of marriages that end in
divorce
support that's given.
is no
spous
There is a concern
inadequate
consequences of
of

recent federal census data, the average
is given is approximately $400 a month.
many circles that in many instances this is
some of the again those unintended
and some issues relating to feminization
the context of inadequate spousal

we re attempting to do here is to, as I mentioned
overturn but to try and give some, I think, very
and perimeters to the court to respond to, given
as being a problem in some of the
are currently being made.
- 3 -

I think it might be better, Mr. Chairman, to hear from
the panelists. They have a copy of the bill in its mock-up form
and I think we can go from there.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Although it's worth noting, I
think in the revision of the bill that what you're doing is
deleting the reference to long term marriages and a different
standard for that, at least as I read the draft.
SENATOR HART: That's right. That was particularly
controversial and we thought in the interest of trying to move
the legislation along that it would be best to delete that
provision of the bill.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
SENATOR HART:
provision of the bill.

Great.

I think that was the most controversial

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: OK, good. Senator, can you stay
with us for awhile? I mean, you know, not that we want to
dragoon you in staying here, but it would be helpful I think if
you would. Ms. Mojonnier from San Diego has joined us also on
the Committee. The panelists, for those of you on the Committee
who are not familiar with them, are awfully bright and impressive
people. We have first Justice Don King from the First District
Court of Appeals in San Francisco who spent, I can't remember how
many years, as the chief family law trial judge on the San
Francisco Superior Court.
(inaudible -- laughter)
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

It was one or two years.

JUSTICE DONALD B. KING:

Six years.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Six years. And, since his
elevation to the Court of Appeal, has maintained his interest in
the field of family law rights and speaks widely on the matter
and was telling Senator Hart and myself earlier this morning that
he is going back in two week increments to practice justice on
the trial court. Thus, at least, giving all of his Superior
Court colleagues the opportunity to say, "See, we've been telling
you. You guys have been screwing up all this time."
(laughter)
It's a particular honor to have Justice King here. He h~s
appeared over the years on many of the bills and so it's possible
that there is criticism of existing law. He may have advocated
or opposed that existing law at one or another legislative
hearing.
Judge Tom Murphy from San Diego is again one of the
trial judges in the State of California who has built a
reputation and is helping develop the field of family law as
something more than kind of a cavalier involvement of every
attorney
the state into what is a specialty. And comes to us
with high marks as both an interesting and provocative
commentator on the process.
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Next to the

is Diana Richmond who is a very
Law Specialist attorney in this field
from her or read her writings and
and Conciliation Court in Los Angeles,
is the person who is supposed to make
all these warring factions and naturally
being no problems in Los Angeles at

have
harmony
does
all.

Sacramento, is Tom Woodruff, one of the
our community ... a person against whom I've
case and he's impossible to deal with which
(laughter) ... which is a high
Tom is also a Certified Family Law
us now is Assemblyman Tim Leslie from

on
means
mark, I
Spec
ist
Sacramento

order, but Justice King you're
table, which isn't the top of the
not start there if you wouldn't mind.
JUSTICE KING: OK, thank you, Assemblyman Isenberg and
members of the
ttee. I'm sure I speak for each of my
colleagues
commending you for giving us this opportunity to
come. All of
I'm sure, have been here one or another times.
I
luding me, have stopped coming because of
the 1
s kind of opportunity to talk with you,
being
into the position of being for or against
a bill
having an opportunity to talk to you about
what's
subject matter of the bill and how it
relates
in our courts and what goes on with the
fami
talking to
we were at the prospect
the hurried
ly toward
Can
materials
1
now
revis
el
you a
comments

I

some of the other panelists
of having this kind of an
process that often takes
the end of the Session when a

ask one question of clarification? In the
, there still was the provision about the standard
term marriages. Is that, do I understand

out?
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's been deleted in the
we were given within this last week, Judge.
OK, I don't have the changes but that
of
I was going to say.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, what we'll do is we'll get
of
s
while you go ahead and make your
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JUSTICE KING: This whole area, spousal support, is a
very very difficult area. It's difficult from your standpoint.
It's difficult from the standpoint of parties, obviously, and
it's difficult from the standpoint of their lawyers, it's
difficult from, very difficult,
the standpoint of judges.
The variety of facts and circumstances that exist in each
marriage that comes before you, the differences in the nature of
the parties, their background, their education, their economic
circumstances, their children, everything is so varied that it
necessarily is an area where the trial judge has to have
considerable discretion.
At the same time, I think, it's an area unrelated to any
of the bills you have -- but related I guess to some extent to a
bill, Senate
11 1209, that did pass this Session by Senator
Roberti -- which requires a degree of knowledge and education
about what's going on with families that sometimes is lacking.
And I'm hope
that Senator Roberti's bill will increase and
enhance the amount of judicial education for judges who are given
family law assignments and I
that's a major part of the
problem in this subject matter area.
It's been particularly true in most areas of the state
over the last few years with the present Governor who has
appointed a number of judges who are certainly very qualified but
whose background essentially is from District Attorney or
Attorney General offices where they have had no family law
experience. San Diego has been one exception that has gotten
several family law specialists and that's a big change.
The troubles that we're dealing with, as I'm sure you
know, in this area is not related just to what's going on in the
family. They're re
to age discrimination and sex
discrimination and job discrimination and a lot of things that
are going on in society that the Courts in some way have to
attempt to compensate for.
There's no easy answer to anything with regard to
spousal support. It's probably the issue that brings more cases
into court than any other, although I think you have to be
careful about the statistics because when you talk about -- I'm
not sure where the figure of 85% of the marriages where there's
no spousal support came from -- but you have to recognize that
about 98% of all the cases that go through the courts (and that's
something like 175,000 filings a year in California) are resolved
by the parties and/or their counsel and not the result of any
court order except the court
incorporating whatever the
parties have
to.
We
and that's
you've got a
especially if
and after the
support.

tremendous numbers of very short term marriages
these figures substantially because if
of one year or two years duration,
parties have been working both before, during
, there's not going to be any spousal
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In terms of the amounts, I think that you also have
with taking a figure as to what the
ly if you don't consider in conjunction
the amounts are for child support. One
example, I've had of the so-called Santa
for child support is the child support
lines are too high and the result of that
amounts that are issued for spousal support are too
equilibrium that you've got to have there and
's going to go down. Because
to be dealing with a portion of income and
attributed between support for children and
parent.

of
Clara
figures
is that

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, let me just ask for some
We know that as a result of the Agnos
support schedules and so on that there is
ss that people go through right now, at
Throughout the state, can you tell us or
panelists can tell us how many of the counties
ines in writing on spousal support?

have

JUSTICE KING:

Well, what happened ••. Oh, on spousal

?

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Yeah.

JUSTICE KING: Most of the major counties do, but not
very few, relatively few, of the smaller
alJ of
It's something that I mentioned in our
counties
conversation
and I can mention it for the benefit of the
The Chief Justice has recently appointed
others
an advi
to the Judicial Council on family law.
Both Hugh Mcisaac and Diana Richmond are members of that
committee.
's first meeting last Friday. The makeup of
's a dynamite committee and I would expect that
the committee •
one of
that they will be doing will be to move forward
in the area of es
ishing statewide some guidelines for spousal
support.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Is there any evidence that you
know of
would suggest that in counties where there are
guidelines
support that either the frequency of the
award,
of the award, or the amount of the award is
higher?
1 counties can't really be compared to
big
is there any evidence to support this?
JUSTICE KING:
and
judges
a matter
to he

Well, I

think they can be compared
where you have guidelines by
I think the approach of most
most lawyers want this to be the approach as
consistency, want guidelines which are going
what the order is. Now with the guidelines
the most part that print spousal support,
temporary support from the time of the
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filing until a judgment of dissolution or a permanent order or no
permanent order on spousal support.
The guidelines I think are intended and are applied, as
far as I know, in each county that has them on the basis that
this is what the courts' order will be under the circumstances
that the guidelines provide. They often have an outline of not
only how you calculate them but what the basis on which they are
applied, unless there is good cause shown for the order to be
different. There may be exceptional medical expense in a given
case, unusual school tuition or some other major expense. There
may be other circumstances which will cause the guidelines to
vary but my sense of it is that the guidelines are not there as
rules to be always applied but they're there as guidelines to be
applied unless there's some reason shown why they shouldn't be.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, the premise of Senator
Hart's bill is that, I'll say women although it's technically not
a women's issue precisely, that many women are not receiving
spousal support when they should and that the amount that they
are receiving is very low.
Is that true or false?
JUSTICE KING: Let me deal with the two segments. In
terms of temporary support for those counties that have
guidelines, by and large what happens is that there is an
allocation made of the total income of the family from the time
there is an initial or show cause hearing until there is a final
determination of whatever is going to happen on that subject
matter and generally speaking there's an allocation.
It tends to
run, if there aren't very many children, in something like a
sixty percent of the net income is going to stay with the earner
and forty percent is going to go to the non-earner and usually
the non-earner is the one who is also the custodial parent.
It's not that simple because, I'm not sure about other
places, but I know in San Francisco it was the exception to see
families where both people were not working. There may be a
disparity in their economic level, but generally speaking on a
temporary basis there tends to be that kind of a breakdown of the
60/40 percent breakdown of the income. The reason for that is
that the law, the policy of the law at this point as to temporary
support is to attempt as much as possible to preserve the status
quo of the parties until there can be a permanent disposition.
When you get to the permanent disposition of spousal support,
we're bound by Civil Code Section 4801 which this bill provides
amendments to.
Again I would comment,
few of these cases -- in
terms of the numbers of cases filed -- ever come in on a
contested trial. Even on spousal support, and it's probably the
item that's more frequently tried than any other item. I'm not
aware of anyone who does not apply Civil Code Section 4801.
I
think the problems sometimes are the lack of education I've
talked about before. For example, in a place like San Francisco
the trials of these cases are heard by the whole array of trial
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judges. In many other counties -- Los Angeles, now San Diego
where the judges assigned to a family law
they have a
court do both temporary hearings and also the
section
orders. In San Francisco and most of the counties,
's not
case and you're just assigned out to whomever
happens to
That may be somebody who has no knowledge or
background
In fact, some of them I suspect are
quite surprised
the counsel points out to them what the
provis
are
Code Section 4801; they're not familiar with
it.
one of the problems is we need some current
data.
respect, Lenore Weitzman's data is way out of
date and,
, a lot
it I think was during the "fault"
days. It wasn't "no fault" and I would mention to you that for
the bene
of
s Committee, the Legislature a couple of years
ago
create within the Administrative Office of the Courts and
under the
Council, an Office of Family Court Services.
And although their orientation was to be to a great extent
related to those child-related matters within our family law
system, it's much broader than that and I think they can be a
very ef
resource for you in gathering data. The
Admini
of the Courts has a separate Statistical
Section.
're now starting some programs, using these bar
graphs that the supermarkets use for pricing, where they're going
to be able to gather all sorts of data from the courts in terms
of what goes on in these cases. I don't think we have that
information now.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I assume litigants don't have to
have the bar graphs imprinted on their hands ... (laughter)
JUSTICE KING:
... in order to get their spousal support
check every month. We've always felt, and I know this Committee
historically
always felt, in any one of these issues that
gets
sed
we are all inadequately informed. We know
what's going on usually in our own court. We have a pretty good
idea about that
we don't know what's going on necessarily in
the courtroom next door and certainly in the county next door,
and I think
is an area that we need more information on.
I
my impression is that trial judges of this
state try very diligently to follow whatever the factors are that
the Legislature provides should be looked to in making a decision
about spous
support.
what the result of that is, I don't
know
we don't have enough data to know it. I do think,
from my own experience I can tell you, I don't remember -- during
the six years I was doing this I was doing both temporary orders
and also
s of
cases -- during those six
years, I
rarely was there a case presented with a
request for
support where spousal support was not
granted. If it wasn't a case for spousal support, it just never
got that
; once in awhile, but not very often.
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In terms
judge in
make an al
you

s
le.
s created
take

attempt to do as a
all the circumstances to
Some of the factors
very well; for example, the
, spousal support is
's
years duration
is in a marriage of
s are 40 years old. You have
you try to create some
temporary support are
for permanent, you start
ts limited too much. You
whenever you have exercises
starting point.

you're
se cases with a family
s income, whatever
is
it doesn't make
it is, whether it's a thousand a month or ten
thousand a month-- the problems are the same. That's the income
they've been living up to and perhaps, with Visa and Mastercharge
and American
ss, they've
l
beyond it. Now all of
a sudden
same income has to cover two households and in most
of the areas
state with
hous
expenses, that's a
big jump
And there s
isn't enough money to
cover this new situation and what
trial judge is attempting
to do, with relatively little ability
many ways to know what's
going to happen a year or two down the line. What the trial
judge is
to do is to determine what's a fair
allocation
the
rcumstances of these
parties.
If you've got somebody who has been married for five
years and they're sixty-five years of age and you're making an
award for spousal support to that woman, if the man at that point
is receiving a pension and social
, you pretty well know
what the future s going to be.
's not going to be many
changes in that and there's ce
not going to be many
changes in
employment status or her non-employment status.
But when you're dealing with the whole range of people
we deal
't have
certainty and it's a problem of
looking at
factors
that the
slature sets forth
then deciding how to apply
those as
to this couple that's before you. It's not
an easy job.
I
most of us who have done it, will tell you
once we
out what the actual
are, once we resolve
di
s
and
income and the expenses
are, you
and you sit down with a calculator
or with a
through a series of
calculations
what seems to be the fair way
to do this.
se factors come into play and
once
you have the numbers. What
does
s
usually is more than what this
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person can
leave them
when
soc

's fair to have this person pay and still
of living reasonably, and especially
them enough money? In this
it goes to another bill.
continues to be, as I hope it
have frequent and continuing contact
you have to give the so-called paying
to have sufficient funds left so that he's
, or she, a physical facility in which this frequent
contact can be
oyed. So it's very difficult.

In essence, what you ask trial judges to do is to
or wave a magic wand and come up with
to satisfy needs that cannot be satisfied
are available. Then what happens, and I
pass the subject up without talking about
society where nationwide one out of every two
In California the number is probably
is probably higher.
, people remarry. And
s those marriages don't work out. And we
and situations with children by
, with different circumstances with ... I
remember one doctor who came before me who was paying spousal
support to four or five different women, child support for
several
It gets very complicated and you almost feel
like
consolidate all these actions together when one
of them makes a
to modify.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, you could at least say the
doctor was
engaged with life.
(laughter)
JUSTICE KING: He was, absolutely. Almost to the extent
of not
able to practice and earn enough money to meet all
these
obligations. But that's a continuing problem. And
what do you do? And perhaps the most perplexing problem I think
is -- I don't know of a single family law judge that has come up
with a
solution to i t - - what do you do when there's a
remarriage and
do you count the new income or the new
obligation to
new spouse?
do with the mother who is the custodial
parent
is employed and has an income -- so there may or may
not
spousal
paid, but there's child support-- and she
and has children by the second family and decides at
not to
and
does that then affect the
ld
rst marriage?
I'm
j

These cases are
complicated. I don't know whether
s field or not, some people think I am, but I
am, I
't know the answer. I know that what
to do is to diligently follow whatever guidelines
I don't know of any judges that don't do that.
- 11 -

answer is all judges
sometimes the guidelines
that there must
account of
ling what
is correct.
s an art, not a science,

you come
Service
the answe
terrible
The
the
bui

Revenue
s and this is
create such
1 the factors.
is because it's
isn't a table
s of these people who
ing a judge,
in the
judge is that
where, when the
your
ssues. You're dealing
problem. And I
If we change
attempts to do -we're doing a
of this
wants to bring it
of government in

re
chance to look
chance while
into comments
Mr. McCl

you haven't had a
' t we give you the
calling you
have arrived.
has been
fore only
, as opposed to
have some visceral
law
County of
and the
rman, I ve just been
ask Judge Murphy to
zelle.

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN FRIZZELLE: This presents too good an
opportunity, to ask you all questions, to pass up.
I presume
that a lot of the discussion in your court revolves on what to do
in the future with cases that have children involved instead of
just a spouse. There are other avenues open to you or other
opportunities or options. I presume that a certain amount of the
award can go to the children and such that the spousal support
would end on a second marriage, whereas the child support would
continue regardless. That type of thing.
Is that a ••. ?
JUSTICE KING: Yes, it continues of course until the
child reaches the age of majority or, in a few instances, becomes
emancipated or self-supporting before that time. But the orders
that we have to make are made on the circumstances, made
applicable to the circumstances that are presented to us at the
time of the order. To the extent changes occur in the future,
either child or spousal support of course is modifiable and they
frequently are modified.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
I think one of the things that
complicates our job in the Legislature, as much as anything else,
is that obviously when you make a law you have to do it in such a
manner that it applies to everybody all of the time just the same
way and not everything is the same all the time. And so you
to break apart the different elements that are separable in such
a manner that you can treat them independently.
One of those areas is the business of following with
child support, whether they're in the state or out of the state
is another factor, and how we establish linkage with the previous
father who now may be somewhere else or in different
circumstances and so forth.
The trail isn't always available to
you to follow.
So does your judgment originally sometimes end up
almost punitive in trying to account for the potential flight of
the spouse that is freed from the obligation of direct care of
the child?

•

JUSTICE KING: No, I don't think in any way it ends up
being punitive. There's been an evolvement of a development of
procedures and adoption of both federal legislation and state
legislation that pretty well now involves the District Attorney's
Office, the Family Support Bureau of the District Attorney's
Office, in pursuing the enforcement of any of these orders,
whether somebody's just leaving the county and going to another
county or going to another state and the District Attorney has
that responsibility both as to child support and spousal support.
Obviously, if somebody disappears it's a problem perhaps
of locating them and, as we all know, there are opportunities in
the society for someone to disappear if they really want to.
I
think those numbers are relatively small, but the present process
that has finally now evolved-- if the District Attorney's
offices have sufficient resources and that's a big question
depending on the office; for example, I know the one in
Sacramento is sorely overtaxed -- if they have sufficient
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resources, through the efforts of various law enforcement
, they are able pretty much to find people and try and do
In fact, a good deal of our calendar loads are often
cases where one of the parents is in another state and we're
through
process in this state to either make an order,
to enforce an order, to modify an order.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I'm alerted only in the
circumstance of Senator Hart's bill regarding spousal support.
It addresses spousal support, per se. I'm concerned about the
relative need of the children independent of the spouse or the
's condition being potentially independent of the need of
children. And so, it's a potential thing that needs to be
ssed in the bill.
JUSTICE KING: Well, until very recently,
even now
in terms
I think most of the District Attorney's of
location of resources because of benefits they receive for
lection of
ld support under certain circumstances
they
not
for collection of spousal support. District
though, now are doing that much more
First of all, until a few years ago they didn't do
at
didn't deal with spousal support at all. They still, I
legitimately make some allocation of their resources as to
what they're going to put where and since collection of
ld
brings money into the office under federal and state
they, I think, tend to put a little more priority -- and
appropriately so -- in pursuing the collection of child
But they are able to and many of the offices do do an
excellent job with regard to pursuing and achieving the payment
of spousal support also.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: OK, thank you. All right, now
we've
j
Joan
ly,
is a psychologist and is one
of
, I guess
's fair to say, although she might not like
description, seminal thinkers and writers on the subject. A book
she wrote with Judy Wallerstein in 1980, "Surviving the Breakup",
was-- well, I'll just quote myself, since when I read it at the
time, I thought one of the most provocative and interesting
studies kicking around. It is criticized because it's Marin
County and all of that, and you know the rest of the world isn't
1
Marin County, but it started to point out the value of
longitudinal research in domestic relations and I'm just very
pleased to see you here. You write a terrific book and a
provocative paper which the staff passed out to us.
All right, we're going around and Judge Murphy, if you
would also, at one point in your comment, tell us about Senator
Hart's bill. Is it good, bad, or does it make any difference at
all?
JUDGE THOMAS MURPHY: Assemblyman Isenberg, I thank you
also and would like to echo all of Justice King's comments about
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allowing us to have some input here, because I know that we want
to have input, and this is a special time that you have allowed
us to do that.
The proposed legislation to amend Civil Code Section
4801 -- more specifically to require the court to primarily focus
on how the parties to a divorce lived before the divorce and to
grant spousal support awards consistent with that lifestyle -- I
think recognizes certain inequities that are in our court system
and tries to solve them at this time. To any of you who are
familiar with domestic courts in California, it is obvious that
the present law does not provide sufficient guidelines for
awarding permanent spousal support.
I believe, however, that it is unrealistic for us to use
the marital standard of living as a starting point and I say that
with due respect, Senator Hart, and for the Committee that worked
with him -- because I know the work that they did and in fact
worked with the Chairman of that Committee in reviewing all of
the information as it carne in. And the reason that I say that I
think it is unrealistic, is exactly for the same reason that
Justice King has said, and that is that there is seldom, if ever,
sufficient money available for either the husband or the wife to
maintain the standard of living that they had during the marriage
after the breakup.
It simply costs more for two families to 1
than it does for one family to live and almost all of us spend
what we make regardless of what it is. What should the public
policy be, that was one of the questions that was asked, for this
state concerning the issue of spousal support?
I feel that we, you and me, should try to create a
statute that is understandable by the public, that is
understandable by the lawyers, and allows all of us to predict
what we as judges are going to do.
It also should be fair.
So I
think it should be predictable and fair.
I think that is the
basic thing that we should be looking at.
This present statute that we have directs that we look
at almost all of the fairness issues that all of the different
groups want us to look at. The unfortunate aspect of it is that
there is absolutely no predictability whatsoever.
I feel that
the existing statute needs to be completely revamped, with a
of defining what is the purpose of permanent spousal support
creating understandable guidelines of both amount and duration.
Nine months ago I spoke to a hundred domestic judges,
all of whom are very interested in domestic law.
I prepared
around eight tough hypotheticals.
I have them here and was
to go over them, but we don't have enough time. I asked them to
answer those hypotheticals; tough hypotheticals.
I must say,
reasonable people could differ.
In every single question, there
were substantial emotional differences between all of us and
there was no consensus on any of them. And these are
knowledgeable, intelligent and concerned judges who want to be
involved in domestic law.
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The existing statute tells us to consider, as I stated,
most if not all of those fairness factors.
It doesn't tell us
what weight should be given to each of these factors.
It doesn't
tell us how much we should award or for how long, and that's the
final question. How much money does this, generally, woman get
and for how long should she receive it? I suspect that everyone
in this room would agree that if we have a fifty-eight year old
homemaker who has been married thirty years, that she has no
employable skills and her husband earns $5,000 a month, that she
should get spousal support. And she should probably get it
open-ended for as long as she lives. And I suspect that most
judges looking at that would award her a figure somewhere between
$1600 and $2100 a month. I also suspect that none of us in this
room would think that a woman who is twenty-three years of age,
has been married two years, has no kids, is employed, and is
earning at or near what her husband is earning, should get a dime
in spousal support.
There are also substantial numbers of cases where it
doesn't make any difference. We can sit here and theorize what
spousal support should be, but there's just not enough money.
After you've awarded child support, the parties don't •••
the male, he makes $1800 a month, he's got three kids, and we
award $600 to $700 a month, and after he pays his taxes, he's
$600 to $700 left.
A woman doesn't care what the money is called, whether
it's spousal or child support. Generally, it's how much money
she puts in her pocket.
In the recent handout that was given by
Senator Hart, and they mention the Ramer and Brantner cases, most
all open-minded people would agree that the trial judges in both
of those cases made a big mistake -- in both of those cases. I
believe that those cases are the exception. Judges make mistakes
-- lots of them.
What should be the purpose of spousal support? To
provide a transition period during which the non or the low
earner can try to become self-supporting. And maybe we shouldn't
even have that. Maybe we can just have one reason for spousal
support and that is to meet the reasonable expectations of our
society for divorced persons; society's expectations, not
expectation of the specific wife.
To establish a formula for both amount and duration,
rather than calling it a guideline, use maybe a less mandatory
phrase, similar to what they're using in Santa Clara for other
things; call it a rule of thumb. With the understandinq that
each case is unique, that there must be flexibility anddiscretion left with the court.
Most, if not all of the factors that the special
interest group want to put in 4801, they're already there and
they're already being considered by the courts and the parties
and their counsel. But still, nobody has an answer to these
tough questions.
- 16 -

I ask this to you, when if ever does the support
obligation become a societal obligation? A three year marriage
where the woman is severely injured and married to a physician.
Does that mean that the physician for the rest of this woman's
life should have to pay spousal support? She needs it and he's
got the ability to pay it. Should it be forever or should we
answer that? Should we say, in marriages -- half the length of
the marriage, that should be the amount of the spousal support?
Maybe, I don't know. That's a question you have to answer. But
we need a specific direction.
Is there an obligation on the part
of the supported spouse regardless of how rich the husband is?
Should she have an obligation to go get a job? That's a tough
question to answer when you've got a fifty-three year old woman
whose been married to a physician who makes $15,000 a month.
Should she have to go to work at a local store selling
foundations?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Excuse me, Judge, one second.

Mr.

Isenberg.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, you said that the Ramer
case was an example of a mistake and judges make mistakes, but
you don't think there are a lot of mistakes. Why then do you
think if there are not a lot of mistakes, that you need
guidelines which attempt to control the outcome of the judie
decision?
JUDGE MURPHY: Because I have a certain philosophy of
what I think fairness is. I believe that on a four year marriage
where someone has been injured -- you have a tragedy on one side
a female whose been hurt in an automobile accident -- I believe
within two to four years that the obligation to care for that
woman is society's, not from the man. That is a value judgment
of my own and if I make the correct findings, the appellate
courts, unless they're seeking out something, are going to
sustain me on that. But those same set of facts might go before
him and he might feel different and give an open-ended support
order forever.
It's not fair for some woman to come in and just
by chance get me when she could've gotten him.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well then, that suggests that
there should be no judicial discretion under any circumstance.
JUDGE MURPHY: Oh, I think we should have judicial
discretion, but I think we should have some predictability. It's
a tough thing.
I mean you have to do both of them.
I would
suspect society does not want just to roll out a formula in
and every case, but we need to have a guideline, a rule of thumb
that may be support •••
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, the factors that you
into account in the Civil Code Section now are guidelines. What
you're saying is that they're either not the right guidelines or
they're not specific enough or clear enough to dictate an
outcome. On the other hand, the only thing I can think of that
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is clear enough to dictate an outcome are mandatory limits. You
know, kind of in the personal injury area? One arm of the male
under the age of fifty-five is worth $150,000. You know, that
kind of discussion. Well, the Legislature's been reluctant to
ever do that obviously. The courts always in that field complain
about the lack of guidelines, but at the same time there are some
questions that society always wants to ask and never wants to
answer. And I wonder what you're suggesting doesn't rise to that
level? And that is that the Legislature is never going to be
capable of saying, "OK, we agree if you've been married,
regardless of circumstances, for less than four years ..• " If
there's a problem with the lady, the taxpayers are going to step
in and there'll never be a circumstance where the spouse would be
responsible for the ex-wife. Do you really expect the
Legislature to say that?
JUDGE MURPHY: No, but I think we do it by presumptions
in many areas. In that maybe that the burden should be on the
person requesting support to prove why it should continue if
support continues beyond half the length of the marriage. And
maybe we should have just an arbitrary statement that
spousal support should never continue in any case for a period
equal to, for a period beyond the actual length of
In other words, if it's been a ten year marriage, should we
an individual be required to pay support for twelve, thirteen,
fifteen years?
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Is your answer then,
this to Senator Hart's bill, your answer I suppose would be,
"Well, it's not bad but it doesn't do very much."
impact.

JUDGE MURPHY: I think that his bill will have no
I think that ••.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's one argument for passing
it, although that is not Senator Hart's argument.
(laughter) He
thinks it will have an impact.
JUDGE MURPHY: I understand that, but I
interpretation in the courts will have little or no
think that it looks at a serious problem that we have
courts today. But I think that it just will have no
mean it's already there. It's simply saying let's
at
first. The standard of living of the parties is already
something that's in 4801.

I
I
s

And I guess maybe an answer to your question, should we
restrict judge's discretion? I guess my answer is yes. I think
maybe there should be some restriction in the area of spousal
support, so that that judge's discretion should be limited within
certain areas and he or she should know that you can't go
further than this. You can't grant any more than that. I mean
we do it anyway right now.
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Justice King said that realistically in a lengthy
marriage, the woman is going to get forty percent of the man's
income. That's a rough rule of thumb.
Up until two, three, four
years ago, support was awarded for half the length of the
marriage.
I mean that was a rough rule of thumb that lawyers
used in negotiating cases out. We'll give her support for
approximately half the length of the marriage. We just need
those rules or rules of thumb put into something so that
everybody understands that. And I guess it is restricting
discretion. Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. McClintock.

ASSEMBLYMAN TOM McCLINTOCK: What I've heard so far are
just general vague references to what maybe the guidelines should
or shouldn't be.
Could you give us some specifics? What do you
think the guidelines should be in these matters, specifically?
JUDGE MURPHY:
I can give you a series of what the
guidelines are.
They are in great part set out in George
Norton's article which is a part of the materials that you have.
I personal
feel you could just, with two guidelines, if it were
put into a spousal support •.. if nothing else, two vague things:
that it is the obligation of all of us to try to support
ourselves to the extent possible and, I think, that the burden of
spousal support, after it has been paid for one-half the length
of the marriage, should be on the other side to show why it
should continue. Those are two basic guidelines that would solve
a lot of problems within the courts and give some real direction
to lawyers and to parties.
ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK:
the duration of the marriage?

Ok, why the figure one-half of

JUDGE MURPHY:
I don't know.
It's like forty percent.
It's something that we've used in the past.
It's what fairness
is in your stomach.
Spousal support, the idea of spousal support
is simply a reflection of the mores in our society.
In Texas,
they don't award permanent spousal support. There are other
guidelines that Mr. Norton in his article sets forth, a number of
very very specific items.
I'd be happy to give it to you.
I
have it right here.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'd like you to wait one second.
I
want to get your question answered, but I'd like to ask these
three panelists to make their introductory comments. You may
have questions that will generate from theirs as well. Ms.
Richmond if you might give us your opening thoughts, we would
appreciate that.
MS. DIANA RICHMOND: First of all, I thank this
Committee for the opportunity to have this dialogue about these
important bills and I would encourage this Committee also to have
a similar dialogue about the pending bills.
I know there are
plural on support beyond the age of eighteen. That's a critical
issue to address.
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I think that the comments before about this being,
although not on its face, in effect a woman's issue are
absolutely correct and I understand the genesis of this bill and
am sympathetic to
I observe also in my practice the
phenomenon that Lenore Weitzman has described of women's,
supported spouses, mostly women's, standard of living
decreasing following the marriage and men's standard of
living increasing. And representing both men and women on
practically an equal basis, I know the amount of divorce
planning that goes into income and I know the phenomenon even
very rapidly, post dissolution, of men's income and standard of
living tending to increase and the converse for the supported
spouse.
I'm not
, in fact, I have real reservations about
bill as it is now, inadequately addressing those
lems. I
first want to address some things about it that I think are very
good.
The adding of a factor of reduced or lost life-time
earning capac
of the supported spouse is important to look at.
It meets the hypothetical that Tom Murphy
up of
30-year marriage with the 53-year old housewife who has
a traditional course of married life, whose children
now are
probably adults or close to being adults so that chi
support is
not a factor, who has not been employed during the marriage.
This is the archetype of the situation where I think spousal
support ought to be on a level that meets the standard of living
that the husband has, both at the time of the dis
on and
afterward and
permanently.
I fundamentally disagree with the notion of there being
a burden imposed on that sort of wife to go to work at some later
point in time or to justify why her support ought to last more
than half the length of this marriage. I think that's the
archetype where we need the kind of focus that Senator Hart's
bill has of addressing itself both to adequacy and duration
Another component of this bill that I like is adding a
factor of immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
Most informed family law judges are doing this; it's a factor
that tends to enhance the level of spousal support and adequately
reflect what the paying spouse can afford, given the
that he has and what the receiving spouse ought to
given
fact that she's got to pay taxes on it. And most practitioners
in this field also address themselves to this point. There are a
few judges who still are reluctant to pay attention to these
factors and this factor would, in the legislation,
direction.
There's a paradox about this bill that I would 1
bring up and that is I think that focusing on the standa
living during the marriage could actually have the ef
of
reducing the long-term level of spousal support, rather than
enhancing it. Now, there's a threshold issue here and that is in
-

20 -

most families they can't meet the marital standard of living
post-dissolution because there's not enough money. So already I
think this bill is really addressed to people who have a
comfortable living standard. It's, in effect, an upper-middle
class bill. And it also becomes irrelevant for the very wealthy
because I don't think there should be equalization when you get
to comfort levels that are luxury beyond what most of us imagine.
Addressing myself to those people who could afford the
standard of living during the marriage, there are instances where
the managing spouse in the marriage has depressed the marital
standard of living or depressed the supported spouse's standard
of living -- sometimes his own as well and sometimes not his own
during the marriage -- so that it would be an artificially low
standard.
And then there's the phenomenon that I've described at
the beginning which is that his situation improves after the
dissolution. I guess I would focus on refining this in such a
way as to -- you know we already have standards of living as a
factor; it's usually not a very important factor in spousal
support because of the practical component of it -- I think I
would add to the existing factor something to the effect of where
possible not to reduce the supported spouse's standard of living
after the dissolution. That would have the effect of preserving
adequacy or serving as a foundation and perhaps a model for
ensuring the continued adequacy over the long haul, taking into
account the fact that the supporting spouse's earnings are likely
to go up.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

•

Thank you.

So Mr. Woodruff.

MR. THOMAS WOODRUFF: I'm honored to be here with this
prestigious panel and to have an opportunity to address you.
I
have practiced full-time in the family law area for several
years.
I represent probably a few more women than men in my
practice but I attempt to keep a balance.
I think that is one of
the things that helps all of us get a different perspective than
many of the attorney's groups that testify here who have
represented one side or the other extensively.
Spousal support is something that I have to deal with
everyday in practice because we have cases that we just have to
resolve it. And the rule of thumb, of half of the length of the
marriage, is one that I've never felt comfortable with -- I think
I've known about it; I've used it in general cases but usually if
it's a long-term marriage, it's just open-ended support, that's
the law and we stick with that.
I'd like to make some comments more specifically first
about the bill.
I think one of the things that needs to be a
focus here is the duty of the supported spouse to find and use
her marketable skills, the marketable skills of that person. And
usually it is the woman who is trying to face the issue of
becoming employed. That is a reality issue.
I think the clients
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that I've had that have found employment -- the women I've
represented -- even if they have been out of the market for a
number of years, they have been happier people. They have been
able to share the children; they have gone forward from the
dissolution and become much happier about, much better adjusted
to the issue of the dissolution of marriage rather than staying
home and focusing on it.
The problem that we have here is if there are small
children and, as was stated in the summary, the two
classifications of people who are most hurt by the present system
are women with young children and older women who have been out
of the labor market.
I think if we can focus on those two
categories with the legislation, that in the middle, the other
areas we're not having as much trouble with.
It is those two
areas where I think the biggest problem is and I think it is a
judgment that needs to be made by the Legislature as to whether
you want the mother of young children to be in the home, taking
care of the children or not, and at what price you're willing to
pay for that.
In my experience, if the children are preschool, the
judges usually do not expect the mother who has stayed
a
number of years to reenter the labor market until the children
are school age and then they do expect that. That has been my
experience and I think that's a relatively common understanding.
I'm shocked that 85% of the people do not get spousal support and
I think that it is a function of the knowledge of society -- the
knowledge of women and the fact that when people go through a
dissolution, many of them are so emotionally distraught that they
are unable to even focus upon their legal rights.
I think that
probably is more of an issue than the rules of thumb or the
guidelines or what the Legislature does. That is one of the
issues that creates probably as much a waiver of spousal support
as anything.
In Sacramento, we have guidelines of (inaudible)
temporary basis of 40%, less 50 cents on the dollar for the
receiving spouse's income. That is temporary basis and on the
long-term basis the general rule is 30-35% depending upon the
length of the marriage and some other factors, less 50 cents on
the dollar for the income. Those are rules that are written down
nowhere but that after you've practiced awhile you get to know
them.
I feel that they're basically fair.
In Sacramento, we do not have a termination date set
marriages of any substantial length in my experience. Because if
you go to court, you can predict what happens if you go to court.
If you go to court and the marriage is over five or six years,
most of the time the court will not burn the bridges, will not
set a termination date. So •••
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Excuse me for a short question.
Could you run over that one more time, briefly, for someone that
hasn't practiced in this area like ..•

- 22 -

MR. WOODRUFF:

The formulas?

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:

Yes, the formulas.

MR. WOODRUFF: The formulas that are used. On a
temporary basis, the spousal support is 40% of the payor's
income, net spendable income, after spousal support is taken out,
less 50 cents on the dollar for the recipient's income and on a
permanent basis, after the trial, the trial judges are using •.•
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: So it's the 50% thing that I'm
trying to understand.
So in other words, the husband makes
$50,000 a year, the wife would get 40% of that?
MR. WOODRUFF:
earned $10,000 •.•

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:
MR. WOODRUFF:

She would get $20,000 and if she
It would be reduced by $5,000.

It would be reduced by $S,OOO .•• yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:

Okay, thank you.

MR. WOODRUFF: Yes. That's the formula that's been
used.
It used to be. These have all changed, by the way. I'm
sure when Assemblyman Isenberg was there, there were some other
rules and it was not 50 cents on the dollar -- it was dollar for
dollar at the permanent stage. At least that was discussed. But
these are things that really are subject to change and we do need
to know them.
Because it does have a tremendous impact on the
predictability and there really are differing people -- a lot of
people -- a lot of attorneys settle these cases and a lot of
judges don't know the rules, even the rules of thumb, and ask
another judge.
I think the greatest thing that we could do is to have
some, I really was in favor of the bill that said that judges
have to be trained in the family law area. This is like
practicing criminal law in the '60's when you didn't know from
week to week what was going to happen. And this area is so
complex and if we just think of the impact of the tax
consequences ..• The two judges, Justice King and Judge Murphy,
you wouldn't have any trouble if you were in their court talking
about tax consequences. But, I promise you that if you go into
many of the courtrooms and attempt to argue the tax consequences
or the impact of a yearly bonus or something of that nature, you
find tremendous difficulty in understanding these concepts.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:
difficult?

Does the mathematics ever get

MR. WOODRUFF: Yes it does but there are computer
programs. The judges in Sacramento have computers on their desks
and they run through the guidelines. The guidelines are adhered
to as if stone.
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JUDGE KING:

For ••. temporary.

MR. WOODRUFF: For temporary child support and temporary
spousal support, there is no discretion that I've seen exercised.
The problem that we're having is that we don't know -- the
remarriage issue is the big, that's the big difficult issue-- we
have no predictability of what happens when people remarry and
that comes up at the modification stage -- when you're trying to
settle the entire case, you've got spousal support, property and
custody and all those, and you can usually find a lever and have
something to trade off. But later when you have a modification
of child support or modification of spousal support, you don't
have all those trade-offs.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:

Do you do the math yourself?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Leslie, I denied Mr. McClintock.
I don't want to be unfair. Would you like to reach any
conclusion or any summary?
MR. WOODRUFF: A couple of other recommendations I would
like to make with regard to spousal support in general -- I think
that people should be free to contract with regard to
support; they cannot under the present law. That was one of
parts of the Uniform Act that was left out.
I think that people
should have that opportunity, especially because we're seeing so
many second marriages, to at least limit their liability.
I
think that if we make spousal support tremendously higher, we're
going to see people not getting married and that's going to have
a significant social impact.
I do like the focus of the legislation on the lost
life-time earnings. That issue I do think that the courts are
presently considering it but that wording is good.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Although it was not on the original
agenda, I was wondering whether or not Ms. Kelly, do
have any
comments on SB 1296 which you would like to share briefly with
us?
DR. JOAN BERLIN KELLY:
I would to express my
appreciation for the opportunity to appear before this group and
I don't have a lot of comments about this particular
11 except
that I'd like to echo Judge Murphy's comments and Judge King's
comments with regard to the expectation that there's the ability
to base support on the standard of living during the marriage.
On the basis of perhaps more than 200 mediations in
which I participated of spousal support as well as property
division and custody issues, our finding -- in fact, we're
collecting data about the financial status of couples who are
going through divorce -- is that probably about 90% of couples
are, in fact, living beyond their means during marriage. And
that one of the major issues for many families is negotiating the
debts that will be divided up after separation and divorce. So I
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think there's a false expectation set up that people should be
entitled to the standard of living they had during the marriage
because many of those standards of living were achieved by
spending beyond their means and they come to the separation with
a large credit history of debts.
Secondly, I think that -- while I'm very sympathetic
with women's economic situation after divorce and believe that at
some level we have to address this -- one of the problems with
the bill was that we try to address and redress society's
inequities regarding women's pay and equity issues after divorce,
such that we make, I think, sometimes spouses responsible for the
fact that women have problems in the market place earning what
they should be earning, their inequities in pay.
The third thing that I'd like to say is that we
definitely need to define "long-term marriages" if there's going
to be any kind of consideration in this bill of long-term
marriages. The current case law that has sort of defined some
marriages as long-term that have been five, six and seven years,
is, at some level, very disturbing. We're willing to call this a
long-term marriage, as opposed to 10 or 15 or 20-year marriages
And one other question that was asked about why do we
need guidelines.
It seems to me that we need guidelines because
we have to be concerned about the cases that are not appearing
before the judiciary. Guidelines set precedents for all
divorcing spouses, not just those that appear in court and so
they're important. They trickle down into decision-making at the
level of spouses who either don't use attorneys -- there are
probably 35% of women in California who file on their own behalf
and do not use attorneys, as well as those who use attorneys to
negotiate their settlements.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Mr. Mcisaac.

MR. HUGH MciSAAC: Yes, this is a little outside of my
area of expertise --we really deal with children but I'd like to
echo what Joan has said.
That is, I think it's really
questionable whether the laws of divorce should be the vehicle to
solve some of the problems in terms of the long-term consequences
that divorce inflicts upon women in particular.
I think that
there are other issues that really need to be addressed and this
may be a way of diverting our attention from those issues. Just
as affirmative action, comparable worth, those kinds of questions
really need to be addressed directly and not through the vehicle
solely of the laws of divorce.
I think that any system that we develop must satisfy
three basic goals. The first has to be adequacy in terms of the
children and also the spouse. The second is equity, and the
third is efficiency. I think those are the basic tasks that any
system that we device.
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I suppose the third question is, who makes those
decisions?
the courts, through the Administrative Office
of the Courts,
empowered or asked or requested to develop
guidelines
are necessary, and I think it is essential to
have guidel
,
those
lines shape, in the shadow of the
law, the negotiations that parties engage
outs
the law
who never come before the court. Those are my only comments.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Now what I'd like to do,
with the indulgence of the Committee, is for the next 10-15
minutes perhaps any members of the Committee and Mr. Hart, if you
have questions that you think have been raised by the comments of
the panelists, anybody that would like to talk about them and
explore them
Hopefully what we would have out of this
is some
or different perspectives you'd like
expounded upon.
would be the opportunity to either raise
those questions or
make those recommendations. Senator Hart,
or anyone else on the Committee?
SENATOR HART: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple
of
comments from what I've heard. Maybe I'm being a little
se
here,
some of
points that I think are
particularly
is Justice King's comment, I believe it
was, that, or maybe it was Judge Murphy's, that there are a
of judges who get assigned to these cases who don't have much
expertise or knowledge and if that's the case, it seems we in the
Legislature have some responsibility to try and through the law,
to educate or to give guidelines in a way that is not
to be
overly re
, particularly when you're dealing
people
who don't
much knowledge or expertise. It seems to me we
have some respons
lity to try and point people, at least, in
the right direction, and somehow make them sensi
to issues
that we know are out there.
Judge Murphy said that the current law is
open and
that
to
greater selectivity or prioritizing or
doing something
He doesn't agree with the
is
in SB 1296 but
ic point, as I understood him, was
the
law does indeed
to be changed.
There seems to be some agreement from many of the people
here that we need some greater predictability while at the same
time not being
restrictive. The one point
I want to
clarify to the panel sts and to the members of the
, is
that the standard that we are using, and maybe standard is not
the best word, we are not attempting in this bill to say that
we're going to have a standard that is commensurate with what the
standard of living was during the
Judge Murphy made reference to, and we hear it over and
over again, that two cannot live as cheaply as one and that's
understandable. What we are attempting to do, though,
s
bill is to have a starting off point. The operative phrase in
the bill, on page 2, line 20, in the mock-up, is "based on the
standard of living as established". Now, maybe someone
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come up with some language that attempts to get at what we're
attempting to do here which is to have a different starting
point, a different perspective.
It's not meant to be
commensurate: it's not meant to be a standard in the sense that's
what we always expect or expect to end up. But to start from a
point that is different than what is alleged to oftentimes be the
point that's started at now, which is sometimes nothing above the
poverty level for women in certain circumstances.
What we're attempting to do is to have a different
starting point, a different perspective on this issue and maybe
the language that here is giving the wrong implication. It's not
meant to be commensurate but is meant to be a starting off point.
And I guess the concern that I've heard expressed over
and over again by people who support this bill or who are
sympathetic to this bill, Mr. Chairman and members, is that too
often it seems as if the factors of women caring for children -women who have foregone education or employment -- is not
sufficiently appreciated and as a result, the woman finds herself
at a severe disadvantage when the marriage, in fact, is
dissolved.
I certainly understand the point that people have
made that it's not the job of the law to deal, or the job of
divorce to deal, with all of the other inequities of society but
it does seem to me that judges and we in the Legislature have a
responsibility to try to fashion the law in such a way that it
does not exacerbate those inequities and those concerns that
women oftentimes find themselves confronted with. Those are the
principle points I'd like to make.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, Mr. Frizzelle.

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: When we started out here, we
were talking about the concept of "no fault" type of separation
or divorce. Now we're talking about the business of one paying
and the other receiving so to speak. Doesn't sound like a "no
fault" approach really.
It's as though the person who's expected
to provide is going to be the provider and the person who does
not do the providing is the one who gets provided for, ad
infinitum.
I'm concerned about the concept of equity in that
judgment.
It may be traditional but it's not a "no fault" type
of divorce.
It really ascribes the fault to the person who is
the provider and has been the provider during the marriage.
It
may be that the person, the spouse who is not the wage earner,
after a divorce becomes more capable of earning salary or wages
than the other. But the initial decree seems to establish a
fault finding without intending it even.
The standard of living, if a couple gets together and
each has a certain credit capacity, the lady here mentioned the
business of living beyond your means is pretty much a way of
life, especially of young couples with growing families.
It
seems to me you're not only living on a basis of what you earn
and what's net after you pay taxes but on how much debt you can
service with what it is you earn. And, if one ends up paying all
-

27 -

of the basic types of living expenses, like your house payment
and your car and your clothing and so forth, then anything that's
earned by the other spouse ends up the gravy on the dual earnings
that make your standard of living out of two people, maybe one
only part-time earning, way above what one person could provide
by themselves out of whose salary •.• (Taping error; no sound on
approximately one-third of tape B4)
ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK:
••• divorce, I would suggest
perhaps looking at the income rather than at the standard of
living. But I think that after a period of five years, one can
assume that a spouse has had enough time, even if they've not had
any previous job experience or for that matter higher education,
to go out and obtain a degree and to enter the job market
successfully during a period of five years.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Any response?

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Elihu?

Yes, Mr. Isenberg.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I want to present a que
to
the panel and work backwards. Is there anyone here
objects
to the language in the bill dealing with tax consequences?
JUSTICE KING:

No, that's already done.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
to make sure.
JUSTICE KING:

I understand that but I just want

It's a benefit to have it in there.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Are there any fundamental
objections or reservations to the language on reduced or lost
life-time earning capacity, which is kind of new language?
JUSTICE KING:

I think that's a benefit for

1.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay. Then let's
back to the
only thing then that's left in the bill which raises
implications -- which is the words the "standard of 1
established during the marriage" -- as both a factor and as kind
of a premise for the award of support. What is the
consequence of adopting that language?
JUSTICE KING: Well, that's currently the
law and indeed, in Civil Code Section 4801 and two sect
not
changed, it also exists -- it's stated there, both as ability to
pay and as to need.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Now it's during the
The focus is on during the marriage. That's the change.

-
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?

JUSTICE KING:
in 4801 now.

No.

That presently exists in two places

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Show it to me, Judge.

JUSTICE KING: Under l(d) and under 2, and under 7 -let's see-- well, now it's under the deleted 7.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's being added, Judge.
That's the amendment, I believe.
JUSTICE KING: No, no. The amendment as I understand it
is to put it up under the very beginning where you talk about
"may order any amount as just and reasonable based on the
standard of living established during the marriage." But then if
you go into the present section, it says "the ability to pay to
be taken into account, various factors including the standard of
living established during the marriage." The next paragraph says
"the needs of each party based on the standard of living
established during the marriage."
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Judge Murphy.

JUDGE MURPHY: It could have a real impact against
women. The very legislation that you put in on Sullivan -- there
you have the woman who is a nurse who puts her husband, who is
going to medical school, through med school and then on the date
that he graduates from med school or finishes his residency, he
leaves her. The standard of living during the marriage, if
that's the basis .••
SENATOR HART: It's the starting point.
to be locked in concrete. I mean •••

It's not meant

JUSTICE KING: By putting it up in front there, you are
locking it in front
you are locking it in. That's the effect
of the change.
SENATOR HART:
I don't think by rearranging it and
highlighting it, we're locking it into anything. That's not our
intent.
JUSTICE KING:

But that's the effect, I think •.•

JUDGE MURPHY: Senator, I don't think it's going to have
any impact. But I know that, on those unique cases, I'll have
lawyers arguing, "wait a minute, this law was changed and we
don't want to give this woman any more money because she lived at
this level during the marriage." The mere fact that you put him
through med school, etc., etc., we were told not to take that
into consideration. I'm saying that it's in there now-- I'm not
sure that you want to give it priority.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge or Senator, that's one of
the things I wanted to focus on which is the practical
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consequences of adding
court to
focus its attention on
during the marriage
and what
icat
are
have one
party or
a whole
one part or
the other
giant drop in
course the
continuing
that Ms. Kel
out, which is
that folks are spending beyond the
the marriage
anyway. You have heard that debate. It seems to me
's worthy
of some consideration. Could you just tell me your reflection on
that? Some of these folks suggest to you that the impact may
well be to restrict the court's options and, at least in some
circumstances, to leave the court to give a
level of
spousal support as a result of that language
SENATOR HART: Well, I'm here to hear all
testimony.
The language "based on the standard of living established during
the marriage. In making the award the court shall consider all
of the following circumstances of the respective parties," and
one of those is "the reduced or lost life-time earning capacity
of the supported spouse for foregone or delayed education,
training employment or career opportuni
s ... "
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: No obj
to
Everybody
checks off on that -- they check off on the tax consequence.
It's the use of the standard of living during the marriage as
kind of the way of defining the standard of living. The Section
now says the courts shall take into account
standard of
living of the parties, but it doesn't restrict it to the standard
of living during the marriage, presumptively prior to separation.
It says generically "standard of living." You are narrowing the
focus. The courts are now defining it as standard of living
during the marriage.
JUSTICE KING: Actual
case law
s
i
that it
is "standard of living during the marriage" so that if someone
wins the lottery or someth~ng after the divorce occurs, the
former spouse is still only ent led to
consistent
with ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
that, Judge?

wouldn't

JUSTICE KING: The language
the factors.
I
what we're
inappropriate to have it up
paragraph ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

. . and

change

s

's down under
I

S

second
or

decree ...
JUSTICE KING: It should be
is considered by courts both, as to need
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think we've touched
you consider it, Senator Hart, and we wi
-
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both, and
to pay.
and
bill.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Wait a minute -- I just want to
make sure I understand it.
Is the implication then that by
including the language "standard of living established during the
marriage" in lines 20 and 21, that that may serve to be used as a
vehicle to overturn the decision about one spouse winning the
lottery and so on? Is that generally the opinion of the folks
reading it?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. WOODRUFF:
I think that part of the problem is that
it makes it unclear. The law is relatively clear at this point
and if we change it, we're going to have to litigate it.
It's
extremely expensive. Like we're doing in Civil Code Sections
4800.1 and 4800.2. It's millions and millions of dollars going
into these changes.
I think the other concern is that, to some
degree, it will change the focus and allow us to fail to realize
that in most cases there's just an inability to meet that current
standard of living.
It doesn't seem that a change such as that,
which is what we argued, has any basis.
I think it would be a
real difficult problem.
JUSTICE KING:
I think the distinction -- you have it as
one of the factors "is one of the factors to be considered by the
court" •.. If you have it in this first paragraph and with the
language that you have, it seems to mandate that it has to be
done that way.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

That's right.

MS. RICHMOND:
I think that's half of the concern and
then the other half of the concern about putting it in factor 2
in this way, as opposed to 7 where it is crossed out here ••• "the
standard of living of the parties" •••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Please speak into the microphone. We
want to make sure that we get it recorded. Otherwise we would
have done some of this for nothing.
MS. RICHMOND:
I think that covers half of the concern.
The other concern is the creation of the factor as articulated in
number 2 has the potential for limiting it in certain
circumstances.
I do think that's contrary to the Senator's
intent.
If you leave it as current language in the existing
legislation, factor number 7, "the standard of living of the
parties" has already been defined by case law and people know
what it means.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

Mr. McClintock.

ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK: Well, let me ask Senator Hart
why he uses the standard of living, which is very, very
subjective to begin with. And, furthermore, two different
households with the same income can establish very different
standards of living depending upon how they manage that income.
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ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK:
, which is quantifiable
and removes all this objective problem that you have in trying to
define what is an equal standard of living.
SENATOR HART:

I'm not sure Tom.

Let me

about

that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Any other comments from members
of the Committee on SB 1296 --we'll move along.
JUSTICE KING: This is not on SB 1296 but it came up in
terms of comments and I would point out that the Legislature has,
this past session, passed two measures effective January 1st -one which provides for a rebuttable presumption that a 10-year
marriage is a lengthy marriage and, therefore, support should be
permanent. And the second is the bill I referred to earlier by
Senator Roberti, providing more judicial education for judges
handling family law cases. Hopefully, the judicial branch of
government will take that as a hint and take care of the
problems.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Chairman.

Yes, Mr. Isenberg.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Since Senator Hart's or one of
his functions here is
is trying to
out what
is we
are thinking so that he can consider his bill. Senator, I think
I agree with Ms. Richmond and Justice King that the inclusion of
the language on page 2, lines 20 and 21
that is, not as a
factor but as
of 1
f
1
at
support -ses
probably
t want to have in
your bill. And secondly, maybe Ms. Richmond's point is that ...
SENATOR HART:

Phil, could you repeat that.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Yes, on page 2 of your bill,
lines 20 and 21, where you throw in the "based on the standard of
living during the marriage," it's not a factor to be taken into
account. If you make a spousal support order, that's the way in
which the order will be constructed. That's essentially what
Justice K
were saying. I
that raises
implications
don't want to deal with, I
ieve. It gives me
some concern. Secondly
the question would be ...
SENATOR HART: On that point though, because that's the
guts of the bill, it already is under existing law a factor -"the standard of living of the parties" is strike-out language on
page 3, line 30 ...
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SENATOR HART:
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

•
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. I think with that backdrop what
I'd like to do-- I'm not going to utilize the same order that we
did in SB 1296 but rather I think I'll start in the reverse so
the judges might be able to respond to some of the comments made
by other panelists. Mr. Mcisaac, if you'd like to begin.
MR. MciSAAC: First of all, what I'm about to say does
not represent the opinion of or the position of the L.A. County
Superior Court. I want that very clear.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Very clear.

Very clear.

MR. MciSAAC: I'd like to limit my comments because the
bill is much more acceptable than it was when it was first
introduced as a family home award. And the December 8 version, I
think, satisfies some of our concerns.
I'd rather take a few moments to look at the context and
raise three or four questions about the law itself. Robert
Mnookin talks about the effect of law in divorce in his excellent
article on "Bargaining: The Shadow of the Law, the Case of
Divorce of the Courts", Yale Law Journal, April 9, 1979.
The importance of the law is not the law itself so much
as how it shapes the bargaining parties in the shadow of the law.
Ninety to 95% of all divorces are settled by agreement between
the parties themselves.
The history of this legislation in the past decade has
been of special interests, prosecuting their individual concerns.
We began with an emphasis on father's rights; now the emphasis
has shifted to mother's rights. The problem is divorce is a zero
sub-gain-- one person's solution is another's poison-- so that
as we try to satisfy individual issues in the law itself, we
begin to create enormous problems.
We need to focus on the family as a system and find
options for mutual gain; to identify underlying needs, especially
the children's needs; and avoid positional bargaining which
forecloses options, and leaves us no choice. There can be no
winner or losers.
The structure of the law and the system that administers
it must be able to represent the needs of all the parties, not
the narrow interests of some. It requires general principles and
goals with wide discretion to handle individual cases. The
system must encourage fair and peaceful resolutions, not the
opposite -- pitting parents and spouses against one another like
scorpions in a bottle.
Within this context we need to analyze SB 1341. First,
"the deferred sale contingent upon best interests of the child,"
I believe allows wide discretion while it focuses on the special
case that identifies the goal and that's stability for the
children. So I don't see a problem there.
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The December 8 version eliminates the bad faith
bargaining. And the only concern that I have with the bill are
these questions that I would like to ask them
I don't have
answers totally.
The first is will the linkage of custodial arrangements
to property lead to disputes over property in the guise of the
child's custody dispute? That's unknown.
I'm not sure how that
will factor out.
The second is does the tenor of this bill, its earlier
form, -- I think it's much less of a problem now-- exacerbate
the inherent adversary nature of divorce.
It's much less than
the original bill and I think that's a problem that has been
dealt with.
Is having children stay in the family home always the
best solution? The law in this case permits wide consideration
of multiple factors.
There may be situations where families move
quite frequently and it may not be best to have a mother stay in
a home with a huge mortgage payment, maybe really not in her
interests, and I think the law does permit that.
And finally, I guess the last relates to the question I
raised earlier. Are the laws of divorce the best solution for
redressing the documented economical inequalities that I think
that Lenore Weitzman identified.
I would say that they are not.
And in summary, I have no problem with this particular
bill in its current form.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Yes, Dr. Kelly.

DR. KELLY: Again, my comments will be brief on this
particular bill. One thing that I would like to say is that
there is no data available that provides evidence that the sale
of the family home is damaging in the long run to children.
In
fact, there's only one study which even looks at that issue. And
moving once is associated with better adjustment, which is an
interesting finding.
We've assumed that staying in the house creates
stability for children. On the other hand, as I say, there is no
evidence which suggests that. One of the problems I think with
the deferral of the family home -- and not necessarily in
opposition to this bill but I think there are some problems that
get raised -- is the deferring the sale of the home does provide
new and numerous opportunities to continue to litigate around
lots of issues, including issues of maintenance and care of the
home, tax issues, and so on. And so it leaves open, potentially
for many years, a case which might have been closed earlier. And
I think there's some risk in that for families, both financial as
well as psychological, in leaving the whole divorce issue open.

-
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Secondly, the other major issue to be considered is
there is an assumption in this bill that it will be the mother
that is in the home with the children. And the question that I
have is will this create substantial problems for fathers in
terms of enabling them to have their own chance to establish
their own residence with their children, as opposed to assuming
that the children belong to and will be with the mother in the
family residence.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you very much.

Mr. Woodruff.

MR. WOODRUFF: I think one of the issues is that the
Duke case has not been applied widely and there is some question
as to why.
I think one of the major reasons in my practice that
I have seen Duke not used a lot is because of the fact that the
people are tied together for too long and that it is a continuing
opportunity to litigate.
When I tell people that they have the right to seek a
Duke, when I'm representing the woman with children in the home,
usually the initial reaction is "yes." And as time wears on and
as they begin to focus upon the economic realities, and upon the
needs of both sides, and are more willing to move on in their
lives, there is much less attachment to the family home. If
there is some cost or price associated with a Duke, such as
continuing problems with regard to maintenance and things of that
nature, most of them will give it up.
And they want certainty. They want to know "is this my
house or isn't this my house." If it isn't going to be their
house forever then they want something certain.
I find that most
people don't want that uncertainty of the Duke.
I have found difficulty in what I have felt were
appropriate cases to get Duke orders. And I think the
legislation may help that:--! think temporary-type Dukes that I
have argued many times -- say two or three years till the kids
get in school or something of that nature -- or that I have tried
many times to negotiate or request, I've met a great deal of
opposition. A lot is from, again, the judges not knowing the
nature of the rule and how it works and how you actually
implement it.
When I've gone to trial on the issue, I've had to
prepare a proposed order to show the judge that this could be put
down in writing and it could be workable. But I still had a
great deal of difficulty having it used.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Excuse me, Dr. Frizzelle has a

question.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
I have some concern regarding
the ownership of the house, the award of the house so to speak,
as it relates to the equity in the hause as a basis for credit.
We have a circumstance that occurs if an award of a house is made
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to one or another, the credit based upon that property -- that
real property -- for the other individual is completely is
eliminated. And we are asking a provider, in some circumstances,
to provide for a spouse or children and yet, we may have
eliminated the property equity as a basis upon which that
person's credit is based. And I would like to have you address
that as you go along, each of you, because it's not just an open
and closed case regarding the value of the house as a residence
but also what it provides. Or should we split the equity in the
house or allow a portion of the equity to be used by each spouse
in that circumstance as a basis for credit?
MR. WOODRUFF: Certainly one of the problems we see is
the out-spouse winds up being unable to afford housing in many
circumstances because most people buy a home based upon the sale
of the prior home and they don't have the cash available to do
that.
I think a Duke award is a deterrent to joint custody and
the involvement of fathers in more active custodial parenting.
I think that because of the uncertainties that there are
and because people want an asset, I have certainly drafted a
great number more notes and deeds of trust than I have Duke
orders -- which have a note with a certain date, rather than
open-ended tvpe thing that a Duke is, and more confining
circumstances or limitations in periods when negotiating the
case. We do negotiate deferred sales constantly and, in almost
every case, you consider when is the house going to be sold and
it is seldom put on the market forthwith.
You wait until the
spring or wait a year or two, but the Duke-type orders, because
of the uncertainties, many times both people don't like to do
that.
It does tie up, many times, the only substantial asset and
prevents them from moving forward.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
like to ask Ms. Richmond.

Thank you very much.

Okay.

Next, I'd

MS. RICHMOND:
I share all of the concerns that each of
the prior speakers has mentioned. The only way in which I differ
with Mr. Woodruff is that in my experience it has been somewhat
easier in my county to get deferred sale of the family home or
longer term Duke orders than he has described.
I think that there has already been a lot more
litigation over this issue by the availability of Duke orders
than ought to be in certain families.
And I also think there may
be a misplaced emphasis on the children, where we ought to be
looking more at economic factors.
Adding the factor in here,
renumbered number 6, "whether there may be significant
psychological detriment to the child associated with the change
of residence •.. "
Yes, it is the 12/8 version. Each of the mock-ups does
have the psychological detriment to the child associated with the
change in the residence.
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Although common sense would tend to tell us that we
don't want to add to the disruption of divorce by automatically
bouncing a child out of the family home, I do question whether
the child has to grow up in the same home for all of his or her
minority. And I have seen cases in which teenage children's
depositions have been scheduled on this subject.
I think for
parents otherwise inclined to litigate, you're going to have more
examination of children by psychologists and psychiatrists than
you would otherwise have. And I think that it is detrimental to
children to have them paraded as witnesses for one or the other,
due to what are essentially economic interests of the parents.
There are certain economic situations in which this kind
of order really makes sense. And that is where there is a low
house payment for example. The family has long been there. And
keeping the custodial parent and the children there helps, among
other things, to reduce the level of spousal support and enhance
the overall economics of the family. And then you gear it in
such a way so that the out-spouse's tax consequences are not
unduly penalized by virtue of an award such as this. So that
while I don't have any objection to the existence of such
deferred home awards, I do have concerns about emphasizing the
psychological components of the children.
I may wish to see more
definition of the economic consequences to both parents.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Judge Murphy.

JUDGE MURPHY: The basis of the Duke case and this
proposed statute, as I understand it, is the immediate joint
impact of divorce and the sale of the home. Many people move on
a regular basis and the kids move with them, I assume. So it's
the immediacy of them.
I'm in favor of Duke orders, and I think
that -- and there is another case that has been written by
Justice King which makes a lot of inroads into Duke -- and as I
see it, it is simply a presumption. And should-we-have a
presumption that there should be Duke orders and should it be the
burden on the out-house spouse to try to show why it shouldn't
occur? Or, should it be the burden on the in-house spouse to
show why it should occur?
I simply feel that the burden should be on the out-house
spouse, which is Justice King's case. Duke says the opposite.
In Duke, it says that there should be a Duke order when it makes
sense and the burden is on the other side to show why it should
not occur.
I find nothing wrong with the legislation other than
what appears to me to be a blockbuster and that is -- do I read
this correctly -- that you don't want to limit Duke orders even
if there are sufficient assets to award the house to one spouse?
MS. MIMI MODISETTE: My name is Mimi Modisette. I'm on
Gary Hart's staff. My understanding is that that provision was
put in to clarify that we are not trying to limit the court's
discretion. When there are sufficient assets they may still make
-
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a Duke award if they choose to. They aren't bound, as they are
not currently bound, to sell the home immediately.
JUDGE MURPHY: That would be a major change in the
present law which requires a 50-50 division of assets. Let us
assume $100,000 stock and a residence that has an equity of
$100,000. This would allow a deferred sale of the home, allow
the wife and the kids to live in the residence, and give her
$50,000, when realistically she could be awarded the house and
give the husband $100,000. That's a political decision. That's
a major, major change in the law as it presently stands, and I
suspect there would be substantial litigation if that were
included.
JUSTICE KING: Since this bill purports to say that the
Legislature finds a lack of guidance in the law as to what
constitutes the needs of children for purpose of implementing ...
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Just a moment, you are on a tape, I
just want to make sure that I acknowledge you're speaking now.
JUSTICE KING: Thank you. You're asked to make a
finding as to a lack of guidance in the law.
I'm not sure how
much lack of guidance it is but there are, in effect, two lines
of cases. The Duke case, just so we're all clear what we're
talking about, what the Duke case did was to require the trial
judge to, in effect, do a virtual mathematical weighing of the
adverse impact on the child if the home were sold and the child
couldn't live there versus the adverse economic detriment to,
what we call, the out-spouse. And under Duke, if that
preponderated, if the adverse impact was on the child, then the
court had no discretion but had to order that the Duke award be
made and further, in the opinion, required that it~made until
the child reached the age of majority.
If the child was two,
stayed for 16 years.
We've been involved in two cases. The most recent one
is Horowitz, and now, this year, Stallworth, where our Division
said -- and we don't overrule the San Diego District Court of
Appeal, we're equal, but I think that the better rule is and the
one that we adopted was -- it is correct that the trial judge
ought to weigh those factors.
But that's just a matter of
weighing and then exercising discretion as to what appears to be
appropriate.
This bill would represent a very, very significant
change in that law because it elevates the circumstances of the
child. Not only elevates them, makes them primary and
specifically says that the economic needs of the parents as
individuals would be secondary. And I think that's a very, very
serious thing. You're going to promote a lot of custody
litigation which we generally don't have now with the present
kind of Duke situation.

-
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You're talking about some economic circumstances here
that are incredible and I think you have to be aware of them.
The tax consequences here are horrible. The present state and
federal law provides that under, I think it's, Internal Revenue
Code Section 1034 or 1041, that either two years before or two
years after the sale of the primary family residence, you
purchase another residence, you can roll over your cost basis
into that new residence. You don't have to pay taxes on it.
This order would preclude the use of that section by the
noncustodial parent because it would no longer be the primary
residence. He loses that. So when the house is sold, he's taxed
fully on the amount, even if he wants to use it to buy a new
residence.
Secondly, Section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code and a
comparable section in the California law provides that if either
parent is age 55 or above, they're able to sell a residence and
take a gain of up to $125,000 with no tax consequences. Tax free
gain. And that also applies if you sell it and buy something
smaller and you have a gain, you can use that same vehicle. That
requires that the house that sold has to have been the primary
residence of the taxpayer for three of the previous five years.
So the minute you have somebody out of their house for two years,
which is what you're virtually mandating here, they have lost
those tax benefits.
The other party, the one that is in the house, gets them
and maintains them and so somewhere down the line you have a very
unequal division of assets when that house is sold. Because one
is going to be taxed fully on the proceeds they receive, the
other one has no tax on the half they receive at all.
My experience, and I must say, I was doing Duke-type
orders, or Duke/Stallworth orders before any appellate court
cases provided for them.
And I started off with the idea that it
was a good idea to make such an order for the benefit of the
child and probably to do it until the child reached the age of
majority.
I changed both of those views in the course of my
experiences as a trial judge. One is that the age of majority
has nothing to do with it. Secondly, the age of the child may
have everything to do with it. A two or three-year old child has
no attachment to the home. A 17-year old, I have a 17-year old,
we're lucky to get him home.
In most cases, the situation of the
child has nothing to do with this.
It's a matter of what kind of
housing is adequate.
For example, under your bill, if the house were worth a
million dollars, had an equity of a million dollars, one person
would live in it and the other person wouldn't get it, instead of
the court ordering it sold and letting them each buy a $500,000
house. That's what it says. The economic needs of the parents
as individuals will be secondary.
In addition, you've got some definitions in here that
are very, very troublesome, and what you're doing is you're
-
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saying there should be this kind of an award if it will minimize
the adverse impact of the dissolution on the child. That's a
very subjective question. And I don't know that anybody can do
that, although I'm sure we could get some psychiatrists who would
come in and testify to that. And you're asking them to do that,
versus the undue hardship on the other spouse.
In my view, because of these tax consequences, as I've
indicated in the Stallworth case, I think if the so-called
out-spouse is in the position to take advantage or to lose either
or both of these very substantial tax benefits, that's enough
right then to require that the house be sold. Why should
somebody, a few years down the line, have to pay taxes on
$125,000 that both state and federal governments say they don't
need to if that's their primary residence? Whereas, the person
who is in gets that benefit.
I think it ends up being a punitive
thing and I suspect it will generate a tremendous amount of
custody litigation that we've all been trying for so many years
to resolve by keeping out of the courts and keeping in Hugh
Mcisaac's office.
And the basic problem with all of this is, and I think
the reason why the present law to me is just fine -- I like what
the Legislature did in Assemblyman Isenberg's bill a couple of
years ago which made the Duke rule less rigid and gave the court
more ability to be flexible -- there is absolutely no data that
tells us. And I think we should be especially careful with
something as significant as this which usually is the only asset
that people have that is reachable right now. They may have a
pension but that's 40 years down the road. This is there right
now.
We have to be very careful when we make a determination
on this when we're talking about the effect of it on the child.
We're trying to protect the child when we have no data to show
this has any adverse affect on children.
My understanding of the way it's done throughout
California now for the most part, is by and large there are no
really long-term Duke orders made or Stallworth orders, or
whatever you want~call them -- family home awards. They're
mostly short-term. Lawyers negotiate them for the most part now
and they try to tie it in with the time the child is going to be
changing schools and going into a different school district or
different level of school anyway. Or they tie it to other
circumstances that relate to that particular case.
I don't know
of any judges, with the exception of those cases that come in
where people are way over their head in payments, that order the
house sold immediately. And you're not going to change that
because we're going to have to do that. They're lucky if they
can wait until the trial without the house being foreclosed on
them.
So in the short-run I don't think it's a problem.
Post-trial, I don't think it's a real problem. There are
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relatively few cases that I am aware of where the trial judge
orders the house sold immediately. Usually there is some sort of
a transition. As far as I know, virtually always it's certainly
a transition through the current school year. If the divorce is
January, no one is going to order the house sold in January.
They're going to say put it up for sale in June or July.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Is that automatically taken into
consideration? Or is it just basically some judges do it and
some judges don't?
JUSTICE KING:

I think virtually everybody does that.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: There's no problem though if you
wanted to make a statutory presumption that obviously that would
be a factor in terms •.•
JUSTICE KING: No, but I don't even think you need to.
I mean, with all due deference to Senator Hart and I recognize
the problem he's trying to address, I think the present state of
the law is working well since we got the legislation a couple of
years ago that allowed people to come back in and under various
circumstances allow the court to consider changing such orders.
As the attorneys said, this is not really developing, or has not
developed, into much of a problem.
I guess I must say that the major concern I'd have here
is, aside from these losses of tax benefits, I just see an
explosion of child custody litigation if this were to go forward
and I think that would be a most unfortunate result because in
effect you'd have to litigate the custody issue.
If we know what we'd be doing, we'd be going right back
to the "fault" in a way. What used to happen before the Family
Law Act was you could only get support and more than half of the
assets if you were the innocent party and so you had to say what
a lousy person the other person was and you couldn't very well
say they were a lousy person while also saying without saying
they were a lousy parent. So you threw that in too, and then you
had all that evidence.
Here you're going to get into effects on the child and
you're bringing "fault" back in and you're bringing parents
litigating against each other over an economic issue -- in many
instances, the only asset -- where it simply doesn't occur at
this point. I think most of us, when this mandatory mediation of
custody and visitation started, got concerned.
Is it really
going to work because aren't people going to see, "Gee if we come
in and we agree that she has custody or I have custody, then
automatically I'm going to get the family home" and won't the
desire for the family home really foul up the possibilities of
mediation working.
It hasn't worked that way. Very rarely is
that really even a consideration. Even though everyone knows in
the back of their mind that it is certainly there and it's there
for at least some period of time.
-
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I would just say that the concerns of what could happen
here and the fact that we have something that's working -- as far
as I can tell, very well right now -- don't call for this kind of
action.
If you want to do something to clarify the law, then I'd
say you take a look at Duke and take a look at the Horowitz and
Stallworth and say this-rs-the way courts should handle the
temporary awards of family homes at the time of dissolution. And
that, I think, would be a better approach than to place the
interests of children above parents.
I think when you are
dealing with custody and visitation, by and large, it's a good
area to place the interests of children above parents. But when
you're talking about the family home, and perhaps the only asset,
it's a dangerous place to do that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. I'd like you, Ms.
Modisett, if you have questions to answer them at this time, but
in your answers are there any questions of members of the panel.
I'd wish you would kind of give me your perspectives as to what,
if any, impact you see this legislation having on the doctrine of
joint custody and if you think it does have an impact, why you
think it's appropriate to modify it.
If not, why not?
MS. MODISETTE: On the question regarding joint custody,
the people who wrote the bill attempted to make it very clear
that either custodial parent could request the deferred sale. We
refer to "a" custodial parent rather than "the" custodial parent.
We put in language that specifically says this isn't meant to •••
I can find it for you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's okay. But that's the intent.
You want to make sure that it's clearly stated though. That
either party can ask for it ..•
MS. MODISETTE: That's right.
It was the suggestion of
Mr. Cook actually who is in the audience that we put in language
that made it very clear that this was not meant to favor either
custodial parent.

•

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. You had some questions you
wanted to raise. Ms. Modisett, I didn't mean to cut you off.
you want to ask something or respond to something? Okay.

Do

SENATOR HART: Justice King said that he thought
existing law was working well and that the system was functioning
smoothly.
I thought I heard Mr. Woodruff say that, in his
experience in dealing with judges, many judges were not that
familiar with Duke and when you had the short-term Duke request
that you often times had to do the work yourself and bring it to
the judge. And they were really unfamiliar.
I hear very
different things that are being said by an attorney who practices
here in Sacramento and what you were saying .••
JUSTICE KING:
The problem is a very complicated
procedure, especially because the attorneys have to protect their
clients on these tax consequences.
I doubt if you can count on
-
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one hand the number of judges in the state who understand these
tax consequences. But the attorneys are always critical. I
don't
there's anything wrong with that. And I think they
should be
ones
are advising the court as to what the
adverse effects or how to overcome adverse effects of what the
court might be ordering.
SENATOR HART: On the point of stating in the law what
are some of the things that judges ought to look at -- in trying
to give some education and guidance to the court -- the one
comment that I've heard is the reference to psychological affect
upon the child, is that accurate? I mean, it just seems common
sense to me that taking a look at what the psychological affects
on the child are going to be. They're going through the trauma
of divorce and, if they're forced out of that horne, they may be
forced out of the neighborhood, they may be forced out of the
school, they may be forced out of their friendships.
That's
something that ought to be taken into account.
I'm not interested in having a bevy of psychiatrists and
others overload the courts, but it seems to me to be a reasonable
requirement to have the court consider this.
JUSTICE KING: That's what the both the Duke and the
Stallworth cases require that the courts consider that. Now it
is true that the action that you took two years ago, I guess,
there is no statute that deals with a Duke order as such except
that statute which really tends to deal more with
to modify or how to change it or when to change it. And I
think if what you're suggesting is that there should be a statute
that talks about what the circumstances are at trial which the
court should consider-- I guess that's really what this bill is
-- in making such an order.
What I'm suggesting is that if you codify the holdings
of Duke, Horowitz and Stallworth and you can put the burdens of
proof on whichever party you want, that's kind of unimportant.
I must say the one real disagreement I had with Duke was
I don't think the judge should just tote up some figures in some
fashion and be mandated to decide something which doesn't fit for
these people. The concept is you look at the adverse impact on
child on one end, and the economic detriment on the other.
In this housing market, if we're going to have a
continued public policy-- which I guess is the next bill we'll
be discussing -- of frequent and continuing contact between
parents, in many instances the only way the parent who's out is
going to be able to have any kind of housing to provide that kind
of frequent and continuing contact is by taking the one asset
that exists and using that as a basis for obtaining other
housing.
In this society how many people can afford two homes.
You can't.
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SENATOR HART: Well we do have as one of the criteria,
in making these difficult choices, financial ability of each
parent to obtain suitable housing. You feel that .••
JUSTICE KING:

That's fine.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Senator Hart, let me ask a question
for my own edification. Do you have a response or perspective as
to the questions that have been raised as to the length of time
of deferral? You mentioned psychological effects on the child, I
mean, could it be throughout, again, the age of minority or is it
a period of time for transition? Do you have a perspective on
that? Or does the bill, as stated, in your perspective, clearly
articulate where you are at?
SENATOR HART:
I think the intent is that it is meant to
be discretionary. We don't say "to the age of 18 or until other
specific factors." We assume that the court is going to take
that into account •••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But you have no limit on -theoretically, it could be throughout the age of minority and I
guess ...
SENATOR HART:

Theoretically it could.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

So that's your intent, is that

correct?
SENATOR HART:

That's correct.

JUSTICE KING:
I should mention I really have no dispute
with the factors that you listed.
I mean I think they are all
appropriate to be considered and I think they fit within the
confines of those cases. My real concern is the emphasis that
places the children's interest above the economic circumstances
of the parents in a way that I see as being potentially very
destructive to the family in the future.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Any comments as it relates to the
length of time? The original sense that I had was that it was
transitional. Now I'm getting the sense that it may, in fact, be
more or less permanent. It could be, for example, 17 years if
the child is a year old at the time of the dissolution.
I have
some problems with that personally. But I don't want to
prejudice the panel in terms of •..
JUSTICE KING: One of the problems with that,
Assemblyman Harris, is that, in many of these cases as we talked
about earlier, there is a very difficult financial situation.
And for the one who is in the home, all of a sudden, you need a
new roof, the house needs to be painted. There is some kind of
maintenance that had been put off during the marriage because
they didn't have enough money to do it which now can't be put off
any longer -- a new hot water heater, a new furnace, a new what.
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And that's another one of the factors I think that often makes
these orders sort of short-term because when you make your
spousal and child support order, you're considering what those
housing costs are. You may wish you could consider what
maintenance costs would be but there is not enough money to do
that. So it makes it very difficult, except in the more affluent
cases, for people to stay in the homes very long and to be able
to actually maintain them in the condition that they were in
while the parties lived there.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Isenberg.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Dr. Kelly, can you go over again
what information is or is not available on the psychological
impact on the kids of removal from the home? You've started off
that way but we didn't spend much time on it.
I find it very
interesting.
DR. KELLY: Basically, there is almost no data available
about the longer term impact on children's adjustment with regard
to residence. There is a lot of data available in terms of the
quality of relationships that children have with parents and
other kinds of factors such as conflict, for example. But the
family home ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's reflected in the paper
that you gave in '87 at the Psychological Association.
DR. KELLY:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me just jump ahead for a
minute. Generally speaking, kids do better if there's less
conflict between their parents. Minimizing the areas in which
conflict can arise is obviously one wav to help promote that
goal.
I suppose your suggestion is if you have this never-ending
problem hanging out there of a house, you're likely to have
parental conflict about that, which will have some impact on the
kids.
Fair summary?
DR. KELLY:

Well, that's certainly a fair speculation.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: The other point from your earlier
works and also from this paper is the notion that to a certain
extent, it's the first year, the second year, maybe the third
year after the separation or the divorce that has both the
psychological impact and the big hit economically. Any just gut
instinct on your part as to whether that would be also true on
family homes? If there is an impact with the kids, is it likely
to be an immediate impact or not?
DR. KELLY: Well, it's true the children have many
things they have to adapt to at the point of separation -primarily being the departure of at least one parent from the
household. And changing residences is yet another transition.
On the other hand, there is evidence that some children welcome
-
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that change in transition, for example, because they are getting
away from the house that has been full of anger and conflict and
they don't like the house. Other children
' t want to leave
the house; they've been there five or 10 years. There is no firm
data that says it's bad, it's good.
It varies enormously from
family to family.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: From your perspective in
mediation -- and I guess, other than writing and commenting,
that's how you spend your professional career-- is the status
quo, the present law, regarding deferred house sale adequate
enough from your view point as a mediator, trying to be flexible
to do one thing one time, is it good or bad?
DR. KELLY:
I think the current status is good.
I would
agree with Justice King.
I would also agree with him that I
think that elevating the best interests of the children to the
top of this bill, which basically equates family residence with
the best interests of the children, is a mistake.
I think they
ought to be down where they are, further down, as one of the
considerations that people ought to take into account if they are
going to do a Duke order, for example.
The other thing that concerns me about the way this is
worded is whether there may be significant psychological
detriment to the child.
I think it does invite a lot of
litigation and all of it is speculative and that's one of the
problems with this. We're trying to project future damage based
on the current sale of residences and I think that's an
impossible task, as someone who also does forensic psychology.
members?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are there any other comments by
Yes, Mr. Woodruff.

MR. WOODRUFF: One of the concerns that I've had about
Duke is how to (inaudible) the guidelines.
I think it would be
easier to get a Duke order if there were some kind of an
adjustment to the child support or spousal support as the result
of foregoing the access to the capital that's invested in the
major asset of the family.
Some judges have suggested that you take the fair rental
value of the property, less the payment that's being made, and
divide that by two and reduce the child support by that amount.
Where you have stone guidelines that are being applied woodenly
by most judges, it really exacerbates the situation of the
out-spouse if the only major asset is tied up by a Duke order and
you have no access to that capital.
---If we had some input as to using the rental value or the
lost return on capital -- assume there's $50,000 and you take a
7% return and reduce the child support by that amount -- I think
Duke would be much more acceptable. We'd be able to work it in
and work out something whether by way of a note or something
else. But that is one issue on Duke that I don't think has been
addressed well and is currently not being handled.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Mr. Mcisaac.

Okay.

Senator Hart, do you

yes,

MR. MCISAAC: Yes, having heard the testimony of this
bill I would like to change my position. I now have a problem.
(laughter)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay, any other comments?

Yes, Dr.

Kelly.
DR. KELLY:
I want to say one other thing. That it is
not necessarily in the children's best interest to preserve the
family residence. That's particularly true where there are high
mortgages and where a disproportionate amount of net spendable
income goes into maintaining that house such that, for example,
parent and child or children have no money left over to do other
things that they might ordinarily do.
It depends very much on
the size of that mortgage and certainly some of these Duke orders
make more sense where we have long-term houses that have $300
mortgages. In 1990 this bill will probably be irrelevant.
(laughter)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Any other comments? Senator Hart, do
you have any closing comments? I think you heard the critique.
SENATOR HART:
I appreciate the input and will consider
these comments. I would just reiterate my initial point which is
that we are attempting to list points that the court ought to
take into account when it is making these decisions. We are not
obligating the courts to do anything and I think that some of the
implications of the comments that somehow this is a major
departure from existing law are erroneous.
But we'll certainly listen carefully to what's been said
and other points as well. But I hope people will keep that
comment in mind. That we are not attempting in this bill to make
a major departure from existing law and I don't think even
inadvertently that we've made a major departure. The issue of
intent language in the child versus the economic interests and I
11 certainly take a look at that.
It seems to me, I mean my bias is -- and having not
appeared in court, but having heard a lot of people comment -that oftentimes, it seems to me, that the economic interests
oftentimes are foremost in a lot of people's judgments. And all
we are trying to do is to have the court be sensitive to the fact
of the needs of the child and perhaps we have gone too far with
this ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: See, that also may presume though that
they are not currently doing that, Mr. Hart.
I think that one of
the questions we are raising is how far they go in terms of the
best interests of the child balancing other interests and other
perspectives.
I think we are trying to find a delicate balance
and I think that's something that is very difficult to do.
-
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So I
,
fully you all understand that, we are
tinkering. Whenever you're tinkering, you always have to be a
little concerned
whether or not you're going one way too far
or whether
've gone far enough. So you're sensitive to
that. I
we're
now
Mr.
Isenberg.

•

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Just an observation. I found
this discussion to be very, very interesting and informative. A
whole lot of things I had not talked with, but it's worth noting
that a whole lot of bill authors would sit through this
discussions and be bored or get angry. Senator Hart is one of
the few legislators I know who has cared enough to spend, God
knows how many, hours yelling at me and everybody else, and is
one of the few authors prepared to actually deal with objections
raised. And I think this will be extraordinarily helpful in the
ultimate debate on this bill.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I haven't had the experience of
having a few authors
1 at me about the
bills, Mr. Isenberg.
So you are a
perspective.
(In and out of committee)
But
at least ...
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:
(laughter)

I think we need a mediator here.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, absolutely, absolutely, or
referee, med
But at any rate, I think it's very
important and I
that as we debate this bill, both in terms
of any changes Senator Hart may decide are appropriate on either
one of these measures, that the Committee is also better informed
to respond to
Senator Hart will prepare and present to us,
because I think we all have limited perspectives.
Mr.
, I think, has the benefit along with Mr.
Connelly of
in the family law area and has much more
familiarity
perhaps than any of us on the Committee or
perhaps in the
slature at large. But this has been helpful
and I think, hopefully, Senator Hart and his staff, as well as
people from the
Equity Task Force, may want to take this
transcript as soon as
's available and look at it and analyze
it and perhaps be prepared to answer any of the questions that
have been rai
when the bill is heard in January. So I want to
thank you for all the comments we've had on these two bills.
All
, we're going to adjourn now for lunch and we
will reconvene at 1:15. And it will be my intent to have us out
of here by 3:00 despite the words in the agenda.
LUNCH BREAK
CHAI~~N HARRIS:
I thank everyone for coming back so
that we can start. We're a little bit late but obviously not as
late as we were this morning getting started. It is still my
intent to try to get through this issue in the next hour and
one-half. With everyone's cooperation we will achieve that goal.
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Senator Morgan, what I'd like to do is perhaps initially
give you a sense of the process. What we will do is have you
make some introductory comments about SB 1306. We will then ask
each of the panel members that we have assembled to make comment
about SB 1306 from their perspective in general terms. Then we
will engage in collective dialogue between the Committee, the
panel members and yourself and/or staff. So we can try to
basically give both the Committee and you, Senator Morgan, some
direction as it relates to any appropriate changes you may want
to make, or the Committee may want to make on this bill before it
is finally heard. Does that make sense to you? Is that process
acceptable?
SENATOR REBECCA MORGAN:

I understand it.

CHAI~~N HARRIS:
Okay, fine, Senator Morgan, then would
you open please on SB 1306.

SENATOR MORGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Member.
What we have on SB 1306, I believe, is not the very complex bill
that has been represented to be but rather a fairly simple bill.
It is directed to just ensure that the child's best interest is
the primary standard to be used in the award of custody in
California. Now I understand the process here, Mr. Chairman, but
I need to share with you that I could have had at least half a
dozen judges here that are in support of my bill that would have
loved to have testified.
I am going to be quoting from them
because in the one-day notice that we were given, we were not
able to get them to Sacramento.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me, I want to tell you that
that was the only purpose if you wanted to have one or two people
that could explain the bill. This is not a pro and con type
hearing. You have the ability the present witnesses when the
bill is heard in January.
We tried to bring some people who are objective experts
to come and talk about the bill in an even-handed analytical way,
as opposed to people who are advocating for or against the bill.
So you understand, we are not looking for advocates and opponents
to the bill.
So I don't want you to be offended by the fact that
you didn't have notice. We just wanted to make sure that there
was someone, one or two people in particular, that you thought
could give us a clear perspective from your standpoint as to the
content ..•
SENATOR MORGAN:
I would like that opportunity, and in
fact, Adryenn Cantor from Family Law in San Francisco and Sarah
McCarthy from the Senate Office of Research •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That's fine.

SENATOR MORGAN:
..• are here to describe their
understanding of the bill and what we're trying to do.
I have
over a couple of dozen people that are on the list that were
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unaware of the
present law •••

and their opportunity to be here.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why is that now?
an opportuni
to
?
SENATOR MORGAN:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

In the

Why didn't they have

Pardon.
I don't understand.

SENATOR MORGAN: Because it was my understanding that
only your panel was to discuss today.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's right. It was indicated you
only wanted one or two people to help ••. this is for the purpose
of the Legislature, you and the membership. Anybody that wants
to testify, we can
to schedule that in January. This is for
the purpose of trying to give you some direction and the
Committee some direction as to the policy implications of the
bill. All of us are free to take or disregard what we hear
today. I just want you to understand, the purpose for this
hearing is not s
to have witnesses parade in front of us,
pro or con.
SENATOR MORGAN: I understand. And Mr. Chairman, I hope
that I will feel when I finish this hearing, this discussion here
today, that we have heard both the pros and the cons of the bill,
and that what we have here is not a staged opposition to what I'm
trying to do.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I hope that what you ..• Let me
reiterate -- this hearing is for the purpose of trying to
elucidate to the Committee the issues that we are facing in this
bill and, again you should not feel bound by anything you hear
today. It is
to you to present your bill in a final form or
fashion as you see appropriate and you will have the opportunity
to bring proponents before us to consider those viewpoints. We
wanted to give you the ability to hear from the Committee, as
well as from some experts who, in fact, we have sought out to
come and give us their perspectives. So I don't want you to
think this is
al, because it is not.
SENATOR MORGAN: I will proceed. As I understand the
present law, the
ld's best interest is defined "frequent and
continuing contact" with both parents and that's created the
implied presumption for joint custody dating back to about 1982
when the law changed. In SB 1306, we're trying to clarify the
present law so that joint and sole custody would be considered on
an equal basis by the court.
And to quote Judge Harlan Veal, the Presiding Judge of
San Mateo County,
says:
"The presumption as it presently
exists in Civil Code Section 4600.5, that joint custody is in the
best interests of a minor child, is not in fact in the best
interests of the minor child. The proposed amendments to SB 1306
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appear to me to be more properly put the best interests of the
child above the conflicting selfish interests of the parents. I
believe the amendments would also tend to noticeably reduce the
numbers of instructional modification hearings presently
consuming so much judicial time and effort." And the Judge urges
adoption of the bill as we have amended it and it has been
amended since we first introduced it.
I would like to just share with you an example of a
problem that has occurred as a result of the presumption of joint
custody in my own district with one of my constituents.
This is a woman who moved to San Mateo County a few
months ago from Ventura County. The boy's custody agreement
called for him to spend one week with his father and three weeks
with his mother. After being in San Mateo County for a few
months, he was ready to enter first grade. His father insisted
that the boy still spend one week out of every four with him in
Ventura County. They went back before the courts and the
original ruling was upheld.
So what we have is a six-year old
spending three weeks a month in first grade in San Mateo County,
and one week a month in Ventura County.
Now I ask you is that in the child's best interest?
It's that kind of ludicrous situation that we're trying to
address because, despite the best testimony of school
authorities, the judge upheld the original custody decision. And
what we are hearing over and over is, the judges are presuming
that the Legislature in '82 said that joint custody was best for
the child and making their rulings accordingly.
Last July, I met with all of the family law judges from
Santa Clara County, four of them, and what you have on page 4 and
5 in the bill is a result of that meeting.
Some amendments that
they proposed as a result of their experience and they are now,
and you have in your packet which we shared with you, a letter
from Supervising Judge Stewart, Supervising Judge-Designate
Fogel, Judge Eliam and Family Commissioner Kittel giving their
enthusiastic support for the adoption of the bill as amended in
your version of August 17th.
The new amendments, we believe, strengthen the original
intent of the bill to treat both joint and sole custody on an
equal basis. The factors which are previously considered for
"joint custody only" would be considered for "any" custody award.
The factors would include the ability of the parents to
cooperate; the ability of each parent to encourage the child's
love and contact with the other parent; the geographical
proximity of the parents; a history of child abuse; spousal
support or parental kidnapping: the age and maturity of the
child.
The judges also added another factor for consideration
in custody awards and I'll quote that:
"As to the extent to
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which the conduct of each parent has promoted or frustrated the
policy of the law to encourage cooperation in the resolution of
child custody matters insofar as the conduct has affected or may
affect the best interests of the child." The judges that I have
worked with on this bill feel that this factor would inhibit
either parent from creating an adversarial situation in order to
gain custody.
As Judge McConnell, who chaired the Task Force that was
the source of this bill, would have been happy to testify also.
It was sponsored, in fact, by her Task Force on Family Equity.
It is endorsed by the Family Law Section of the California Bar
Association; the Association of Parents without Partners and is
co-authored by 10 bipartisan legislators. And with me today, as
I said, is Adryenn Cantor from the State Bar Association who was
able to join us from San Francisco and Sarah McCarthy from the
Senate Office of Research, whom I hope will have an opportunity
to enter into the dialogue as we proceed. Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, why don't we hear from your
witnesses now so if they have anything they would like to add, if
they feel it's appropriate in addition to what you've stated,
we'd have that as an introductory remark.
MS. ADRYENN CANTOR: Thank you very much.
I'd like to
thank the members of the Committee for allowing us to come today
and tell the Executive Committee's position on this bill. The
Executive Committee has chosen to support this bill, with just
the elimination that there be no presumption that a child younger
than three years of age, that there should be a joint custody, I
mean a sole custody arrangement.
The Executive Committee, as you know, is made up with
lawyers throughout the state who are in the trenches and the
custody arrangements ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Executive Committee of what,

please?
MS. CANTOR:

State Bar.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Okay, thank you.

MS. CANTOR: Yes, Family Law Section, and I'm the
Legislative Coordinator. And it was our opinion that there is
definitely an ambiguity, if not a misconception, in the law that
is today. Too often, sometimes attorneys, sometimes judges,
often mediators in the Family Court Services program, believe
that there is a presumption for joint custody. The law does not
stand for this and we think that this needs to be clarified.
It was interesting for us to note that the Family Court
Services personnel, and I'll let him speak for himself, felt that
he did not want the deletion of the continuing and frequent
contact language. A possible solution to this might be to
-
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specify that there is no preference, either for sole custody or
for joint custody, and that of course there should be continuing
and frequent contact no matter what the arrangements might be.
That might satisfy those particular people.
We felt this was a sane approach to -- an irrational
approach to a very irrational subject and I think it's important
for the Committee to know that the population we deal with are
the very people that have to come to the court for assistance for
custody arrangements.
Many people have joint custody and do not come before
the court. Those that must come before the court and seek a
joint custody arrangement, the court needs to have guidance in
order to determine whether in fact this would be a good
arrangement for the parties in these particular cases and it's
really a case-by-case determination.
Therefore, we are in full support of what we consider a
very logical resolution to an ambiguous law.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, Mr. Isenberg.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me just ask the State Bar or
Senator Morgan, we will be hearing ••• Dr. Kelly's here now. Do
you have any evidence in terms of studies or reports to indicate
that there are detrimental affects, statistically, to significant
proportions of children who are subject to joint custody awards?
And if so, maybe you will describe those briefly for us.
SENATOR MORGAN:
I'd like to ask Sarah McCarthy to
answer on my behalf, please.
MS. SARAH MCCARTHY: Sarah McCarthy, from the Senate
Office of Research.
Senator Morgan asked me to be here today to
provide just that type of assistance. There has been very little
research done on joint custody that has failed and where it does
not work out. Most of the research has been done on highly
motivated couples who chose joint custody. They were usually
upper middle class professional couples who really wanted it to
work and in most cases, that I have been able to find in the
literature, that tends to work out quite well.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: But people who voluntarily enter
into joint custody usually work it out and it's okay, right?
MS. MCCARTHY: Yes, from my reading of the research,
that appears to work out. One study by Susan Steinman, of 67
children between the years of '81 and '84 -- again, most of these
studies are nonrandom samples that are very small so it's hard
to extrapolate to the general population -- but she did find
that, in direct contrast to families where joint custody was
selected, "in families where joint custody was court ordered or
the parents were influenced into a joint physical or joint legal
custody arrangement, they did not create a family structure to
-
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support or nurture the children. In these cases the joint
custody family was disfunctional."
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

How many cases were these •••

MS. MCCARTHY: The total study was on 67 children.
doesn't say how many •..
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
MS. MCCARTHY:

She

And of the 67 •••

••. fell in this particular .••

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So we don't know how many from
this study were in court ordered as opposed to voluntarily
entered into joint custody.
MS. MCCARTHY: I could probably flip through this real
quick. Actually, she doesn't say that. She divides them into
three groups: the successful families where both parents agreed;
the stress families, those who agreed to joint custody in
mediation; and the failed families, those that even after
mediation the parents were extremely and chronically distressed
and dissatisfied with joint custody and, generally, they were
very hostile towards each other and could not share their child
rearing responsibilities without bitter and overt conflict.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay. But these are .• just so I
can understand, these were, all 67 were in fact families in which
joint custody was a court ordered or an agreement of the parties?
MS. MCCARTHY: Or agreement of the parties, right.
These were all joint custody families.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So joint physical custody existed
in each of the 67 cases. In that study do you recall how many
were, according to the author's opinion, not satisfactory out of
the 67? If you recall.
MS. MCCARTHY: Let's see, I don't believe that this
divides it, let's see. It does say that approximately 24% of the
sample the authors considered the children to be seriously at
risk of major emotional disturbance. I'm not sure that ••.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Because of joint custody?

MS. MCCARTHY: That exactly translates into ••• well, it
appears so. I don't know the exact answer to your question as to
how many of the 67 were in court-imposed custody.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
so I can jot it down?

Who is the author of that again,

MS. MCCARTHY: Susan Steinman. She has done previous
research in this area and has published in this area and
concludes, as do most of the serious authors in law review
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articles and other research journals conclude, that the research
on joint custody voluntarily chosen tends to be very positive.
But where it is court-imposed, we just don't know enough and
there is some evidence that it has negative effects because there
is continual bickering.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Would it be more likely in those
three categories that the negative results would be in, what do
they call it, the dysfunctional or the distressed, the failed
family? Is that likely from the study?
MS. MCCARTHY:

Yes, that's the implication of the study.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: All right. So if they are screwed
up and they are fighting and arguing during their family
environment, nothing is likely to change. But there is a
mid-range of people where we don't have evidence yet to reach the
conclusion on whether it helps or hurts.
MS. MCCARTHY:
I would say that this study would support
that. And so, therefore, the thrust of the bill to clarify that
there should be no legal presumption in favor of one form of
custody or another, I believe, is supported by the research which
just is not strong enough to say at this point that one type of
custody is better for all families than another.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
Is that the basic research
document you're using to support that conclusion? I assume there
are some others ••.
MS. MCCARTHY:
of it?

No, I've got a lot of different ..•

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
Okay.
MS. MCCARTHY:

Okay, but that's representative

Yes, representative.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Are there any parts of that or
other studies which reflect upon the situation that existed prior
to the adoption of joint custody in California, as to whether or
not there existed a de facto bias against joint custody
arrangements.
I'll just tell you from my personal experience
practicing law, until there was a statute around that said the
magic words "joint custody", it was real hard to convince judges
to consider it.
I know my personal experience is not valid, but
are there any studies that would indicate that the prior law had
a de facto bias against joint custody?
MS. MCCARTHY:
I haven't read any studies to that
effect.
I think that you're perception of what the practitioners
believe is correct.
ASSEMBLY~~N

ISENBERG:

Okay, thank you Mr. Chairman.
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MS. MCCARTHY: The only other two points I'm going to
mention is there are a couple of points, on which you often read
in literature by joint custody advocates, that joint custody is
superior to sole custody because of lower relitigation rates and
because of higher rates of payment of child support. And I would
just like to say that there is some reason to question both of
those assumptions.
One, the research I've read indicates that relitigation
rates are definitely lower, again, when joint custody is chosen.
But that when joint custody is court-imposed, the relitigation
rates are just about equal to sole litigation cases.
And, also, where joint custody is chosen by both
parents, there is definitely a tendency for better payment of
child support but, again, we don't have enough information to
know when joint custody is imposed, whether or not that will be
true also.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I'm sorry, just basic facts •••

Mr. Isenberg.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Of the total number of 140,000
filings a year in California, do you know how many court orders
result in joint custody awards?
MS. MCCARTHY:

I don't.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

It varies greatly by county.
Does anybody •••

SENATOR MORGAN:
It's our understanding from talking
with judges, and I can't statistically validate that, but in
Santa Clara County, 95% are now joint custody because they
have •.•
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
joint "physical" custody?
SENATOR MORGAN:

You mean joint "legal" custody or

Some kind of joint custody.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: There's a giant distinction in
the law. Joint "physical" custody means there's a sharing of
time between the parents more than just a normal visitation every
other weekend. And so we have to be very careful when we discuss
this. Do you know, Senator, on Santa Clara, in terms of joint
physical custody?
SENATOR MORGAN:
custody .••

That's what the judges ••• joint "legal"

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I don't want to interrupt Senator
Morgan's presentation, but just on the factual question, Mr.
Mcisaac said he did a study. I'd just like to try out the
numbers.
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MR. MciSAAC: It's about 60% in L.A. County are some
form of joint custody which would include joint legal custody.
Joint physical custody is less than 9%, around 9%. That's of the
60%. About 38% are sole custody. When it's contested, in that
same study, 17 were sole custody to the mother, one was a joint
legal and physical custody. Very few cases are going to trial at
this point. Most of them are resolved in mediation. Trials are
very rare. At least in L.A. County, very rarely does a judge
order joint custody.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay, so what we've got is, in
L.A. at least, 9% are joint physical custody.
SENATOR MORGAN:

Nine of the 60%.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Nine of the 60% or nine of the

total?
MR. MciSAAC:

Nine of the total.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Nine of the total. Nine percent
of all the domestic cases that reach a judgment in L.A. County
over the study period involved joint physical. Of that
proportion, how many of the 9% were voluntary as opposed to, if
you studied it, involuntary?
MR. MciSAAC:
I don't know. I can't answer that right
now. I don't have the data with me but I could check that out
and get it to you.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
I'd like that. It seems to me
it's relatively important to try to figure out how extensive the
problem is to try to pin that down and, Mr. Chairman, would you
mind if our staff would, if your staff, would pursue that to try
to get ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
this together.

Our staff, Mr. Isenberg.

We're all in

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: You always defer to Chairs .•• to
try to get the study and try to nail that figure down. Also,
does anybody else, Mr. Chairman, know just the answer to the
factual question?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I understand that.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Not the conclusions, if anybody
else has a different figure that's radically different.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Why don't we proceed now
with the panel members. Judge Murphy, if you'd like to lead off?
JUDGE MURPHY: Well, I listened to Senator Morgan's
comment about the judge who made an order granting custody of one
child to a parent for three weeks and then to another parent for
-
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one week while the child was in school and that the child had to
move to different counties. And I think that everyone would
concur and agree that that judge made a ridiculous order. And I
would suspect that if this legislation goes through, that there
will be judges that will interpret this legislation and make just
as ridiculous orders.
But I think that the first thing we need to do is
define, we have to read the statute. And the statute no where
says there's a presumption of joint custody.
I have the statute
here and it says custody should be awarded in the following order
of preference, according to the best interests of the children:
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 or to
either parent. There is absolutely no presumption anywhere in
this statute of joint custody.
I don't think that the
legislation that Senator Morgan is ••• (interruption) .•• I think
that the legislation that she is suggesting is fine.
But how is
it going to be interpreted if there are people that are saying
today that reading this means that there is a presumption of
joint custody and it doesn't say that.
I mean, there's no way that anyone can interpret these
words to say that there's a presumption of joint custody. But if
there are people that say that this is a presumption of joint
custody and we're changing this law to something else, are we not
then saying that joint custody is no good?
I have no feeling one way or the other about joint
custody.
But let me say also that I suspect that each and every
one of us here has a different opinion of what joint custody is
and I make orders of joint custody saying that the parties will
have joint legal and physical custody. The mother will have them
at all times other than alternate weekends and two weeks in the
summer.
I will then make an order saying there will be joint
legal custody with sole physical custody to the mother and the
father will have visitation on alternate weekends and two weeks
in the summer, or I'll make an order of sole legal and sole
physical custody with mother to have the kids and dad to have the
kids on alternate weekends and two weeks in the summer.
It's
exactly the same thing.
What is joint physical custody? Does that mean one week
on and one week off? It's not defined. Again, it's this
nebulous term that we have here. Joint physical custody says
that the parents shall have significant times of physical
custody. What does that mean? That means whatever any judge
thinks it means. We don't have a definition out of a court ••.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Isenberg.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
In Dr. Kelly's speech to the
Psychological Association which I was reading, she indicates that
at least arbitrarily much of the research has defined joint
physical custody as where a child is spending at least 35% of the
time with one of the parents and the remainder of the time with
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the other. Without arguing that 35% is a magic number-- it's
kind of like 40% on temporary spousal support orders -- would
that, in your experience and judgment, at least be different
enough from conventional sole custody with visitation orders as
to constitute a difference in-kind? Would that be in-kind ..•
JUDGE MURPHY: There are many, many orders like that
that are called sole physical custody orders. Because •••
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Really?

JUDGE MURPHY: Because Dad will have them during the
summer and alternate weekends or something like that, you are at
35%.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, okay. In your experience
in adjudicating these issues --clearly you don't feel there's a
mandate on joint custody -- but presumptively I guess you've seen
cases where the parents agree and have what they call a joint
physical sharing, a physical custody arrangement. Have you
personally ever imposed a joint physical custody arrangement
where one of the parents or both objected?
JUDGE MURPHY:

No.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
SENATOR MORGAN:
or one by one?

No.

Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, can I respond at the end

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. I'd rather if you can hold. If
you have something you've got to get out •.• we don't want you to,
you know, suffer in pain.
SENATOR MORGAN:
I just wanted to read the first
paragraph of the code as it presently stands because that's
usually where the Legislature puts their intent ..•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why don't you defer on that then.
We'll give you a chance to respond. It's probably easier to
respond collectively. If you just want to take notes on what
they say unless it's something you think is so out of line that
it demands an immediate response or we're going to get confused.
I'm not confused at this point. Judge, anything else? Okay.
Why don't we move forward then? Mr. Woodruff.
MR. WOODRUFF: When the legislation was passed
mentioning joint custody, in Sacramento it was basically taken as
a mandate and embraced by the courts and family court services as
something that was a radical change in the law.
And, joint custody orders have become virtually, in
every case in which the issue is mediated or in which some issue
is raised, it winds up being a joint legal and physical custody
order by its words and the amount of time is something that is
litigated or decided.
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But the terms are imposed by indications through Family
Court Services that if you do not agree then you are not willing
to share, and if you are not willing to share the child with the
other parent, then you should be looked at negatively with regard
to custody. And because of that we have a great number of
agreements on joint legal and physical custody which are, to some
degree, under the hammer.
I am shocked, frankly, that it works.
It has.
I
opposed many joint custody orders over the years and when it
first came in and I've been astounded that as many fathers as
have actually become active parents. And I think this is a
change that if this is passed, it will be seen as a swing to the
other end of the pendulum.
We are starting to get away from the "all joint" custody
and back toward the middle of the pendulum. And if we have
something that's this much of a change in all the words of the
statute I'm concerned that it will be perceived, not for its
words -- the same as the prior statute was not -- but for its
intent of cutting down on the amount of joint custody.
I think we need a little bit more time so that we can
have some empirical data. We do not have children who were born
during the time that the joint custody was first set into law.
They're not grown up yet. And we haven't really had enough time
to do any type of a longitudinal study and I'm concerned about
that.
With regard to the specifics of the statute, I'm
concerned about the amount of litigation that I think will occur
with the addition of several of the statements in here. The
words "spousal abuse" will cause a great deal of litigation.
Having that as a consideration in child custody will create a
great deal of difficulty. We will wind up back with the "fault"
divorce and we will wind up having a great deal of difficulty in
that.
I think the geographical proximity raises an issue since
it's in the statute. Will people understand that to mean that if
they move away they can avoid joint legal custody? I don't know.
And the statute doesn't say.
The past ability to cooperate. Parties can effect that
simply by creating, if they know that that is a way to avoid
joint custody, they will simply disagree for three years and
create that history.
I think it is important that we spend more
time in finding out how the joint custody is going to work under
the present law.
I don't specifically object.
I think if this had been
the law that passed originally, it would have been fine and we
would have done well with it, and I think that some of the
initial reactions to having joint legal custody in more cases
than we needed. At least it created some data for us to look at.
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But now I think before we change the direction that we're going
down the road, we need to study where we are and the data just
isn't in.
I'm surprised that even in cases where there's been a
forced joint legal custody and physical custody and increased
parenting time far beyond what was normally given prior to the
joint custody law, that those have worked relatively well too.
And I don't really know why but I think that it has worked and,
again, I'm surprised but I think that is where we are.
I can see
a great deal of effort and I would not specifically disagree with
any of the specific statements in the statute. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Ms. Richmond.

MS. RICHMOND: This is an area in which I really want to
try to take a long view. We suffer from things that Mr. Woodruff
has already observed and that is a short period of time in which
to evaluate an important new development in child custody.
A second arena is the whole terminology for this field.
Someday, not today, and I'm not the first to make this
observation, we're going to call postjudgment parenting by
something other than custody, which has some very onerous
overtones to the very designation. That is part of the whole
problem in child custody awards right now.
Somebody is rewarded
by gaining rights over the child.
Somebody loses.
Somebody is
relegated to the posture of visiting with a child that he or she,
up until the time of the divorce, had much contact with and
certainly a lot of authority over.
A hundred years ago if a marriage fell apart, if I have
my history correct, it would be the father who would
automatically gain ownership rights over the child. That
switched altogether sometime later so that the mother
automatically had those rights. By the time I started practicing
law about 15 years ago, we had a "tender years" doctrine but in
practical effect the mother always got custody even if the child
wasn't of tender years.
I do remember, and it wasn't that many years ago, when I
first went to court with an uncontested case where the parents
had agreed on a joint parenting -- joint custody schedule. And
the trial court would not permit us to go forward with that
agreement. The trial judge thought it was an egregious way to
grant custody of the children and ordered an investigation by the
Office of Family Court Services, who fortunately took one look at
the situation and said this was fine.
The parents had agreed
upon a sensible thing here.
When our current statute came into effect, even though
it does not grant any statutory preference for joint custody, it
contains enough language in there referring to joint custody that
it gave it a statutory legitimacy that it didn't have before.
And as a result of that, more parents have been encouraged to
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enter into joint parenting agreements.
I think that has been
much to the good. I'm not suggesting that every family should
have a joint custody award and I don't think every family ends up
with one.
I think we have seen an era of far more involved
fathers.
I think we have seen an era in which more fathers have
become active and interested and actually carrying through on
this frequent and continuing contact with their children and that
the existing statute enables that.
The wording of the proposed statute is really innocuous
but the perception of its enactment at this point in time and
eliminating all the verbiage about joint custody or much of it
about joint custody, I think would be perceived as an indictment
of joint custody. And I think that would be a grave error when
we are still in an era of expanding it and trying to determine
what comes of it for families who have done this.
I might add also that with respect to subparagraph 5,
the extent to which the conduct of each parent has promoted or
frustrated the policy of law to encourage cooperation in the
resolution of child custody matters, I agree with Tom Woodruff.
That it's within the power of one of the parents to kibosh j
custody by utilizing this and there are many judges who believe
that you can't have joint custody if the parents are not in
concert with one another.
I happened to have seen a number of different
lies
where both parents were highly competent, highly involved and
they did what was known as "parallel parenting." They couldn't
agree with one another on very much, but independently they each
maintained joint custody with their children, with the children
understanding the different rules obtained in different
households.
I have seen a few orders of joint custody being imposed
by court order rather than by agreement of the parties. I don't
think that families there have been any better or worse off than
when the court, after a contested bitter custody trial, has made
a sole custody award to one parent or the other. It's an
injurious situation. It's much better solved by agreement and
the vast majority of these cases are resolved by mediation and
agreement.
There are two other factors about the legislation that I
do want to point out.
I do think it's constructive that it
incorporates factors to look at for children under three.
I
think those are highly appropriate from what I've learned about
child development issues and it would be a favorable thing to
have that incorporated into the legislation. And the factor with
regard to either child abuse or spousal abuse, I do think that's
a relevant factor for consideration and I would favor the
inclusion of that.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, thank you very much. Okay.
Next I'd like to ask Dr. Kelly, if you'd like to comment please.
DR. KELLY: Thank you.
I would like basically to
elaborate on
major points. First of all, I think all of
you have a copy of an invited address which I gave the American
Psychological Association which does summarize the major reliable
research that uses comparison groups, objective standardized
measures, and so on, that is going to be published in the near
future.
To summarize what is in that paper, most of the studies
on children divorced today have been on children in sole custody
arrangement, with additional visiting to the father which has
traditionally been about every other weekend or four days out of
30.
Children in sole custody arrangements, when compared to
children in intact families, are not doing well. They are having
both academic as well as social and social competence problems,
and this is particularly true with boys. Within this, and for
children, there's a very consistent finding which is that for the
majority of children, the major drawback, downside, negative
aspect of divorce is the diminished contact with the father. And
that's been consistently documented in a number of studies.
Within this research, as you look at what are the
variables that are associated with better adjustment in children
in post-divorce, we are talking longer term adjustment issues,
which we must. All of us know and agree that the initial
reaction to divorce is a difficult one for children, a troubled
time of transition, but that most children, the majority of
children in the long haul
become well-adjusted.
Within the research what we're finding is that the
greater and more reliable the role of father in sole custody
mother custody -- homes, then the better adjusted the children
are, and again it's particularly true for boys.
There have been very few limited joint custody studies.
It is true that, for the most part, these studies have been
focused on parents who have agreed to joint custody rather than
having it imposed by the court.
In these limited studies that we
have -- again utilizing comparison groups, which is really
critical, we have to say compared to what
all this research in
order to begin to make conclusions -- we are finding that the
boys that have been studied in these joint custody studies are
better adjusted psychologically on a number of different
standardized measures and have higher self-esteem compared to
boys in sole custody homes.
Why do I review all this? I think it's relevant,
because the evidence has grown in the last 10 years that children
in sole custodial arrangements are not doing particularly well.
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And, but that the greater the contact the child has with both
parents and particularly the father, and particularly for boys,
the children are either better adjusted or indistinguishable from
well-adjusted intact family children.
Now, I think that the California law, since 1980,
despite its bumps and problems, has allowed fathers who wanted to
be involved in their children's lives to continue in their role
of parenting after divorce. And prior to the joint custody
legislation of 1980, it was almost impossible for fathers to have
anything other than the limited prescribed visitation role that
children have with fathers in sole custody arrangements.
I believe that public policy in this regard has been
enlightened and that it has made a difference in the State of
California and that it has been in the children's best interest
because the statute really created a climate for change and
alerted both lawyers and parents and judges to the reality and
the consciousness that children of two parents need to continue
to be children of two parents after divorce. That's what
children say they want and that's what they've been allowed to
have through this statute.
Beyond that .••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me one second. The consultant
informed me there's a camera present that I've allowed. If
anyone has any objection to it, then I'll ask him to leave.
So
don't be ashamed if you want to object to it. I'll be the bad
guy, but .•. anybody care? All right. Go ahead. We're really
going to put you up on a wanted poster.
It won't be anything
more.
DR. KELLY: Okay.
I want then to move on to another
area and at least share some data with you about the normative
divorcing family. One of the issues I think that is an important
one that we lose sight of is that public policy should be for all
divorcing famil s, not just for the failures of the system.
I
would quite agree with Judge Murphy that that particular decision
is, I can use lots of words to describe that judicial decision,
certainly "inappropriate" would be, you know, a safe word.
But to change laws on the basis of either poor training,
poor judgment or the failures of the system, as opposed to the
needs of the greater numbers of divorcing families is something I
think we have to seriously look at.
I believe public policy
should be for everyone. And, again, statutes set precedent.
Statutes tell not just those who come to court, but also create a
climate in the State for what shall be, the usual way that
parents behave during and after divorce. And if we gear our
statutes just to the failures of the system, the 10-15% which
continue to litigate, I believe that we do a disservice to
families that are capable of much better than that.
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I would like to just share a little bit of data with you
from a large study that I'm doing of 435 men and women that we're
following over five points in time. It's a longitudinal study.
We've run out of funds ••. if anybody knows of any funds so I can
do the follow-up research, I'd appreciate
The reason I want
to share some of this data is that I believe that's there certain
stereotypes that we have in our society about the divorcing
family and myths associated with those stereotypes that lead then
us to, or society to, be against joint custody or to attack joint
custody.
One of them has to do with the myth that if marriages
breakdown then they are by definition bad parents, are unable to
cooperate, etc. And I'd just like to show you some slides, if I
may?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. So you can see it, why don't we,
sergeant, turn the lights down? All right. Well, let's see. Be
prepared to turn the lights down just in case. Okay. Why don't
you turn down the lights in this part of the room and then I
think that'll be •.. Okay. All right, that's fine.
DR. KELLY: The point I want to make with
s slide .•.
oh great, okay. Thank you. The point that I want to make with
this slide is that in the 1980's, at least, as contrast to the
past ... there are many different clusters of marital factors that
are leading to divorce. Not all marriages involve high conflict
and certainly not all marriages involve high conflict around
their children.
The most common reason in the 1980's at least in
Northern California, and I have no reason to expect Southern
California as any different, is that people are divorcing for
what they themselves are describing as, for example, a factor
that has to do with their emotional needs are not being met by
their spouses. A gradual growing apart in the relationship and
at some point in the relationship, someone decides to divorce.
By the way, divorces are being sought at a ratio of
about three to one by women as opposed to by men. Far more
divorces are initiated by women in our society. And this is true
in the number of different studies across the country. The point
I want to make here is these factors leading to divorce are not
associated with high conflict around children. This factor is
not associated with high conflict or poor cooperation around
children. This one is, this one is, etc.
(pointing to chart)
I
just wanted to show this as an example that we have many
different kinds of marriages ending in divorce.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Remember this is going to be
transcribed. So maybe you could read those into the record.
We'll have a copy we can obviously print.
Dr. KELLY: Well, I can. I don't know that it is all
that critical in terms of going through each one because I know I
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have a limited amount of time and a few other things I want to
show but what I want to show here •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You can submit the written transcript
for our records then can't you?
DR. KELLY:

I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You can submit this, a photocopy of
this for our records. Okay, that's fine.
DR. KELLY: Yes, certainly. The point that I wanted to
make is that in at least half of the marriages ending in divorce
today where people have children, there is not high conflict
around their children nor is there a lack of cooperation.
When you ask people, men and women both, to rate the
amount of marital conflict during the last two years prior to
their divorce, one thing I want to point out is (if you noticed
in the "often always" category, up here) more than half the men
and women are talking about high conflict in their marriages.
If you then ask them a comparable question about how
much conflict around their children, you will see down here in
the bottom that significantly fewer men and women report
child-specific conflict, as opposed to marital conflict. Parents
themselves seem to be able to separate out their marital
conflicts from their child- related conflict and see those as
different aspects of their relationship.
Similarly, parents themselves say that they can
cooperate significantly better about their children, as opposed
to other aspects of marital communication of which we measured
six other aspects, like their relationship, their sexual
relationship, their relationship with friends, etc., other
aspects. They do better around their children than they do with
regard to their adult marital relationship.
This next slide shows the ratings of a level of
cooperation between spouses at the time of separation which is
"time 1" and again at "time 3" which is at final divorce. And,
as you will see here at "time 3 final divorce" 61% of the men and
women who are parents are saying that they are actually
cooperating pretty well around their children. And I think
that's fairly remarkable given that they have just come through
and completed their divorce process.
I do have measures I'm
collecting on one and two years post-divorce so I'll be able to
compare that to this.
The point being that we're dealing here with small
numbers of parents, anywhere from, depending on which slides you
look at, 12 to 20 or 24%, who are not able to cooperate around
their children or who have poor communication around their
children.
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When you ask parents to tell us how well they think
they're going to be cooperating about their children, when you
ask them at "time 1" when they separate, how well they'll
cooperate, 67% or 2/3 of them believe they are going to cooperate
reasonably or very well after divorce. And, in fact, when you
ask them again at "time 3" when they are divorced, you are still
finding that about 2/3rds of the population are reporting good
cooperation around their kids and another 14% pretty good
cooperation. Again, around 18%, 15-20%, who are having trouble.
I won't go on except one piece of data relative to an
earlier discussion about what are people actually doing.
In the
study we have, 85% of men and women have joint legal custody at
final divorce, an additional 50% have the language of joint
physical custody in their decrees. Now having the language of
joint physical custody in your decree is different than how much
time in fact you may spend with your children. Some of these men
and women are truly sharing their children's time and others,
anywhere from traditional weekend visitation and through expanded
contacts up to more like shared parenting.
When we looked at what people were doing at final
divorce, we find here that 12% of the fathers have very minimal
or no contact with their children. Another 29% are what I would
call "weekend" or "just once monthly" dads. Nineteen percent
have expanded contacts meaning that they're seeing their children
anywhere from 20-30% of the time, which usually means every other
weekend plus an overnight. For example, every week or a weekend
extended to Monday morning, so that they have more overnights
than traditional every other weekend fathers do.
About 27% are actually sharing parenting in that 35-50%
range that research has pretty much defined as shared physical
custody and then another 13% here with primarily father custody.
Eleanor McAbee in Santa Clara County, has a huge study -- in a
large study in Santa Clara County, 1,100 families had 1,900
children. This is the biggest study in the United States at this
point. She has found that of those who had agreed to custody
issues three months after divorce petition was filed ••.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

What's the year of that study?

DR. KELLY: This study is actually in press.
It's being
conducted right now. Three-quarters of the families had agreed
on joint legal custody. An additional 20% had agreed to joint
residential custody and 40% mother residential custody but with
joint legal custody. And she's finding the greatest percentage
of sharing among children range from ages of two to seven and
that there are, amongst these families, much more sharing of boys
in terms of physical custody arrangements than of girls. What
she found is that father residential custody is not increasing if
you look at previous decrees in 1979, but that joint residential
custody ...
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me.
closer .•. is that mike working? Okay.

You want to hold the mike

, a summary I think of various studies
that are ongoing
now, many of which have not yet been
published, are that there certainly is an increase in the number
of parents who are electing post-divorce to be involved in child
custody arrangements that do maintain the involvement of both
parents. This probably is more true of children between the ages
of three and 10, as opposed to younger children and adolescents,
most of whom nobody wants and the kids don't want to be at
anybody's houses.
And furthermore, that we're finding in our current study
that 68% of the men at final divorce or "time 3" are satisfied
with their current visiting or shared parenting arrangement,
whatever it is; and 52% of the women are satisfied, with an
additional 17% of the women sort of in-between, neither
dissatisfied nor satisfied, just sort of right in the middle. So
I think we're finding that the law has made a difference and it
created the climate for children to be able to continue to be
involved with their fathers.
I think if we're concerned about the failures of the
system, I think we should deal specifically with the failures of
the system, that is those parents who come to court repeatedly to
litigate, rather than changing the bill drastically, to sort of
gut the intent of joint custody
SENATOR MORGAN:

Mr. Chairman, you said if we couldn't

wait.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I think we're here.

All right.

SENATOR MORGAN:
I know you have one more person to
comment but, you know, comment further later, but I hope there's
not a misunderstanding as we go into this. I, in no way, am
bringing forth this bill as an indictment against joint custody
or as an attack on joint custody. That is not my intent at all
and I get the sense from some of the testimony that we're hearing
is that this bill is out to do away with joint custody.
1
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I think
S more that they think that
may be one of the results, or by-products, whether your intent is
to do that or not.
I think they're commenting that this will be
the effect of the bill. Now if you want to object to that •.• I'm
not trying to characterize; that's how I interpret it.

SENATOR MORGAN: I just want to make sure that we
weren't starting this with that misunderstanding. That's my
impression.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

All right.
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Mr. Mcisaac.

MR. MciSAAC: Senator Morgan, let me state that I agree
with the goal of your legislation. I think there should be no
pteference for or against joint custody and the current statutes
so defines that. But that there may be confusion in the minds of
some about that and I'll suggest the solution that I think is
superior to the one here and I'll spell that out.
This is an old debate.
It's the Imbrecht versus Smith.
Those of us who have gray hairs here 10 years ago listening to
this debate, it calls back all those old tapes that we listened
to a long time ago. That there, it is clearly in the law the
Smith bill which prevailed, was the first bill that passed, was
that there would be no preference for joint custody and that was
indeed the law as it came forward out of that piece of
legislation. And there is an excellent article by Steve Belzer,
which I've given you a copy of, that traces that rather torturous
legislative history which you can read about and don't have to
live, which is probably good.
The goal should be no preference. Each family is
different.
I think as Joan Kelly has very eloquently pointed
out, the current law is working, basically. From my experience
-- and I was opposed to joint custody originally, I thought it
was not a particularly sensible idea -- but in looking at some of
the families that we see, they're making a very good use of that
law.
I think that the judiciary needs a wide range of choices
because each family is unique and preferences tend to
discriminate. A macro-preference breaks down when applied to
individual cases. It places extraordinary burdens on those
families where the preference doesn't prevail. So, I think it's
important that we not have a preference or presumption.
In addition, I think Joan has pointed out that we need
more research and unbiased research. Much of the research tends
to be for or against, and it's not really looking at it saying
what works and what doesn't work.
It's rather somebody is taking
an adversarial position and is really trying to document one way
or the other. And I think we do need more to find out what works
and works with what family.
I think that, in regards to the specific bill, the
problem that I have with SB 1306 is the shift of the frequent and
continuing language for the preamble to the joint custody
section. While on the surface, it doesn't look to be a whole lot
and I originally didn't think it was that serious. But on proper
reflection and seeing what that effect might be, is that it
weakens this very significant and important statement about
behavior. It implies this language does not apply to sole
custody -- leading to many more disputes, in my view, over
custody as couples look for clubs to hit one another in that
angry phase of the divorce process. And so I think that that is
unfortunate to shift that language. I don't think we need to do
that.
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The second area that I have some question about is that
I think that any history of spousal abuse -- the other is child
abuse, obviously, and parent kidnapping -- but I think spousal
abuse is a little broadly worded. Many times there is an
episodic event at the time that is not chronic abuse and in that
situation that could be used as sort of a way to foster
litigation.
I think that that is something that needs to be
considered, as each tries to establish its position.
I think the factors of (inaudible) are very good and I
think that the requirements for mediation are also very helpful
and useful.
I think a much better solution to the problem I
think you correctly identified is this:
that simply state and
add to the preamble a sentence that says this section does not
imply a preference for or against joint custody or sole custody
but allows the widest possible choice for parents and courts in
establishing a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the
child or children.
That simple statement would clarify once and for all the
fact that California does not have a presumption in favor of
joint custody or preference for joint custody. And I think that
would be a solution. That's my testimony. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. All right, now, it's your turn.
If any of your witnesses want to respond to what they've heard,
through you or as directed by you, that will be fine. And we
also ask that any members of the Committee that would like
further clarification of your position or that of the panel
members, we'll take that at this time.

•

SENATOR MORGAN:
First of all, I'd just like to say
thank you to the people that have found something good about it.
And I know Tom Woodruff said that if this had passed in '82 or
whenever that probably the language would have been just fine.
And I hear support for the definitions here at least from Diane
Richmond relative to the children under three and trying to
clarify that there is some difference in what is good for the
kids, if you will .
The stimulation for this bill really came from what I
was hearing from both of the counties that I represent and has
been documented in some other counties that both attorneys and
mediators are telling parents that they must have joint custody
and that it's better to work it out ahead of time than to have to
go into court. And so we are, in fact, seeing a lot of joint
custody, sometimes as a way to get child support, sometimes as a
way to avoid the court proceedings, and it has nothing to do with
whether or not it's good for the child.
And so because, as a result of the language that's
presently in 4600, that says "the Legislature finds and declares
that it is the public policy of this state to assure minor
children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents",
judges have said to me, "With that being the intent as stated in
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this code, then we have assumed that the Legislature preferred
joint custody." And I think that whenever you can have parents
agree and you can work out joint custody, that's marvelous and
that's best, but that's not always the case.
And for judges, because of the way the code is presently
written, to presume that joint custody is what the Legislature
intended, really needs some clarification and that's what we were
trying to do through the bill that we introduced. We found it
was not written last year in a way that was gathering support
even in my own district. We went back with the judges and family
law and rewrote it in the form that you see it in now and the
items that are in italics.
And I guess we're really open, if there is some
clarification that would stop parents from creating adversarial
or judicial problems as they go through the procedure, for
clarification, fine.
I'm a little confused I guess by Dr. Kelly's testimony
because as late as '83, I know you were saying that divorce
research confirms the need to seriously consider joint custody as
an option of equal status to that of sole custody. And frank
that's what I'm trying to do in the bill. So, if there's
opposition to that, and in the four intervening years, Dr. Kelly,
that you've changed your opinion on balancing the two, making
them equal in the eyes of the judge, and then deciding which is
best for the k
, and I think that in most cases, some joint
custody will be because it is important that that child see both
parents. But it's trying to balance the scale, if you will, on
behalf of children that is the purpose of what we're doing here.
HARRIS: Excuse me. Mr. Isenberg has a
Do you want ••• okay. When you're through, I'm sorry.

CHAI~~N

question.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

I'll wait for the Senator to

finish.
SENATOR MORGAN:
I think that we have been in touch with
Ms. McAbee at Stanford. It is my home district.
She has done
excellent work with children over the years and has not
officially taken a position but has been very encouraging on the
bill feeling that the whole issue of custody needs clarification.
What I'm trying to do, both through this bill and
through my work on the Child Care and Development Committee that
I'm working on, is to help our young people get off to a good
start so that we aren't putting our money into judicial systems,
into probation departments, but that we're doing what's best for
the child. And it's with that in mind that we've tried to just
clarify it in a way that judges won't presume one or the other is
best but look at each case and determine it accordingly.
And I'm pleased that the State Bar, Executive Committee
of the Family Law Section is in agreement with the language as
amended.
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Senator, I've got three questions
but the last one I'm going to present to you, not to be answered
now but at the end of my other questions, maybe.
I'm interested
in your
witness' reaction to Mr. Mcisaac's
sugge
You haven't had really much
chance to
about .•.
SENATOR MORGAN:

No, I've seen it.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me, I want to ask Dr. Kelly a
couple of questions. Dr. Kelly, when I was doing my very early
reading in this whole area, when I was trying to figure out how
to handle cases, I ran across the Solnit and Anna Freud book,
Beyond the Best Interest of Child, which I thought was early, but
very suggestive. I'm going to show my ignorance. What I drew
from that book,
people whose credentials at least seem to me
to be quite good, is that above anything else, a child wanted
stability. Even stability in a what objectively would be called
a less than desirable environment. It was change and
instability, as I recall it, that was viewed as inappropriate.
From reading your article, the book you co-authored in 1980, it
struck me
's -- I'm trying to think my way through what
it means on s
I wonder if you could just
me from a
kid's viewpoint, understanding you're generalizing and there is
always going to be exceptions, is it fair to say that stability
is more important than anything else?
DR. KELLY: Well, the concept of stability needs to be
discussed because there is stability that's achieved through
geographic stabil
and there is stability that's achieved
through continuing
ationships with both parents and most
people
would say that children are attached to their parents -- more so
than they are
to a particular crib or a particular set
of toys in one house. But the concept of stability came out of
predivorce era psychoanalytic theory. All of us agree, stability
is important but we've had to add on, now, looking at the child's
stable relationship with both parents. That is, the child who is
two or three, who has a stable relationship with a parent who
they now suddenly don't see very much, experiences a lot of
anxiety and loss
that may be much more important than the
crib.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That then flows into the other
thing implicit
that argument is the notion, as you indicated
earlier, that people who disagree with each other are going to be
disagreeable forever. At least that's an assumption, and I know
that's not always true-- everybody knows that's not always true
-- but I must confess I still have this visceral feeling, after
my fifteen years of handling divorces, from people that it was
damn tough for folks who were argumentative during their marriage
and during their divorce to ever become really cooperative
afterwards. So two things on that, why would some parents
cooperate with one another on a joint custody order if a court
mandates it when they could never do it by themselves?
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DR. KELLY:
I suspect those parents won't cooperate, and
I think that many of us who are involved with divorcing men and
women are looking for a civilized, businesslike relationship and
if you can find that amongst 80 percent of your couples, we are
in good shape. And a certain percentage of people will be able
to cooperate.
I think it's too much of an expectation to say
that everybody can cooperate and be friends, but they can learn
either in mediation or some other kind of intervention how to
communicate and reduce conflict and work things out around their
kids.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So would you believe, for
example, that there should be a prohibition, essentially that a
court could not order against the will of any party a physical
sharing arrangement?
DR. KELLY: Well, the language I believe is here.
It
says it should not be ordered over the objection of a party
is
that right?
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
DR. KELLY:

Is there any language in here about that?

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
DR. KELLY:

No.

No.

Was that in the other bill?

SENATOR MORGAN: No, we are just saying that it is the
policy of the law to encourage cooperation in the resolution of
child custody matters.
DR. KELLY: Okay, it was raised here today about the
issue of should judges order joint custody over the objections of
one parent or the other and I would be very reluctant to see that
kind of legislation for the following reason: Women continue to
be deemed the appropriate custodial parent in our society, that's
a political and social fact of life.
In order to have joint custody, men must ask for joint
custody, because most women coming into a divorce assume they'll
have the kids at least 80, if not 100 percent of the time. And
men have to ask for it.
Therefore, women are always in a position to say no to
joint custody and therefore block the joint custody arrangement,
even if the other parent is in fact a really terrific parent.
So, I have some serious reservations about a statute which would
say that you should never order it over the objections of a
parent because it's too easy for the mother to, in this case, be
obstructive about it.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Respond to Senator Morgan's
comment. Parties come in, they see their own attorneys, their
own attorneys say, "Look, you're going to have to go in front of

- 74 -

Judge King or Judge Murphy, they're both awful, they'll order
joint custody at the drop of a hat, you better cut your own
deal."
Wife says, "Oh, that's terrible, I can't do it." The
attorney says "Oh well, if you don't do it, the judge is going to
order it and you'll lose everything." And so therefore
reluctantly, bitterly, with great antagonism, large numbers of
women accede to voluntary joint custody orders. That's one of
the allegations Senator Morgan made. Is your experience
comparable to that?
DR. KELLY:

I don't think •••

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
two judges in particular.

Without using the names of the

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Especially since he's on the Court of
Appeal now anyway .••
(laughter)
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
still sitting occasionally.

He used to be a terror, and he's

DR. KELLY:
I think judges ought to have discretion to
either order it or not order it. And I think they ought to
consider the kinds of factors that are listed here. I have no
problem with these factors, although I do think we're holding
parents of under 3's to a higher standard than we are of older
kids, which I have some problem with. Or at least I'd like to
encourage people to do that all the way up .••
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, let me just ask, in your
own mediation experience when you mediate disputes, is a factor
that the parties use in determining a joint physical custody the
belief, the assertion, the claim that "Gee, judges are inclined
to do this anyway, so we ought to at least set the terms
ourselves rather than let some strange fellow or lady screw
around in our live." Is that a factor that's part of the debate
and discussion?
DR. KELLY:
I think that's a factor that's operative in
almost every decision that people make about divorce. They'd
rather, at some level, make the decision rather than lose control
of the decision.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: But the next question is, for
parties who then, if you ask them, they'd say, "Well, I'd rather
not do it but I don't want to run the risk of not doing it." Do
those custody arrangements fail at a significantly higher rater
than the parties who joyfully traipse into your office and in a
blissful way work out their own arrangements? You know what I'm
trying to say?
DR. KELLY:

Nobody joyfully traipses.
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

But you know what I'm trying to

say.
DR. KELLY: Yes, I do understand what you're trying to
say. I need to specify that
cases
are coming to me are
not the cases that are going to the HUgh Mcisaacs of the world
because those again are the most litigious and probably the
most •..
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Yours are the most litigious.

DR. KELLY: No, ours are less so. Although my study
that I gave you is a study of both adversarial and mediation
people.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
you mediate •..

Then in yours, the people that

DR. KELLY: I would say that on the average, most women
come in reasonably opposed to any concepts of joint custody. We
start a discussion, their spouses talk about why they want to
continue to be involved, and at some point along the line they
decided that that's not unreasonable. They may not like it, but
they feel that from the kids' standpoint, it make since.
I can give an example. The woman in my office recently
who said "I hate this divorce. It's criminal what he's doing to
the kids and if
was up to me he would never see the kids
again," because she's furious. But she said, "I know," and it's
hard for her to say this, "but I know that from the kids'
standpoint, they should see him again." Or the fact is, he's a
good father.
If they had gone the route of the court, she would
have said "no," and her attorney was advising her to say "no."
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So they enter into a stipulation,
the court approves the stipulation, there is shared custody.
Under those kinds of circumstances, do.the agreements fail any
more often in your experience?
DR. KELLY: No, they haven't. I have that data that I
will be able to analyze by the end of the year.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: What is your opinion as to why
they don't fail? Generally speaking, you'd say people who are
dragooned or more reluctant about entering an agreement might not
cooperate. Common sense would tell you they ought to fail more
frequently.
But you say they don't, what's your guess as to why?
DR. KELLY: The issue is, how dragooned are they? At
the level of Judge King's old court, they might have felt more
dragooned then at the level of our nonprofit mediation center,
even in Hugh Mcisaac's setting. But you're asking some hard
questions for which it's hard to respond with specific data also.
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: This is the heart of the whole
debate, trying to figure out what the impact of this whole
process is.
DR. KELLY: Well, there's impact in terms of legal
issues, relitigation and so on, and then there's impact in terms
of the children.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Do you see more frequent
relitigation for parties who are -- my wording -- are dragooned
into an agreement?
DR. KELLY: No, and not more frequently than sole
custody.
I think there's an assumption here that in sole custody
agreements there's less conflict than in joint custody agreements
with people of equal levels of conflict. There is no evidence to
support that.
We have seen for years very high levels of conflict in
people with sole custody and limited visiting arrangements.
There is no evidence that people with the same level of conflict
and joint custody are expressing any more conflict, and if
anything, they're frequently transferring the children at schools
and child care and do not have the opportunities for those kinds
of volatile exchanges we used to see on Friday nights in sole
custody families.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Mr. Chairman, could I ask
Mr. Mcisaac and maybe Ms. Richmond, who is also ••.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Before you do that, I was going to ask
Justice King if he has anything to add, since he was absent when
we took the first round.
If you wanted to advise Senator Morgan
as to your perspective on her bill •••
JUSTICE KING:
I apologize for being late, but I had a
meeting in the Governor's office that kept me longer than I
anticipated.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right on.
(laughter) Maybe that's
what he was down there about.
(laughter)
Now that we've gotten
through talking about your future in the Judiciary, you can talk
about the bill.
JUSTICE KING:
I think that we all understand that the
mediation process for almost all parents is not a therapeutic
process, but to a great extent, as I see it, it's an educational
process. Part of that education is to learn what needs the child
has that can be perhaps only met, or best met, by the other
parent. So that there is a starting point of a recognition by
each parent that the child has needs that are met by the other
parent and that the child suffers if there is an interference
where they are cut off from the other parent.
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One of the other educational processes is to learn you
can make your own decisions and to do that, you also have to
learn how to
as parents even though you are
no longer
So to
out what the incidence of relitigation is
from a mediated process, or attempt to do that is probably a
mistake because the fact is that if mediation has been
successful, the parents have learned now to deal with each other.
They may need help from time to time in the long run doing that.
They've learned how to deal with each other over things affecting
the child and they have also learned as part of that process that
the worst way to handle their custody or visitation dispute is to
take it before a judge and have the judge arbitrarily, to a great
extent, say here is the way it's going to be.
Agreements that are mediated, even if they are under
some concern, or compulsion even, of what might ultimately happen
in the courts if
goes to a contested hearing ... All legal
issues and all cases to some extent, if they are going to get
settled,
settled because somebody is looking down the
line and saying, if we go to court this is what the
ly
outcome is. Sometimes the threat of
might happen is very
substantial and so you reach compromises.
In this process what you're really trying to do is, and
I think what good mediators do accomplish, is to reorient the
parents to looking to what's going on in terms of their own
conduct and in terms of the situation of the breakup of the
marriage, and
subsequent third parties' involvements with
parents, what the impact of this is on children and how to
minimize that
In
, for the most, part what you're doing is
you're developing some kind of standard that people do look to,
but as part of the mediation
s the results are much
different than
they would be if it went into court because
at that point
get caught up in the adversary system. And
the idea of working out something -- that the judge by an order
is ever going to be able to order anything that will work well by
comparison to whatever the parties can reach by way of agreement
-- just isn't realistic.
In terms of the bill
f, the one concern I have,
which I'm sure has been raised and is
the materials, I have
found from the
and I know lawyers have found from their
practice, that the present wording of Section 4600, the first
paragraph, which talks about the public policy of the State of
California gives the most underrepresented and least represented
minority in the country, children, a right themselves to frequent
and continuing contact with parents.
It's not just the right of the parents, it's the right
of the child, and I think that's an essential right of the child.
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I know from my own experience -- when parents appearing
before me who were in conflict over this -- to be able to read to
them the first paragraph of Civil Code Section 4600 was extremely
important, and to
to them, "this is the policy of the State
of California."
That, perhaps, is the major concern I have with this
bill, to shift that into some other section causes me a great
deal of concern because I have seen in practice how important
that can be to mediators who can show it to people. It's amazing
once you put something in writing how much more meaningful it is.
Or that a judge can read it from the bench or that lawyers can
make a xerox copy of it and give it to the client, and say "This
is the policy of the State of California."
I would say of all the things we've been doing in this
field in recent years, perhaps the adoption of that .•• and as I
recall, we did that primarily at Jim Cook's suggestion.
It was
in the original legislation some years ago, it was further down
in the bill, we put it into the first paragraph and I think in
retrospect that was an awfully important decision.
It didn't
seem so important at the time, but it really was important. And
I would hope that as part of whatever is done with this bill,
that we don't change that first paragraph.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, Mr. Mcisaac, I think Mr.
Isenberg .•. is that correct?
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Do you remember the question?

MR. MCISAAC: Yes, if highly conflicted families who are
asked to share their custody actually do it and work it out?
I've been very surprised at the numbers of very highly conflicted
families where you have two competent parents who are very angry
at each other in the spousal role, who, after a passage of time,
are able to work things out, work very successfully. When you
think about it, raising kids, you need all the help you can get,
and if you don't hang together you're certainly going to get
clobbered by those kids later. I think the parents gain a great
deal by working together.
If Reagan and Gorbachev can work out a settlement,
certainly these very angry parents could do the same. So, I've
been very amazed at the numbers of families that at first blush
you would never think would work out that dispute who gain, and
as a result of cooperating work together, and have a much better
relationship. They don't like each other particularly, but it's
a business relationship.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
In any of the studies done in Los
Angeles, have you attempted to quantify the frequency of return
to court, and what does that show?
MR. MCISAAC: The Jessica Pearson Study, which is
probably the major study of the effects of mediation on disputes,
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is that if it's litigated,
's about a 36 percent return, if
it's mediated,
's about an 11 percent return.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Of those who are mediated, was
was a severe
there a distinction between
to a joint custody order?
difficulty between the
s
Is there a higher return rate there?
MR. MCISAAC:
I don't think so. About 60 percent are
some form of joint custody. I don't think, off the top of my
head, there is any correlation. I think it's the factors within
the personalities of the parents that are more important. If the
parent has, and there are some people who are very bad candidates
for joint custody, somebody who is psychotic or if there is
somebody who chronically .•. there are some people who just love
conflict. God forbid we resolve it. If this goes away, there's
sort of like a living paraphrase of the quote, "I fight,
therefore I am".
(laughter)
They don't want it to go away.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

Are you quoting one of your own

articles?
MR. MCISAAC:

Yeah,

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Who is the

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

one?

Ms. Richmond, I think, had a

comment.
MS. RICHMOND:

Mr. Mcisaac said what I was going to say.

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELI,E:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Dr.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.
zzelle?

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I'd like to ask a question along
that same line. If a youngster is involved in the awareness of
the conflict and perpetuating the conflict between the parents
and ultimately
s some sense of guilt himself as though he is
the sponsor of the conflict, does the court moving in and making
a decision make it worse? Do they cement a feeling of inadequacy
in the child -- where mediation, as you might say, helps to teach
or instruct the parents in these circumstances with the aim of
preventing that sense of deficiency in the child on the child's
behalf?
MR. MCISAAC:
I think children often make very bad
choices. Sometimes they will choose
parent to rescue. They
will become the parent and the parent becomes the child so they
will try to rescue the parent, the parent that they think needs
help. I think that the parents could work together, then the
kids are freed from that. Basically most kids don't want the
divorce, they love both
, and it goes back to Joan's
answer about stability. It's the stability of the relationship,
of the continuity of contact with both parents that's really
critical.
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ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Marriage may be a learning
process in itself. Divorce is a learning process in itself. All
of the different instructive mechanisms involved are part of that
instruction,
I'm not sure that a youngster without judgmental
tools is in as perceptive a role as the parents ought to be.
I worry for fear that we in law seek to impose some kind
of a decision that freezes a circumstance that sponsors
hostility.
I don't believe in government entering into private
families' roles anymore than is necessary in any regard, and it's
usually with the opposite result than what's intended.
I wonder if in this measure, or measures like it, we
tend to use government in the attempt at fairness to really
freeze in circumstance this learning process at some point so
that you don't ever get past the antagonism.
MR. MCISAAC:
I think there is a problem with the
courtroom adversary system, and you've identified it, and that
which is probably the most ultimate intrusion of government in
the lives of a family -- is that it's frozen in time. They don't
have the benefit
coming back and sort of shaping that
agreement.
In mediation, what we do frequently is we use step-up
agreements. You will try it, and people sort of learn how to
become parents in this very different and new family system. And
I think that's one of the major issues, that we're seeing a new
family system develop and we have to invent the understandings
and the systems.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: It seems to be oriented in that
direction regarding keeping the thing flexible a little bit. How
can you designate, then, different things shall happen to a
certain degree so that lawyers and parents and different people
know where they are in time and space, and still maintain that
flexibility.
I don't understand how you ••.
JUSTICE KING: Well, because as part of this educational
process that I mentioned, one of the main educational features of
it is to get the parents to understand that the best way to solve
the problems they are having, either with each other or with
relationship to the child, is not in the adversary system. So
most courts with this mediation process available allow parents
to come back in when they have a problem. They can call up, talk
to the mediator on the phone or come back in. It doesn't require
the lawyer to file a motion, it doesn't require it to come back
into court, it's an encouragement of providing assistance for
people to solve their own problems.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

That's an arbitration process,

then.
JUSTICE KING: No, it's not arbitration because in
arbitration the arbitrator makes the decision, and in the
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adversary system the judge makes the decision, but in the
mediation process, the mediator there is really a facilitator to
help the parents make a decision.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

More of a counselor.

JUSTICE KING: That's the real difference because no
matter how conflicted people are it's remarkable how-- I was one
of the first to require this mediation on a mandatory basis in my
court -- and I was astonished with the success of it. Because
once you cut through these things and once you provide this kind
of an educational insight to parents -- no matter how conflicted
they are and no matter how conflicted they may be on other issues
down the line -- if you can get them to understand what this is
doing to their children, their love for their children somehow
seems to get them to change their conduct, change their
perspective and to be able to separate out this issue from the
other issues that arise.
I don't think mediators can deal with other issues. For
example, I think it's very difficult for them to deal with how
much spousal support should there be, how much child support
should there be, because you start getting a sense where one
might feel they are favoring the other.
But if they view the mediator as being there really as
an advocate of what's best for the child and not taking positions
between the parents but helping them and being willing in the
future to help them. Some people need help semi-permanently.
Some people we never see again. But I think our experience was
the cases that came back with some frequency were the cases that
were litigated on child custody or visitation. The cases that
were mediated successfully, I'm sure the people still had
problems, but they didn't come back in and try to solve them
through the adversary system. By and large, they solved them
coming back to mediation or coming back in some other way.
Now, that's not to say occasionally there wouldn't be
one coming back, if all of a sudden one parent is transferred in
their job to New York and that's the custodial parent. They want
to take the child with them, and then you get some other issues
coming up, which maybe they can't, without the mediator, work
out. But our experience was that by and large those cases that
were mediated simply didn't return into the adversary system
because they learned that wasn't going to solve their problems.
That made second marriages better than first ones sometimes.
SENATOR MORGAN: May I ask the Judge a question, Mr.
Chairman? Judge, I'm Senator Morgan.
It is my understanding
that you were a part of writing the law as it was changed in '82,
is that right?
JUSTICE KING:
'80. The mediation was in '81, and I
guess it was before that, a year or two before we had the joint
custody mediation-- '80.
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SENATOR MORGAN:
Is it fair to interpret what you've
just said about the value of mediation that the presumption of
joint custody, which seems to be what's happening in many courts
as the law is now
, that the presumption that joint
custody is the intent of the state is a better way of getting
parents to mediate?
JUSTICE KING:
I don't think it has any effect on
getting them ..• well, first of all, they have to mediate whatever
their •.. if they are corning into court, the law requires that
they have to go through a mediation process before they can take
any further step in the litigation process.
I know there is a lot of misunderstanding in terms of
the provisions of Section 4600 and whether or not, because of the
wording, joint custody somehow has some legal significance or
priority over sole custody. I don't know that it has so much
effect as the perspective that might exist in a particular
county, either in the judge or judges' handling of family law
assignments in that county; perhaps the mediators, whether they
are in the private sector or the public sector, and their own
personal perspective.
The goal here is to assist the parents to work out
whatever arrangement they can agree to is best for the child.
I
don't think joint custody can be imposed if by joint custody we
mean not equal sharing of time, but some very significant sharing
of not only time of the child, but the full responsibilities and
decisions affecting the child. There are many people who simply
can't have that work, and to try to impose it on somebody where
it won't work is foolish, it's absurd, it's not going to work.
It'll come back, just the same as if you go to a contested
custody hearing and the judge makes an order which is imposed on
somebody. It's generally not going to work satisfactorily. Some
people, that's the only way.
Some people need somebody to tell
them what to do, I suppose.
SENATOR MORGAN:

Are you talking about parents or

judges?
JUSTICE KING:
Probably both.
In fact, some judges are
even parents, also.
I think that there is a lot of confusion out
there as to whether or not there is some legal preference for
joint custody as opposed to sole custody.
SENATOR MORGAN: And, as I said before you carne, there
were six judges in three counties that stimulated me to write
this bill because of the presumption that the intent of the
Legislature as it was drafted was that joint custody was
preferred, and that that wasn't always in the best interest of
the child, and that's what we've been trying to work through.
JUSTICE KING: Well, at the time of legislation some
years back when this was all adopted, I personally had a
preference for listing the order of preferences by saying sole
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custody, and then second, joint, and so on. As part of a
compromise, I think we all agreed to make sole and joint
alternatives, and then to satisfy some who felt very strongly
about it, I think we mentioned joint first in the language. But
without any intention that was to mean it was preferential to
sole. They were just to be equal alternatives, and I believe
there has been some confusion because of the wording that joint
custody is legally preferred.
The other real problem with all of this is that the
semantics are very, very important to a lot of people. What
something is called is really more important than it should be,
and partly because these words mean different things to different
people. It's in the eye of the beholder. And of course the
problem was, when the Legislature adopted this all originally, it
didn't have any definitions; it used some words, "joint," "sole,"
and "legal" and "physical," but it never attempted to define
them.
attempts
ways. I
a matter
there is

Now, at least, we have some definitions or at least
at definitions but they are not very definitive in some
agree with you that there is some confusion. I think as
of public policy, it would be appropriate, if they feel
a preference, they ought to state it.

The sense I have, and I've been out of this for ••• , -or at least I've been a sideline observe; I've been back in it a
little bit -- my sense is that the pendulum of joint custody kind
of swings from time to time. And that it. was a bit more popular.
Well, first of all this all started because judges had some
concern about whether they could even make orders about joint
custody because there was no statutory provision for it. That's
how this all really happened, and some judges refused to make
orders where the parties were stipulating to joint custody,
because they said there is no statute that says I can make a
joint custody order.
So that's partly how this all came about.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Some judges are quite frank and just
refuse to do it anyway, even with the statutory authority.
JUSTICE KING: That's correct. And it's hard, Mr.
Harris to ... I mean some people just feel it won't work, I
suppose, but most people looking at people coming before them
feel here it's not going to work.
If it gets past the mediation stage, my experience is
that there are relatively few who have not successfully mediated
their dispute who are going to have a real shot at a successful
joint custody arrangement. But, if they can't work it out
through that process but at the same time, and I'd echo what Joan
said, we have to be very careful that we just don't give one
person the veto power. That's critical, because otherwise -and, again, it usually is the mother who has played the primary
child-rearing role --we just can't let one person make the
decision, I guess, unless it's the judge.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why don't we start wrapping this up
because I've got one more issue I'd like the panel to discuss
that wasn't on our agenda. Mr. Isenberg, first.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Senator, I meant to get back and
I forgot. Your
to Mr. Mcisaac's suggestion on, not the
precise alternative language, but certainly the approach.
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, certainly, I'm open to trying to
make the bill better. My concern with the addition that was
suggested, which I believe is "Alternative 1" under a memo that I
have. The section establishes neither a preference nor a
presumption for or against joint custody -- Is that it, Mr.
Mcisaac? -- and legal or physical or sole custody. I don't have
a problem with
per ~~ but if we just add that it still
leaves the de
of "child's best interest" intact.
I think, in working with judges and family law
professionals, we've made some progress, particularly as it
relates to children under three for whom I think stability is
particularly important, both emotional and physical, at that age.
Maybe I harken
to what my minister told me twenty-five years
ago when I was pregnant with my first, but we all come with our
biases. But I do feel very strongly about the stability for
those young
ldren. So, if we don't make any changes in the
definition of "child's best interest" and just add this to it, I
don't think we've
far enough.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Mr. Chairman, it could really be
"yes" or "no" answers. I'm not asking for a definitive analysis
of Mr. Mcisaac s language.
SENATOR MORGAN:
I would add it if we can use the
definitions that are in my bill as amended.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay. Let me just say, from my
point of view, Senator, somebody has to vote on it.
I mean, for
example, I think you're going to have independent concern on
abuse and all of the other things we've mentioned. So if what
your reaction is that you'd consider the language but only if the
rest of the bill is the same, I think you're going to have,
maybe, some problems with the Committee.
I'm not asking
panel members to give a definitive
answer. But, in general, would an approach that would state
there is no intent to mandate or imply preference either for sole
custody or for joint custody, would that, in your opinion as
panel members, solve some of the ambiguity that exists without
leading to endless more litigation on the subject?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Let me ask each of them to
respond, if they would? Or, if you don't feel like you want to
or can't respond, don't do it. But I'd just like to go around
and ask Judge Murphy for a quick one sentence response to Mr.
Isenberg's question.
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JUDGE MURPHY:

In one word, "yes."

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

Judge Murphy, okay.

Dr. Kelly?

DR. KELLY: Yes, to the language that Hugh Mcisaac
proposes but •... (inaudible)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. WOODRUFF:

Mr. Woodruff?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Mcisaac is on that.
MR. MciSAAC:

Okay.

Okay.

(laughter)

No.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

No, he says, "no."

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
(laughter) Justice King?
JUSTICE KING:

..• changed his mind.

He's been persuaded by Senator ••. ,

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. RICHMOND:

We already know where Mr.

Okay.

Ms. Richmond?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. So, basically the panel's
in agreement that that type of language would be appropriate, and
obviously we understand that you don't concur, Senator Morgan.
But I want you to understand that one of the things that
really is in issue here is whether or not the Committee members,
who obviously will have to vote on your bill one way or the
other, agree with the fundamental policy shift or with a
clarification of the policy, and that's your burden to bear. But
you have to understand that is the issue, fundamentally.
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, are you saying that if we add
this one sentence that's being proposed, that's the only
amendment that you want ••.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
SENATOR MORGAN:

No, I'm not saying anything.
.•. or will accept?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me.
I think Mr. Isenberg said
it well. That is that you have to understand that there is a
philosophical perspective on the Committee. It's not just a
matter of the wording. It's a matter as to whether or not the
Committee feels individually and, ultimately, collectively as a
majority, that they like the changes in direction that your bill
embraces, because, personally, that's my problem too .•.
-
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SENATOR MORGAN: Well, is ... , my sense was that Mr.
Mcisaac's
amendment ••.

was

CHAIRMAN HARRIS

Yes,

SENATOR MORGAN:
to
ish.

.. was of

what ...
same

as to what I

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Right, but there's a question as
to whether
's a clarification, as opposed to a new
shift in
the previously articulated policy as we
understood
the 1980 and 1981 discussions, which
ultimate
change •.. , on the question of joint
custody,
SENATOR MORGAN:
CHAIRMAN
trying to
only trying
the
this

Can we keep the factors?

We can look at all of them. We're not
presentation to this Committee. We're
some
spective as to where members of
relationship to what you have presented at

You
dec
that you want to reject
you've
heard today, and
back to something we've never seen before.
But, at least we're trying to be helpful so that you don't have
to
to
s or try to be a psychic as to where we're
to
know what some of the biases or
are between
Committee and what
far.
anything else that you would like to add?
stions? Any other statements?

that it?

SENATOR MORGAN: I
perhaps
propos
the
this

I were
amended by
would be to
think

Is

part of it is just in working
where we put the paragraph that he is
any prohibition against some of
the bill, as long as we also include

Senator, let me just give you my
on the bill today, I'd vote "no." If
contained the present statute as
to Mr. Mcisaac's, my inclination
, although I haven't had a lot of time to

On the
hand, I have problems with the conditions
and factors
're adding in. And the reason is that I believe
that the purpose and the motivation for the factors, and
certainly the
're written, is to make joint custody
awards more
They are not, in my judgment at least,
neutral factors
And that, it seems to me ... , that bothers me.

- 87 -

If the argument is we want to make this absolutely
neutral, neither
nor against, then it seems to me that you
have to write them with that thought in mind. I'm just telling
you that
me problems, just if you want to know where I
am on the issue.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I guess that we're trying to be
helpful. If you want to talk to individual members of the
Committee to attempt to get six votes out of this Committee,
understand, at least from the standpoint of Mr. Isenberg who has
articulated what I'm trying to tell you, we have a problem with
the fundamental change in joint custody. And, if that's what
you're attempting to do, then understand that I'm not in
agreement with that.
Okay? I want to be straight with you. I don't want you
to think somebody's pulling your leg. I'm being straight and up
front, okay? And you may decide you don't need my vote, or you
may decide that you don't care where I'm at. I just wanted you
to know that going in so that when you come back here in January,
if you present a
11 that is basically the same as you've
presented, my position will not have changed.
I think, as Mr. Isenberg has indicated, that I'm
inclined to agree with
neutrality perspective that has been
articulated by Mr. Mcisaac, but I'm not really interested in a
fundamental shi
in the joint custody.
I like joint custody,
frankly, and a
fting is something I'm not prepared to support.
SENATOR MORGAN:

I understand.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. All right. Now, one of the
things we'd like to do if we can .•. , unless there are any other
questions or statements on this legislation, is to get the
panel's reaction ... , (did you distribute, yet? would you?) Mr.
Isenberg, why
't
, please if you would, while we ask the
panel to accept ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I know some of the panel members
have to •.. , Judge, I think you have to get off to San Diego in
about three minutes ••. , but let me make a suggestion, and Senator
Morgan, maybe you can hang around. We went through this long,
complicated hearing on your bill on the question of support past
the age of majority, whether it's college support or child
support, which is enormously complicated. You were very generous
with your time at an earlier hearing. Senator Watson told us she
couldn't be at either of these days of hearings, which is why we
didn't schedule it.
I'm not asking for detailed reaction, but I would like
some thoughts from the panel members, and I'm asking for thoughts
only, on issues that ought to be raised with regard to that. I
mean, it's one that I've wrestled with for many, many months and
I frankly don't know what my position is on the issue.
I keep
thinking of different problems.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Just for the purpose of the record,
these are thoughts that we are asking on SB 13 by Senator Morgan
and SB 215 by Senator Watson, relative to support for education,
either
or vocational, beyond the age of 18. It's a
fundamental
shift, one that causes degrees of, certainly,
controversy,
we're just trying to find out if you, as experts
and people
experience
the
eld, have any perspective as
to either legal problems or policy problems in generating or
providing a mechanism for support beyond the age of 18 for
students pursuing educational attainment beyond high school.
JUDGE MURPHY:

You're asking for opinions?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
first, why don't you ...
opinion.

JUDGE MURPHY:
(laughter)

Yes.

Thomas, since you've got to go

No, I don't have to go and I do have an

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

JUDGE MURPHY: I have an opinion both as an attorney who
represented a father who was sued by his son, as a father who has
a son attending Davis right now, and as a judge who has had to
make decisions regarding parents who contracted to put their
children through school. In each one of them, I would ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: When you say, "contracted", do you
mean contracted with the child or contracted with a trust?
JUDGE MURPHY: No, contracted with the other parent as
part of an agreement in the dissolution decree.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

All right.

JUDGE MURPHY: With the father that I litigated and
represented him,
destroyed the relationship between the father
and the son forever.
I was making decisions in the two cases
that I've handled, as to whether or not a child had the right to
live in Del Mar in a condominium that was costing $900 a month,
as to whether or not that was reasonable, as to whether or not
paying that child's reasonable tuition, educational expenses ... ,
the mother was saying that she did not want the child living with
her; the father had agreed to pay for the educational expenses.
So it, again,
more conflict.
As a
with a son who is 18 years of age, who was a
perfect son until he was 17!, and then decided he was smarter
than me, (laughter) and may be, I found that my ability of
controlling those purse strings to the point where I said to him,
"Young man, straighten up or you're going to be attending a
junior college,"
an immense impact.
Now, I understand the problems of women, and generally
it's women that we see it, who feel an obligation to put their
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children through school and use their spousal support or
accumulated earnings, because their former husbands refuse to
assist. But let me say, there are just as many, and probably
times ten or times a hundred, of fathers who are assisting their
children go to
slation, whatsoever. I
suspect this will create immense numbers of problems. I mean, I
don't know ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, maybe Senator Morgan, you might
want to indicate as was done in previous hearings, that there's a
study that's been done that indicated that there was a tendency
on the part of divorced parents, for there not to be support for
education, disproportionate to those who supported their children
when they remained married.
Is that correct?
SENATOR MORGAN: Yes, we do have that. What we're also
finding with the Student Aid Commission is that the student only
has to report the income of the custodial parent, and in most
cases that's
mother with minimal income. The father may be
earning $100,000 to $200,000 but that doesn't have to be
reported, so
student qualifies for a grant.
So the taxpayer is in fact educating our young people
when there is a parent with the capacity to pay. But because
they don't have to report their income, and there's· no
instruction from the judge that they should continue child
support, they are in fact refusing to provide any support.
So, we're (1) having children not supported by both
parents in the efforts to get a college degree; (2) having the
taxpayer fund our young people. And I am all for grants and
scholarships, but I'm not for providing money where there is a
parent with the capacity to pay. And what we're finding is that
this is the trend
's going
We keep confusing 13 and 215. My bill, SB 13, just
would continue
ld support, not the payment of tuition, not the
payment of all educational expenses, just child support as
determined at the time of settlement, whether it's $50 or $1,500,
it's child support for a full-time student.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

That's an academic •.•

SENATOR MORGAN:
In an academically qualified
university, and it excludes
military, legally emancipated
those definitions are
it -- and they have to be
good
standing. So that they can't be goofing off, too.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Sure.

Dr. Frizzelle?

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I have a slight concern, and
maybe you have a
of addressing
, I'm not sure. That is, in
a circumstance where, because of a dissolution of a marriage, the
courts step in and make some decisions on behalf of the family,
this bill -- both of these bills -- seem to establish a condition
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of support for college education and so forth, in that
environment in which it cannot and does not do for people who are
not in a circumstance of
solution. I think there's a basic,
inherent unfairness
ion of government into one set
of lives when it's not
another set of lives.
SENATOR MORGAN:
other states and •.•

Well,

s has been tested in courts in

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: The fact that it's been tested
doesn't make it any more fair.
I'm concerned about the fact of
the government intrusion here, and the fact that it's forcing a
circumstance to occur to the economic advantage of one set of
people and not another. And it establishes it almost as a right,
and I think we have to be very, very slow in establishing that
perception in law.
I don't know how you handle that.
I suspect
that you're going to have to do a whole lot more convincing among
a number of us in the Legislature, not just on the Judiciary
Committee, regarding that intrusion factor.
SENATOR MORGAN: Do you rather the taxpayer pay?
Because these kids are going to school.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Well, if they're going to
school, they take their own responsibility. The taxpayer pays in
the form of a loan or grant or something of that nature; that's
something different. And, that's an establishment between the
individual who benefits from the education and the state, or what
the taxpayers do or don't do. But it still makes it such that
everybody is on the same footing.
Here you are seeking to put
certain people on a different footing, and I think that's an
unwarranted intrusion.
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, I would say that, again, the
child support is not funding for all of the education. And the
judge could take into account the expectation within that family.
For instance, if it's a third child and the first two had gone to
college, and the third child had been promised that, but for the
divorce no help was forthcoming, that is a factor that the judge
would take into consideration.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
If there's no divorce, and a son
or daughter ends up no longer being supported by the parents, in
the absence of a divorce situation, what happens then? Are the
regular parents of an 18-year-old, graduated from high school,
obligated to provide a college education?
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, I think what the studies are
showing -- studies and anecdotal evidence, is that, that the
child in the vast majority of cases is helped.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
only heard of •.•

Is there more than one study?
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I've

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: The fact that they are or aren't
is different from a compulsion that they must be.
SENATOR MORGAN: This isn't a mandate, either.
discretionary. SB 13 is discretionary.

This is

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But let me ask, are there any studies
other than the one that has been cited? I've only seen the one.
SENATOR MORGAN:
Sarah, can you help me out there? I
think Ms. Richmond and I think Judge King ••• , I'd like to hear
their comments on this also.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

You'll hear it.

MS. McCARTHY: There's only one study, the one that's
been referred to, that I know of that looked at children of
divorced families.
However the census data indicates that at
least 60 percent of children are dependent on their parents up to
the age of 20.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We understand that. That's not the
issue. There's no dispute there, we can stipulate to that. The
question is whether or not there are studies that indicate that
there is, in fact, a discrepancy that one could attribute to
divorce. Ms. Richmond, would you like to comment?
MS. RICHMOND: I'm grateful to the Committee for g1v1ng
us an opportunity to come in on these two bills, in addition.
Addressing Assemblyman Frizzelle's concern.
In Judith
Wallerstein's ten-year study on families of divorce, in Marin
County, one of the unlocked for findings that she came up with
was that children who otherwise would have attended college but
for the divorce, and who had that expectation, were being
deprived of it for a variety of reasons.
One of them is a situation that doesn't happen within
the intact family where the plan was, and it was within the
parents' discretion, to send their children to college or not.
And that is a remarriage and new children situation, where for
one reason or another, the new children of the new family become
a factor that tends to detract from the expectations of the
children of the first family.
And this legislation is intended
to help out those first families.
As an economic reality, there are very few children
these days who, I think, can afford to put themselves through a
four-year college education. And I think that families across
the board deserve some help where it can be granted.
I think
that the Legislature would not be acting prejudicially by
enacting this legislation even though it only addresses families
of divorce.
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As between the two of these bills, I do have a distinct
preference for Senator Morgan's bill for several reasons. One is
that it is discretionary.
It builds in some of the controls that
we, as practitioners, build in when we're negotiating for this on
behalf of spouses. One is it builds in some provisions about a
student in good standing and contains a reasonable age
limitation. You don't have children coming in as third party
beneficiaries enforcing this for a six-year undergraduate degree.
It is limited to graduation or 21 years.
It's enforcement is by
the spouse, who is entitled to the child support, rather than
being enforceable by the child, which I do agree tends to create
a terrible parent-child situation.
The other bill, although it does address the specific
finding of the study about children who would otherwise be
expected to go to college, is a bit more amorphous in terms of
its application, and far more difficult to set up what the
appropriate evidentiary standards would be. Whereas SB 13 is
really directed to an extended child support during a period of
time that children are, in reality, dependents of their parents.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Isn't it elitist in that it is limited
to college? I mean, that's not the only, basically, purpose of
higher education •..
MS. RICHMOND:

Let me read it more carefully.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
universities.
SENATOR MORGAN:

It's limited to colleges and
Or occupational training.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh, occupational training? Okay. So
it does include vocational education. That's what I kept asking
you. Okay, fine. Mr. Isenberg?
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Ms. Richmond, as a litigator, I
read this and I think it gives an independent cause of action to
kids to sue either or both of their parents. That's the way I
read it.
It doesn't specifically exclude it and it says, "child
support shall continue to be paid on behalf of ..• " (that's
defined) or "to any student." Now, I don't see how you can r~ad
that any other way except giving an independent cause of action,
and as a litigator, I want you to give me your gut reaction to
that.
MS. RICHMOND:
we in court •..

I haven't parsed this carefully, nor are

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
I apologize.

I understand, and it's unfair and

MS. RICHMOND:
... but I think that case law now, of
existing child support enforcement, limits it to the parents to
enforce it, and not to the children directly.
If I'm mistaken on
that, I'm willing to admit that.
- 93 -

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me just ask a question if I
could. What is the logic that would say, just as an example, if
one parent refuses to "pony up" for college education, but the
kids living at home with mom. Mom helps put the kids through
college. Dad won't contribute. Mom can sue or kids can sue, but
if both parents refuse, the kid can't sue. It seems to me,
you've either got to have it one way or the other.
It's a child's right that the child can enforce, or can
be enforced for the child by somebody else. Can the child deny
it? I mean, what do you do with a mom who wants to go after dad,
and the kid says, "Look, mom, I don't want the hassle.
I've got
a part-time job; let's not do it." I mean, these are adults.
In some ways, this is the most provocative, puzzling,
difficult and challenging series of bills that I've read in a
long time. The fundamental issues of human relationships.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask as you answer, also. Do
you have the right to go after both parents, based on ability to
pay? Or just the parent who's been paying child support?
MS. RICHMOND:
I think this is phrased such that you can
go after either parent for .••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So, even if a parent has not been
paying child support at age 18 -- that goes again back to what
the right is. If you're going to have the right to go after the
parent who has been paying, then it's in the parent, not in the
child.
MS. RICHMOND: They're very thoughtful questions. One
point -- and I haven't thought this through -- is, if both
parents think that money shouldn't be provided for this child,
maybe then you're in a situation as, in an intact household where
both parents come to that conclusion, and perhaps they ought to
be entitled to.
I put that out as a thought, not as a
position.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Everybody feels it's complicated
except Senator Morgan and Senator Watson. They think it's
simple. Okay.
MR. MCISAAC:
Isn't this really an artifact of the point
of time where we reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18? At
one time, there was a time when parents were required to support
their children to age 21.
I see a lot of kids being disadvantaged because they are
in a divorce situation and are not going to college, and I would
be in favor of this approach provided it also provided for
children who in intact families also had the same benefit. I
think that's a serious concern that you treat one population
differently.
So I think it would be good to raise it to 21.

-
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Mr. Mcisaac, speculate on
mediation efforts in situations where you now have adult
children, for most purposes, beyond the control ••. not Judge
King's 17-year-old beyond his control, but really beyond control.
I don't know how you can mediate the dispute.
MR. MCISAAC: Well, we'd have a Sullivan situation for
children. Children who are going to have to take care of their
parents at some time.
It would be very difficult.
It would be
very hard.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
MR. MCISAAC:

From your point of view .•.

But I think it could be accomplished.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: How would you react to the
provision that the child was able to maintain the action his or
herself and, presumptively I suppose, entitled to mandate
mediation on his or her request for college education support?
MR. MCISAAC:

How would I feel about it?

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Yeah. Other than you need full
funding for your office from the Legislature and the county, and
therefore that's the only way you'd accept it, I got that.
MR. MCISAAC: Well, I think those are mediatory.
disputes. I think you take a look at what the underlying needs
are, and interests, and ••.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG. You've got to be able to talk
about it.
I mean the age of majority, I know, is the legal
fiction.
I understand that. No parents think their kids are
ever adults.
I understand that, too.
MR. MCISAAC:

Correct.

My mother doesn't either.

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: But it strikes me that one of the
things that most crucial about this is that there is that rite of
passage, that automatic transmission or transmutation that occurs
when you reach the age of majority, which though parents don't
believe it and kids don't believe it, in some way must govern
relationship.
And here you have the anomaly of at least in one area,
although in a limited fashion, you're maintaining a different
kind of relationship. And it's the interplay of the
relationships that seems to me that is as much important as
anything else. Murphy's comment of his case, it seems to me is
one of those horror examples that you think of 50 examples, I
suppose.
MR. MCISAAC: But you have to look at it in the context
of a very modern technological society where it requires that
kind of training in order to survive.
I think that in terms of a
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broad social policy we ought to provide that children have the
best opportunity and equal opportunity.
It's an equal protection
issue here.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I'm not opposed for society
promising that every kid ought to have a college education for
free all the time. I'm for that. But this is the notion that in
some cases of divorce some kids are entitled to sue their parents
to force their parents to pay for it. That's the social issue.
MR. MCISAAC:
It's happening. Twenty states have this.
The rite of passage isn't 18 in twenty other states, and yet it
has not created a major problem.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: We don't know. I mean, Senator,
there is no evidence that any of ..• unless there's something I
haven't seen, and I've read all the stuff anybody's given me.
SENATOR MORGAN:
to be discussing this.

Well, I wasn't aware that we were going

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

No, and I know it's unfair for

you.
SENATOR MORGAN:
I don't have my documentation here.
But as I say, it's not longer 18. It wasn't 18 up until '72, it
was 21, and since '72 twenty other states .••
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:

I understand that.

SENATOR MORGAN:
..• changed the age of majority,
particularly for purposes of educational funding of child
support.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS':

Justice King.

JUSTICE KING: First of all the Legislature has already
done something that deals with this anyway, when you passed the
bill a year or two ago about allowing child support to be paid
beyond 18 if the child hadn't graduated from high school and was
attending on a full-time basis and allowing him to go to 19. So
that's a foot in the door, anyway.
To address Assemblyman Frizzelle's concern, I think you
have to categorize families. You can't treat families where
there has been a divorce the same as you can families where there
has not.
Intact families operate differently, and I agree with
you that as little intrusion as possible. But we already treat
nonintact families differently. We've already .••
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: The nonintact families, the ones
that have been separated or just dissolved, are families where
the cost factors are greater, not lesser, than the others. And
they are the ones you are mandating the additional costs on by
means of this bill.
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JUSTICE KING: But whatever cost may be mandated -- and
I don't think it should be mandated, it should be discretionary
-- is going to be fixed if any is order consistent with financial
circumstances of that family.
I'm not so much concerned about -maybe I should have more concern about the-- taxpayer's dollars.
I'm not so concerned about the problem Senator Morgan was
addressing about use of grants.
I'm more concerned with the people I saw who weren't
going to go to college, or weren't going to get some occupational
training because they couldn't get a parent who could afford to
contribute, to contribute. That's the real loss to me because we
all know in this society a high school diploma doesn't get. you
anywhere.
It's hard enough to get anywhere if you've got a
Master's degree. And to put people in a position simply because
their parents are divorced, that at that stage in their life
their whole future is determined because their parents were
divorced and not because of any inability of the parents to
provide for them, I think is a serious mistake.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: It gets into a sociological
issue, though, doesn't it? Because really, people who are very
successful having a college education; they can be very
unsuccessful having a college education. And people without a
college education are often times very successful too, for the
very fact that they shoulder some of the responsibilities
themselves.
JUSTICE KING:
look at the ...

I agree with that, but I think when we

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: You can look at statistics for a
long time. My problem is with the government in one certain set
of circumstances creating, in essence, a mandate or force of cost
to families sometimes that are doubled families, where there is a
second marriage and so forth involved, with people that don't
have the ability. We are making the sociological judgment or
commitment for them whether they have it or not. Or even whether
the kids want to go to school or not.
JUSTICE KING: Well, let me say the major road block ...
I dealt with a log of these cases because, as you know, the
judgements that were entered before March 2nd of 1972 parents
still have to pay until age 21 for child support. And there are
still those kids around, and those kids are going to college now.
It's the ones where the divorce has occurred after March of '72
where it end at 18, and we are powerless to do anything about
that.
The fact of the matter is that in most of the instances,
most of the cases that I saw where there was an ability to pay
and there was no payment, it was because of second marriages.
It's very difficult to for you to take money out of your pocket
to pay for the college education of a kid from a prior marriage,
though you will do it for the kid of the present marriage, and
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try to justify that to your current spouse. It's very difficult.
Whereas if the court is in a position to say you have to do this,
it's a whole different ball game. My experience was that the
real road block was the spouse in the later marriage.
There was another road block, and that's one we can't do
anything about. And that's where the conflict between the two
parents of the child of the first marriage reached such a degree
that the supporting parent got so turned off that they hold their
grudge against their former spouse against the child of that
marriage, and that's another problem.
MR. MCISAAC:

We see a log of these cases •••

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

That cuts both ways.

JUSTICE KING: Yes, it does.
In some cases the child
may indeed have picked up that cudgel and maybe have cut that tie
themselves, and I think that should be a consideration.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I don't want the courts to cause
more divorces in the second marriages either.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Isenberg:

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
Why restrict to education?
JUSTICE KING:
Legislature ••.

Judge King, why stop at age 21?

I think that's a matter of a policy the

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Come on, we don't have any
policies, you know that. What's the logic of it, if there is
any?
JUSTICE KING:
I don't think there is a logic to it.
There's no more logic to age 18 or age 21, or anything else. Why
do we say the age of majority is age 18?
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, you've been around a long
time. When this all happened, before any of us were in the
Legislature, you were probably observing politics. We abolished
relatives' responsibility in the welfare and support laws of the
State of California calling massive reform, what was it 1962 or
'64? This, of course, at least in one level suggests that
relatives' responsibility from adults to children extends past
some cut off point.
JUSTICE KING: Yes, and I don't have any problem with
that. To answer your earlier question, I think the child should
have the right to proceed. I don't see children getting it if
both parents say they shouldn't get it. It's not going to
happen.
I also don't agree that it has to be available to a
child with a intact family, either. The first thing that'll
happen is that family won't be so intact anymore either.
-
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But I think part of your policy is part of your
determination. From our standpoint, all I can tell you is we see
a lot of kids who should go to college, who should go to
apprenticeship school, who should do something and they cannot do
it. They end up going to McDonald's or they end up going
somewhere else, and it's a dead end for them because three or
four years later there is nothing for them to do. Those kids are
there, and we ought to help them.
If you feel that the policy of the State of California
should be that the age of majority is 18 ••• I mean it's just an
anomaly, because New York, at the same time as we did, reduced
the age of majority to 18 and kept child support payable until
21. So, it's just. that maybe we made the wrong judgment at that
time.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Are a higher proportion of
children of divorced families going to college in New York,
statistically higher than in California?
JUSTICE KING:
I don't think it make any difference. It
doesn't have anything to do with divorce.
It has to do with the
educational level of the children.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: The only justification for a bill
like this is to express a fact that statistically fewer children
in divorced families attend college. If that fact can't be
proven, as compared to another state •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

It could also be a result of economic

factors.
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Sure, I understand that.
that doesn't occur, this bill never comes into play.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Well, why not?
kinds of things that aren't based on fact.

But if

We pass all

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Justice King, wouldn't it make
it such that all of those different families would be solicited
for the children's education by different colleges and different
training programs because of the fact they know that the state
has mandated they must be paid for?
JUSTICE KING: They shouldn't mandate that anything must
be done. This is a situation where you must look at it and
decide whether or not this is a case where it should be done,
based on the facts of this case. I also have a son who is 17 and
in an intact family, and I'm getting inundated with those things
already.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: My parents are still married and my
father stopped child support when I was about three. (laughter)
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG:
bill ought to pass, I suppose.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That's conclusive evidence this

Dr. Kelly.

DR. KELLY:
I think
are not unrelated. That is,
some consistency in terms of
issue of children being able
an important one.

that some of these bills, of course,
I think we should be looking for
policy matter. I think that the
to be supported through college is

We've also observed that when fathers in our mediation
center through their negotiations are able to continue to be
involved on a regular basis with their children, they are then
very willing to negotiate agreements about support after 18 and
the sharing of college expenses. We fairly routinely have that
in our agreements, by mutual consent. But it comes after they
also perceive that they are going to have a stake and a share in
their child's life and their motivation, then, is much higher. I
think those two are very important and they should be kept in
mind. That people are not motivated to support kids they haven't
seen.
But you know, even if they remarry, I think that's an
important issue. The fact is, if a father for example, has a
substantial amount of time with the child and that continues on
in the remarriage family, the new spouse sees that obligation to
that child and does not object to the paying of college expenses
because she perceived that it's part of his family.
She has a
relationship as well. These are not unrelated issues.
I think
we need to look at consistency and policy matters along the way.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Woodruff.

MR. WOODRUFF:
I think, first of all I'd like to request
that the retroactivity be made really clear. I've spent
thousands of my clients' dollars litigating the issue of
retroactivity recently.
I hate to ask them for it, and I hate to
take it. And the clarity of this statute is, at the present
time, such that I could charge some a fortune, would have to, in
order to determine whether there is an existing agreement,
whether it applies or not, whether it could be modified.
If the
child is already 18, if the child is not already 18, if the
agreement was negotiated before January 1, 1988 but put into
effect, entered into a judgment sometime later.
So I would
request that that be really clarified and that good history be
made on that issue because it will be tested, I promise you, if
it's retroactive.
I'd also like to state that one of the issues is whether
you continue the support in the amount that it was, or if you
adjust it upwards because of the child attending Stanford.
That's something that really needs to be considered and if the
guidelines that the courts are using ... what's happening now on
the past 18 to 19 while the child is still in high school, at
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least in Sacramento, t.hey' re all using the guidelines. And if
they're going to use guidelines, they also have in the past used
as supplemental awards the amount of half the school tuition.
And so that issue needs to be addressed or it will be very
expensive again to litigate. I would rather have that issue
addressed and decided here so that I don't have to charge people
for it.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
come back and respond.

Judge Murphy, I think you wanted to

JUDGE MURPHY: Can anyone in this room say that any
child in the State of California is deprived of education, at
least for the first two years out of high school? We have a
junior college system that's free.
So, anybody who wants to go
to college in the State of California can go for two years for
free.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: At least on ability to pay.
what Deukmejian says all the time.

That's

JUDGE MURPHY: And then added to that is the question,
do .we want to have a policy in the State of California that says
that someone is entitled to have their education completed within
four years? There are ten of thousands of people going to night
schools throughout our state. And do we want to say to children
of divorced families that we're going to have a special thing for
you? I think it's a real question that obviously you have to
answer.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Senator Morgan, now you have a chance
to respond to all the wonderful things you have heard pro and
con. Now listen, you've had a lot of fair, and very supportive
statements about your bill, so I hope you're happy with that
dialogue.
SENATOR MORGAN: Except for the shaking heads from
yourself and Mr. Isenberg, I'm very happy. (laughter)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
SENATOR MORGAN:
marvelous.

You can't have it all.
The statements from the witnesses were

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, it has been very helpful and as
you know we will have a vote on that bill. But you might want to
consider some of the statements you've heard, that you further
consider this bill. I've talked to some people in support of
your bill outside of this chamber. If possible, we'll continue
to make the request that you and Senator Watson attempt to
resolve this.
You have the earlier numbered bill and I would certainly
think that might be instructive, but it would be helpful if at
least voting we had one bill that reconciled the difference
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between the two.
If you could expect us to make a choice between
the two, I think that further complicates the bill for both of
you. That's not instructive, it's just advisory. Okay.
SENATOR MORGAN:
might make it?

It that encouraging, that one bill

CHAI~~N HARRIS: I'm saying that one bill has a better
chance than two bills. Although neither bill, in my
estimation •.•

SENATOR MORGAN:

That's the bottom line.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, I was trying to be a little
facetious, Senator Morgan. But you've heard our concerns about
the bill, and I think that some of the things we've heard today
as we review the testimony of this hearing will be helpful in
trying to see whether or not we can either modify our position,
or if, in fact, you can modify yours. Okay? It's a two-way
street, and we make every effort to try to meet you at some point
along the road of compromise on this bill.
I don't think anybody has been so close-minded to say
that they don't want to discuss it anymore, or they know where
they are at on the bill. So I hope you at least appreciate the
fact that people have been willing to continue the discussion to
see if we can find some way to resolve individual philosophical
differences on the exact content and even somewhat the direction
of the bill. Okay. Yes, Mr. Isenberg?
ASSEMBTJYtv'AN ISENBERG: Senator Morgan, I shook my head
"no" a couple of times, but I think I shook it "yes" a couple
times.
I still don't know what in the dickens I'm going to do on
this bill.
SENATOR MORGAN:

Do we still have an 8:30 meeting?

ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Only if you want to have an 8:30
meeting.
It's not required for me, God knows.
I've spent enough
time talking about the measure, but I'm still undecided on the
issue. Although I must confess Mr. Mcisaac and Dr. Kelly shake
11'! :t '1it 1n my skepticisrn, which I found to be .•• you even ought
'-; .ci1d t.o be a .little helpful.
I'd just like to sav to you as
an author and also to the panelists, that this has been
delightful.
If I were still practicing family law, which thank God I
am not, I would walk out of here probably a better lawyer for
having been able to sit and think for about four or five hours
about these issues in conjunction, because we never think about
things in conjunction, with one another. We always think about
them in isolation in legislation.
I'd just like to say thank
you.
It's been very spirited and extraordinarily helpful.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'd like to as Chair of the Committee,
thank all of you for your participation in this hearing today.
I can assure you that we would number one, like any clarification
or written extension of remarks that you'd like to share with us.
The record for purposes of addenda, and certainly there is
information that you made available to us by virtue of video that
we would like to have in writing.
I'm sure Ms. DeBow will be in
touch with you about this, so that we can add it to the addendum,
to the hearing transcript.
But we are going to be looking at
this information.
I know I will be looking at it critically and
I certainly want to echo Mr. Isenberg's statement-- this has
been very helpful to me.
We take these bills very seriously. We understand the
importance of them, both to the parents and to the children, and
ultimately to society at large. We simply need to have all this
information and I think the perspective, I would hope Senator
Morgan would agree, has been objectively stated and hopefully
balanced. Whether on agrees to disagrees, at lease I think
people have attempted to be intellectually honest in presenting
their viewpoints on the bill and did not do it with a sense of an
axe to grind.
So I want to thank everyone for their participation, and
I can assure you that your time has been well spent helping us to
deliberate and hopefully resolve these issues when we come back
in January. Mr. Frizzelle, do you have anything you'd like to
add? Okay, with that then the hearing is adjourned, I want to
thank all of you.

* * * * * *

- 103 -

Appendix

•

- 103 a -

SENATE BILL

No. 1296

Introduced by Senator Hart
March 6, 1987

An act to amend Section 4801 of the Civil Code, relating to
spousal support.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

•

SB 1296, as introduced, Hart. Spousal support.
Existing law provides that in any judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation, the court may
order a party to pay for the support of a party in any amount,
and for any period of time, as the court may deem just and
reasonable. In making such an award the court is required to
consider various circumstances, including the standard of
living of the parties and the earning capacity of the parties.
This bill would require such an award to generally be based
on the standard of living established during the marriage but,
in case of a marriage of long duration, the award would be
required to equalize the standards of living of both
households.
Rather than a consideration of the earning capacity of each
spouse the bill would require a consideration of the ability of
the earning capacity of each spouse to maintain the standard
of living established during the marriage, or following a
marriage of long duration, to maintain a standard of living
equal to that of the other spouse. It also would require, in so
determining the consideration of the reduced or lost lifetime
earning capacity of the supported spouse as a result of having
foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or
career opportunities during the marriage, rather than the
existing requirement applicable to determination of earning
capacity requiring consideration of impairment of earning
capacity due to devotion of time to domestic duties.
Among other things, it also would require the consideration
- 104 -
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in making such an award of the ability to pay of the supporting
spouse and of the immediate and specific tax consequences to
each party.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
·

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1
SECTION 1. Section 4801 of the Civil Code is
2 amended to read:
3
4801. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is
4 the public policy of this state that marriage is an equal
5 partnership, that both spousus have contributed equally
6 to any economic benefits accrued as a result of this
7 partnership, and that both spouses are entitled to share
8 economic benefits after separation or dissolution equally.
9 Spousal support awards shall therefore be based on the
10 standard of living established by the parties during the
11 marriage; however, in marriages oflong duration, spousal
12 support should serve to equalize the standards ofliving in
13 the households of both parties after separation or
14 dissolution.
15
16
(b) In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
17 marriage or a legal separation of the parties, the court
18 may order a party
pay for the support of the other
19 party any amount, and for any period of time, as the court
20 may deem just and reasonable, based on the standard of
21 living established during the marriage, except that in
22 marriages of long duration spousal support shall serve to
23 equalize the standards of living of both parties'
24 households. In making the award, the court shall consider
25 all of the following circumstances of the respective
26 parties:
27
(1) The ability the earning capacity of each spouse
28 to maintain the standard of living established during the
29 marriage, or following a marriage of long duration, to
30 maintain a standard of living equal to that of the other
31 spouse, taking into account all of the following:
32
(A) The marketable skills of the supported spouse; the

w
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job market for those skills; the time and expenses
required for the supported spouse to acquire the
appropriate education or training to develop those skills;
and the possible need for retraining or education to
acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
(B) :t:fte eKteat -te v;aiea ~ suppm"ted spettse 's
preseat 61' fl::ltttre eftt'ftiag ea-paeity is impaired ~ periods
ef ttH:efftpleymeat ~ wet'€ iaettrred dttriag ~
fftftt'fiage -te permit ~ sttpported spo1:1:se -te de..·ete time
-te domestic d1:1:ties. The reduced or lost lifetime earning
capacity of the supported spouse as a result of having
foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or
career opportunities during ~he marriage.
(C) The extent to which the supported spouse
contributed to the attainment of an education, training,
a career position, or a license by the other spouse.
(D) The ability to pay of the supporting spouse, taking
into account the supporting spouse's earning capacity,
earned and unearned income~ assets, and the standard of
living of the parties established during the marriage.
(2) The needs of each party, based on the standard of
living established during the marriage, or, in the case of
a marriage oflong duration, based on equalization of the
parties' standards of living.
(3) The obligations and assets, including the separate
property, of each.
(4) The duration of the marriage.
(5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in
gainful employment without interfering with the
interests of dependent children in the custody of the
spouse.
(6) The age 61' and health of the parties.
(7) +Be staadard ef liYiag ef ~ pa.Pties. The
immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
(8) Any other factors which it deems just and
equitable.
At the request of either party, the court shall make
appropriate factual determinations with respect to the
circumstances. The court may order the party required
to make the payment of support' to give reasonable
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security therefor. Any order for support of the other
party may be modified or revoked as the court may deem
necessary, except as to any amount that may have
accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of
motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke. Any
order for spousal support may be made retroactive to the
date of filing of the notice of motion or order to show
cause therefor, or to any subsequent date. At the request
of either party, the order of modification or revocation
shall include a statement of decision and may be made
retroactive to the date of filing of the notice of motion or
order to show cause therefor, or to any subsequent date.
(b) Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in
writing, the obligation of any party under any order or
judgment for the support and maintenance of the other
party shall terminate upon the death of either party or
the remarriage of the other party.
(c) When a court orders a person to make specified
payments for support of the other party for a contingent
period of time, the liability of the person terminates upon
the happening of the contingency. If the party to whom
payments are to be made fails to notify the person
ordered to make the payments, or the attorney of record
of the person so ordered, of the happening of the
contingency and continues to accept support payments,
the supported party shall refund any and all moneys
received which accrued after the happening of the
contingency, except that the overpayments shall first be
applied to any and all support payments which are then
in default. The court may, in the original order for
support, order the party to whom payments are to be
made to notify the person ordered to make the payments,
or his or her attorney of record, of the happening of the
contingency.
(d) An order for payment of an allowance for the
support of one of the parties shall terminate at the end of
the period specified in the order and shall not be
extended unless the court in its original order retains
j'..lrisdiction.
(e) In any proceeding under this section the court
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1 may order a party to submit to an examination by a
2 vocational training consultant. The order may be made
3 only on motion, for good cause shown, and upon notice
-t to the party to be examined and to all parties, and shall
5 specify the time, plact.", manner, conditions, scope of the
6 t"X~tmination, and the person or persons by whom it is to
7 be made. The party refusing to eomply with such an
S order shall be subject to the same consequences provided
9 for failun• to comply with an examination ordered
lO pursuant to St•dion 2032 of thl' Code of Civil Procedure.
ll
~f) For the purpost'S of this section, .. vocational
12 training consultant" means an individual with sufllcienl
13 knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educ<ltion
14 rf•lating to interviewing, the lt•sting and analysis of work
15 skills, the planning of courses of training and study, tht"
16 formuhttion of career goals, and the work market to
17 qualify as an expert in vocational training under Section
18 720 of tht' Evidence Code .

•
0
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HISTORY
Source:

Senate Task Force on Family Equity
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California NOW; Amador Calaveras NOW; California Home
Economics Association; Children's Rights Advocates Grandparents (CRAG); Los Angeles Parent Magazine;
Sacramento YMCA; Queen's Bench

Opposition:

Individuals
KEY ISSUE

SHOULD AN AWARD FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT RE BASED ON THE STANDARD OF
LIVING ESTABLISHED DURING THE MARRIAGE EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF A
MARRIAGE OF LONG DURATION, IN WHICH THE AWARD WOULD BE REQUIRED
TO EQUALIZE THE STANDARDS OF LIVING OF BOTH HOUSEHOLDS?
PURPOSE
Existing law provides that in any judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation, the court may
order a party to pay for the support of a party in any amount,
and for any period of time, as the court may deem just and
reasonable. In making such an award the court is required to
consider various circumstances, including the standard of living
of the parties and the earning capacity of the parties.
This bill would require an award for spousal support to generally
be based also on the standard of living established during the
marriage but, in the case of a marriage of long duration, the
award would be required to equalize the standards of living of
(More)
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both households. In making such an award, the court would be
required to consider a number of specified circumstances,
including: the ability of the earning capacity of each spouse to
maintain the standard of living established during the marriage,
or following a marriage of long duration, to maintain a standard
of living equal to that of the other spouse; the reduced or lost
lifetime earning capacity of the supported spouse as a result of
having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or
career opportunities during the marriage; the needs of each
party, based on the standard of living established during the
marriage, or in the case of a marriage of long duration, based on
equalization of the parties' standards of living; and the
immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
The purpose of this bill is to require courts to consider how the
parties lived before the divorce and attempt to grant awards
consistent with that lifestyle.
COMMENT
1.

~~~E_fQ!_l~Ei~l~!iE~

According to the author of this bill, "The current standard
for spousal support is what is 'just and reasonable'.
Unfortunately, courts are too often defining subsistence
level awards as being 'just and reasonable'. This bill will
require the court to consider how the parties lived before
the divorce and attempt to grant awards consistent with that
lifestyle."
This bill would require the court to consider the supporting
spouse's ability to pay as one of the factors affecting its
efforts to achieve the standard of living. In the case of a
marriage of long duration where the spouses are likely to be
elderly, the measure would require the court to try to set
awards at a level that would equalize the standard of living
in both households after divorce.
"Many divorced women are living at the poverty level because
they have not been granted reasonable levels of spousal
support," claims the author. "While it may not be possible
to guarantee the same standard of living achieved during the
marriage, I think the courts can do a better job than they
have in the past."

(More)
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2.

~!~!£r~~~g

According to the sponsor of this bill, the Senate Task Force
on Family Equity, the no-fault divorce reforms eliminated
fault as a grounds of alimony. The primary standard for
spousal support became the financial need of one spouse and
the ability to pay of the other spouse. However, testimony
and research presented to the Task Force suggested that the
judicial interpretation and application of this standard has
resulted in economic hardship to women.
Under the fault system, wives were presumed financially
dependent upon their husbands. Under the divorce reforms
which intended to treat men and women equally at divorce,
courts have interpreted this to mean that wives are presumed
to be capable of supporting themselves at divorce and are
therefore not financially in need of spousal support. For
those women who prove that they are financially in need of
support, the courts presume that such need will be
shortlived. The courts assume that these women can quickly
enter the paid labor market and become self-supporting.
Thus, the Task Force was convinced that spousal support
awards are typically of short duration and inadequate
amounts.
The Task Force declared that adequate spousal support awards
are essential to equalizing the economic consequences of
divorce between men and women. The awards reflect societal
perceptions of the importance and values of homemaking and
childrearing contributions and sacrifices made during the
marriage. Thus, this bill has been introduced in order to
improve the adequacy of spousal support awards.
3.

l~£l~l!!lY~-l~!~~!-~~~!l~~

The bill would include a legislative intent section which
would state that it is the public policy of this state that
marriage is an equal partnership, that both spouses have
contributed equally to any economic benefits accrued as a
result of this partnership, and that both spouses are
entitled to equally share economic benefits after separation
or dissolution. Because of this policy, spousal support
awards would be based on the standard of livinq established
during the marriage, except in marriages of long duration.

(More)
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4.

£~£!Q!~_!Q_££~~i~~!-~~~~-~~~!~l~g-~~££Q!!

The bill would require the court, when ordering a party to
pay for the support of the other party, to base any award on
the standard of living established during the marriage,
except that in marriages of long duration courts would be
required to award spousal support payments which would serve
to equalize the standards of living of both parties'
household. The court would be required to consider all of
the following circumstances:
a) the ability of the earning capacity of each spouse to
maintain the standard of living established during the
marriage, or following a marriage of long duration, to
maintain a standard of living equal to that of the other
spouse, taking into account:
the marketable skills of the supported spouse;
the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the
supported spouse as a result of having foregone or
delayed education, training, employment, or career
opportunities during the marriage;
the extent to which the supported spouse contributed to
the attainment of an education, training, career
position, or a license by the other spouse;
the ability to pay of the supporting spouse, taking
into account the supporting spouse's earning capacity,
earned an unearned income, assets, and the standard of
living of the parties established during the marriage.
b) the needs of each party, based on the standard of living
established during the marriage, or, in the case of a
marriage of long duration, based on equalization of the
parties' standards of living;
c) the obligations and assets of each;
d) the duration of the marriage;
e) the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful
employment without interfering with the interests of
dependent children in the custody of the spouse;
f) the age and health of the parties;
g) the immediate and specific tax consequences to each party;

(More)
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h) any other factors which the court deemed just and
equitable.
5.

~~rri~g~_£i_l£~g-~~r~!i£~

This bill would provide a different standard of living in
cases where the marriage had been for a long duration.
However, the bill does not define the term "marriage of long
duration." On April 7, SB 907 (Lockyer) was passed out of
this Committee; the purpose of that bill was to provide for
indefinite jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support in
marriages of long duration. The Committee determined that
the term should be defined and declared that a marriage of at
least 15 years was a marriage of long duration.
SHOULD NOT THIS BILL INCLUDE A DEFINITION FOR THE TERM
"MARRIAGE OF LONG DURATION"?
6.

Igg~l!!!~g_!~~-~!~~~~!~_£i_liYi~g

This bill would require courts to equalize the standard of
living in the case of a marriage of long duration. In
essence, this provision would tie spouses of long marriages
together, at least economically, long after their marriage
had dissolved. One opponent of this bill states that
although the statement of legislative intent declares that
marriage is a partnership, this provision effectively
declares that marriages of long duration are much more than a
partnership-- partnerships can be terminated and proceeds can
be divided evenly; this bill would provide that partners from
long-term marriages could never break the economic binds-they would be required to equalize their standards of living
indefinitely.
SHOULD NOT THIS BILL PROVIDE SOME LIMIT ON THE AMOUNT OF TIME
IN WHICH SPOUSES OF MARRIAGES OF LONG DURATION COULD BE
REQUIRED TO EQUALIZE THEIR STANDARDS OF LIVING?
Under this bill, if one spouse married a wealthy individual
after the dissolution was final, the married spouse would be
required to share the wealth of her new spouse with the
former spouse. Likewise, if one spouse bought a lottery
ticket after the marriage had dissolved, he or she would be
required to share the winnings with the former spouse, no
matter how many years had elapsed since the dissolution.

(More}
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7.

Q££~~~~1~~-!!~~~~~1~

Opponents are concerned that this bill would have a
monumental impact upon the ability of divorced persons to
remarry and to support new families. "If the supporting
spouse was required for what could be the lifetime of the
supported spouse to pay support in an amount sufficient to
maintain the standard of living they enjoyed during the
marriage, how many of those supporting spouses could afford
to incur the financial obligations required for a second or
subsequent family?"
Opponents would prefer to see the issue of child support left
to the discretion of trial judges in accordance with existing
statutory and case law, which provides for reasonable
criteria by which the court is to order such support.
************
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CURRENT LAW
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1.

Same

Petition the court for divorce
- check the box indicating you will
be requesting spousal support.
2.

Submit a Financial Declaration
a. each party submits
b. on each declaration, his and her
current monthly expenses and income are
declared.

3. Supported Spouse files an Order to
Show Cause or a Noticed Motion

Same
Same
c. on each declaration, the joint
monthly expenses and income during the
marriage are declared (these are expenses which represent the marital
standard of living.)
Same

a. requesting an amount of support
b. justifying the amount with what
information is available and appropriate
regarding need and ability to pay (i.e.
supported spouse may speak to age, job
situation, marital standard of living,
health status, earning capacity of supporting spouse, etc.)
4. Hearing (if there's been no settlement)
- Each side puts on its case:
supported spouse establishes her need
and his ability to pay; supporting
spouse refutes her need and justifies
less ability to pay.

Same

\.0
r-l
r-l

5.

Judge

a. determines whatever amount
he/she feels appropriate as the basis
from which to start in determining a
just and reasonable amount of support.

a. determines an amount reflecting
the marital standard of living
as the appropriate basis from which
to start in determining a just and
reasonable amount of support.

b. using this amount as a starting point, the judge arrives at a just
and reasonable amount considering the
factors in §480l(a) and the testimony.
The judge may determine that no spousal
support is appropriate.
--

b. using this amount as a starting point, the judge arrives at a
just and reasonable amount considering the factors in §480l(a)
and the testimony. The judge may
determine that no spousal support
is appropriate.

......
,.....
,.....

SENATE BILL

No. 1296

Introduced by Senator Hart
March 6, 1987

.

An act to amend Section 4801 of the Civil Code, relating to
spousal support.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 1296, as introduced, Hart. Spousal support.
Existing law provides that in any judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation, the court may
order a party to pay for the support of a party in any amount,
and for any period of time, as the court may deem just and
reasonable. In making such an award the court is required to
consider various circumstances, including the standard of
living of the parties and the earning capacity of the parties.
This bill would require such an award to generally be based
on the standard of living established during the marriage ~.
ia gaco a£ a aaasRoso of )opg duration, the gnrerd '"auld be
nijwin&l '" Ei''!'IPli;ro 'lie st&liiSAJidr of linililf:!i of bth
}umnAolfis.

Rather than a consideration of the earning capacity of each
spouse the bill would require a consideration of the ability of
the earning capacity of each spouse to maintain the standard
of living established during the marriage, •• &eYe" tl'!t~ a
mariass of 1ons duration, to maintain a standard or Hni.tia.g
liUifBd *o t&gt of •h otAii' rpouee. It also would require, in so
5

(

•

I

determining the consideration of the reduced or lost lifetime
earning capacity of the supported spouse as a result of having
foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or
career opportunities during the marriage, rather than the
existing requirement applicable to determination of earning
capacity requiring consideration of impairment of earning
capacity duo to dn·oHon of tjme to domertio dnti9€.
Among other things, it also would require the consideration

............. ,
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in making S\ICh an award of the ability to pay of the supporting
spouse and of tqe immediate and specific tax consequences to
each party.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: nq.
·

1 job market for those skills; the time and expenses
required for the supported spouse to acquire the
appropriate education or training to develop those skills;
and the possible need for retraining or education to
acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
(B) !:Rte emem te wftie.ft ~ s~:t~pertee 9pettoo~
7 ~reseat 6i' fttftH'e earai~~tg eaptteH)' t.s tft\psiree 6f perietiB
8 ef ~:tlltefflple)'men~ ~ were ifttlttrree ~
te ~
9 marri~tge te ~ ~ lllttpf:iertee
lO te een'\estie ~ The reduced
11 capacity of the '""""'""'"',-~
1e or del;
12
13
OPDOrtw
14
extent to
15
to the attainment of an cuu~.:i<~.ul:;u, traim:ng,
16
or a license
the other spouse.
17
(D)
of the """nllrtinu
18 into account the supporting
19 earned and unearned income; assets, and the .:mmutu
20 living ~'dill# }JIIJ'.tifllJ' mi4'i:lii'lutd SIINiPI§i l'a> nwrri:teJi&.
21
(2) The needs of each party, bused on the standard of
22 living established during the marriage, w·1 in d111 l\ii'2 ei
23 .. '\wninBt? l?f'lil1¥f lilwfilJJ'wo, !JweJ e1111 11141111•di:~M.tii:IN ,.{ .. e
24 piJI'&riVII' olltMiii!Wll'tk fl c fi11il.lg.
25
(3) The obligations and assets, including the separate
26 property, of each.
Z1
(4) The duration of the marriage.
28
(5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in
29 gainful employment without interfering with the
30 interests of dependent children in the custody of the
31 spouse.
32
(6) The age M and health of the parties.
33
(7) !:Rte stsnettre ef HYittg ·ef the pttrties. The
34 immediate alld specific tax collsequellces to each party.
35
(8) Any other factors which it deems just and
3tt't!quitable.
37
At the request of either party, the court shall m.:~ke
38 appropriate factual determinations with respec~ to the
39 circumstan~es. The court may order the party required
40 to make the payment of support to give reasonable

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION l. Section 4801 of

Civil Code is
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In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
marriage or a legal separation of the parties, the court
may order a party to pay for the support of the other
party any amount, and for any period of time, as the court
may deem just and reasonable, based on the standard of
Jiving established during the marriage, 61"11•* &bot Ml
~sw t1r 'e"d§ de.t'VIJJid.OJi ijllfi'JJtUtl ~e·t :tbM" :tW'1'9 kJ
BtJMMJi1Stl tJatJ Ml*'JJj/,rfh sf Jj t 'will§ Mf :beth JlW!irJS •
Jta~tJtn.. ,Jik. In making the award, the court shall consider
all of the following circumstances of the respective
parties:
( l) The .ability of the earning capacity of each spouse
to maintain the standard of living established during the
marriage, fir
I:N.....,..M§I1 tj[Jo•tg lilus.n&ililn; '"
m.lliu-Wi:Q.." d·uHinrfil o' 'i1.;,.,g iiql''Jol tQ tb'lt ~'til~ .-&hr
~use. taking into account all of the following:
· (A) The marketable skills of the supported spouse; the
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1 security therefor. Any order for support of the other
2 party may be modified or revoked as the court may deem
3 necessary, except as to any amount that may have
4 accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of
5 motion or ordeF to show cause to modify or revoke. Any
6 order for
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36
of one of the parties shall terminate at the end of
37 ·
period specified in the order and shall not be
38 extended unless the court in its original order retains
39 jurisdiction.
40
(e) In any proceeding under this section the court
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August 19, 1987

Assemblyman Elihu M. Harris
P.O. Box 942
Sacramento, California
Dear Mr. Harris:
I am a Certified Family Law Specialist in California, former
President of the Northern California Chapter of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and wrote the Judicial Court
Support Guidelines used by the Judicial Counsel. I lecture and
write extensively on spousal-arr~lCLsupport.
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I agree with you t'at SB 1296_
other pending senate bills
relating to support and~J'property are not in a position
for adoption by the California Legislature now.

Although the Senate Task Force on Family Equity highlighted
some real existing problems, the suggested solutions will cause
as many problems as they solve. What we badly need is a careful
examination of the concept of spousal support in California and a
re-doing of the whole support statute (CC 4800).
I believe that there is a strong movement in this direction
among lawyers who want to cooperate with the legislature, women's
groups, custody interest and other interested parties. An article
by me on this subject is being published in the "California
Lawyer" in September and will be followed shortly by a more
complete suggestion in 11 Family Law News", the publication for all
certified family law specialists in California. A copy of the
latter is enclosed.

The present legislation suggested abides bandaids for some
existing problems and would have terrible equitable results in
situations not considered by the task force. I hope that the
assembly, unlike the senate, will move slowly and carefully on
the existing problems.
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Time for
In Spo
Lawyers and clients
a more consistent
E NEED TO change the way California courts determine
spousal support. We need support guidelines that are clear, predictable and uniform throughout the state,
yet leave room for judicial discretion
when it is appropriate.
The present scheme for determining
support is really no scheme at all.
tion 4801 of the Civil Code provides a
hodgepodge of criteria for setting spousal support that gives courts only the
most general guidance.
Many California counties now use a
spousal support schedule to determine
temporary support payments. Called
the California Guidelines, this """"'"""v
was developed in Santa Clara
and provides a mathematical formula for
calculating temporary support
But Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143
CA3d 65, 191 CR 541 ruled that a schedule could not determine permanent
spousal support, and that it must instead be based on the criteria in §4801.
Unfortunately, the statute provides no
mathematical guidance for applying its
general criteria. A judge can award 10
percent or 50 percent of total net income
to a supported spouse and still make
findings showing compliance with
statute.
In my opinion, the formula "''""''"·":.'"o"
in the California Guidelines
used consistently throughout
to determine initial permanent
support. Under that formula
port payment is 40 percent of the
net income minus 50 percent of
payee's net income, excluding the amount

W

George Norton practices in Palo Alto. He
is a certified family law specialist and a
fellow of the American Acaderny of Matrimonial Lawyers.
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TOTEC PRO-SCAN

Winning at office productivity
means being able to cut corners
to get things done without cutting quality of work. TOTEC's
Pro-Scan Optical Page Reader
"reads" ordinary typewritten,
photocopied or printed documents directly into your PC or
word processor. Twenty different type fonts can be read
including proportionally spaced
type in English or eight foreign
languages. Pro-Scan is as easy
to use as a desktop copier. And
its advanced character recognition system makes it virtually
error-free. Stop re-typing documents and let Pro-Scan from
TOTEC do the work!
Call or write TOTEC Co.,
Ltd. • 9205 Alabama Avenue,
Suite B • Chatsworth, CA
91311 • (818) 718-0055.

Statewide guidelines are needed
for determining spousal support
Support for a divorced spouse is in fact
a government-required transfer of future private income for the purpose of
allowing the state to avoid the obligation
of supporting divorced spouses and their
children. Other public policy considerations include the more subjective goal of
promoting "fairness," which is necessarily based on changing social mores. The
best a legislature and legal system can
do is establish a rationale for spousal
support that meets present government
needs, reflects current social mores and
provides for some degree of uniformity
and predictability in application.
In addition to guidelines for determining the amount of support, courts also
need more precise guidelines for deciding when to terminate or reduce support. For example, for marriages lasting
less than 10 years, termination of support could be allowed-but not required-after half the length of the
marriage. I would propose that a spouse
never receive support for a longer period than the length of the marriage.
Spousal support should not be an insurance policy against disability, insanity,
alcoholism or refusal to work. Society as
a whole should provide for these problems after a defined length of time.
Other issues that would need to be ad-

dressed by statewide guidelines are payment of support after retirement, the
tax consequences of support payments
and the division of pensions and professional goodwill.
would enable couples to consider divorce
with a better understanding of
their rights and more realistic expectations for their futures. It is easier for
clients to accept predictable limits than
to accept extended uncertainty followed
by an arbitrary outcome. Some divorcing couples get realistic advice and guidance from their lawyers, but not all. And
some clients are not willing to accept
their lawyers' advice, knowing that the
law now gives the courts great discretion. No lawyer can predict with certainty what a judge will do.
Vague laws and unrealistic expectations about spousal support increase the
likelihood of litigation and dissatisfaction
with the outcome, whatever it is. And
as we all know, disappointed clients generally blame their lawyers and the legal
system. Divorcing couples, family law
attorneys and judges all deserve a more
rational, equitable and predictable system for determining spousal support. 0
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ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE AND
STATE BAR MATTERS
An established record

of successful:
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Disciplinary defense
Legal malpractice defense
Client Security Fund recoveries
Major plaintiff legal malpractice
recoveries
• Bar admissions
• Fee dispute matters on behalf
of clients and attorneys

Former Senior Disciplinary
Prosecutor for State Bar of
California. Seventeen years
trial experience.
Our three-la"\\ryer office
provides representation, consultation, evaluation, association,
and referral services in all
attorney law matters.
Advertising monthly in
California Lawyer since 1983.
References gladly furnished.
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AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 18, 1987
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JULY 8, 1987
AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 5, 1987

No. 1341

SENATE BILL

Introduced by Senators Hart and Watson
March 6, 1987

An act to amend Section 4800 of, to add Sections 4370.7 and
4700.10 to, and to repeal Section 4800.7 of, the Civil Code,
relating to family law.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

•

SB 1341, as amended, Hart. Family law.
Existing law provides that the respective interests of the
husband and wife in the community property during the
existence of the marriage relationship are present, existing,
and equal. Existing law requires that in proceedings for
dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, except upon
the written agreement of the parties, or on stipulation of the
parties in open court, the court shall divide the community
property and the quasi-community property of the parties
equally, except as specified. Under existing law, a court,
rather than ordering the sale of the family home in order to
achieve equal division, may make a "family home award," in
which temporary use of the family home is given to the party
having custody of minor children in order to minimize the
adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the
welfare of the children.
This bill would revise the law relating to the making of a
family home award to, among other things, rename this award
a "deferred sale of home order," specify factors that must be
considered in determining whether to make such an order,
require such an order if a specified determination is made,

- 124 96 40
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and provide that
such an order may be
considered to
additional child support.
The bill also would
a court to award
reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a party requesting a
deferred sale of home order in any case in which the court
finds that the other party has disputed issues relating to
physical custody of a child primarily for that party's economic
interest
not because of
interests of the child. It
would also
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
Hi<JlSU::;

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
is added to the Civil

1
2
3
4

...,..,.,,.,,...."'e·.-::L,u... pursuant

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

case
disputed
primarily
because
2.

to Section 4700.10,
attorney's fees and costs to
"'*""'' ......"'.,.. sale of home order in any
other party has
vJ.a,uu.r, to physical custody of a child
economic interest and not
interests of the child.
"""'""'""""' to the Civil Code, to

4700.10.
(1)

physical
order" means an order
the sale and awards the
possession of the family
minor children, or children
Section 196 or 206,
has sole or joint
the adverse impact of
on the welfare of the

UVllU'-'

23 children.
24
25
26
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1
2
3
4

awaFd the family home ffi a: custodial paFeat puFsuaat ffi
subdivisioa fat ef Seetioa -l800; the 6eUi't sha:ll deteFmiae
'Nhether ffi ma:lre a: defeHed sa:le of home et=6:eF puFsuaat
ffi -tfti.s seetioa. ffi makiag St:tCft a: deteFmiaatioa, the 6eUi't

5

(b) In any case in which one of the parties has

6 requested a deferred sale of home order pursuant to this

7 section, the court, in making a determination on that
8 request, shall consider all of the following:
9
( 1) Whether there are insufficient assets to award the
10 family home to a custodial parent pursuant to subdivision
11 (a) of Section 4800.
12
(2) The length of time the child has resided in the
13 home.
14
~
15
(3) The child's placement or grade in school.
16
-f3t
17
(4) The accessibility and convenience of the home to
18 the child's school and other services or facilities used by
19 and available to the child.
20
f\1- VlhetheF the custodial paFeat er a: efHl4 lrftS
21 ph~·sieal disabilities.
(5) Whether the home has been adapted or modified
22
23 to accommodate any physical disabilities of a custodial
24 parent or child.
25
+fie
26
(6) Whether there may be significant psychological
27 detriment to the child associated with a change in
28 residence.

w

29
-f6t
30
(7) The extent to which the location of the home
31 facilitates the custodial parent's work optioas
32 considerations, including child care.
33
f'Pr
34
(8) The financial ability of each parent to obtain
35 suitable housing.

36

~

37
(9)
Whether the custodial parent is capable of
38 exercising a right of first refusal in the event of a proposed
39 sale of the family residence.
40
-fQt
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(10) Any other factors the court deems just and
equitable.
(c) Upon a determination pursuant to subdivision (b)
that a deferred sale of home order will minimize the
adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the
child a¥ #.l:e primary family tffi'i.f, the court shall make
such an order to a custodial parent and shall specify the
duration of the order. The order shall include the legal
description and assessor's parcel number of the real
property which is subject to the order and shall be
recorded in the office of the county recorder of the
county in which the real property is located. Such an
order may be considered to constitute additional child
support pursuant to Section 4728.5.
(d) The court may order a lien against the
noncustodial parent's interest
the family residence to
secure any support obligation arrearages of the
noncustodial parent existing at the time of sale of the
family residence. The lien authorized by this subdivision
is created by recording a certified copy of the order
containing the legal description and assessor's parcel
number of the real property with the county recorder of
the county in which the residence is located. The lien
recorded against the noncustodial parent's interest in the
family residence pursuant to this subdivision attaches to
the residential real property upon recordation and is
subject to Article 2 (commencing with Section 697.310)
of Chapter 2 of Division 2 of Title 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
(e) The court may
a dollar limit on the amount
of the expenses of maintenance of the residence to be
paid solely by the party granted a deferred sale of home
order.
(f) Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in
writing, a deferred
order may be modified
or terminated at any time at the discretion of the court.
(g) In making an order pursuant to this section, the
court may reserve jurisdiction to determine any and all
issues that arise with respect to the sale of the home
including, but not limited to, the tax consequences to

27 -
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each party.
(h) This section is applicable regardless of whether
the deferred sale of home order is made before or after
January 1, 1988.
SEC. 3. Section 4800 of the Civil Code is amended to
read:
4800. (a) Except upon the written agreement of the
parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court,
or as otherwise provided in this section and Section
4700.10, the court shall, either in its judgment of
dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment decreeing the
legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it
expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property
division, divide the community estate of the parties
equally. For purposes of making this division, the court
shall value the assets and liabilities as near as practicable
to the time of trial, except that, upon 30 days' notice by
the moving party to the other party, the court for good
cause shown may value all or any portion of the assets and
liabilities at a date after separation and prior to trial to
accomplish an equal division of the community estate of
the parties in an equitable manner.
For the purposes of division and in confirming or
assigning the liabilities of the parties for which the
community estate is liable, the court shall characterize
liabilities as separate or community and confirm or assign
them to the parties in accordance with subdivision (c) .
As used in this section, "community estate" includes
both the community and quasi-community assets and
liabilities. of the parties.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may
divide the community estate as follows:
(1) Where economic circumstances warrant, the court
may award any asset to one party on such conditions as
it deems proper to effect a substantially equal division of
the property.
(2) As an additional award or offset against existing
property, the court may award, from a party's share, any
sum it determines to have been deliberately
misappropriated
the party to the exclusion of the
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interest of the other party in the community estate.
(3) If the net value of the community estate is less than
five thousand dollars ($5,000) and one party cannot be
located through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
court may award all such property to the other party on
such conditions as it deems proper in its judgment
decreeing the dissolution of the marriage or in its
judgment decreeing the legal separation of the parties.
(4) Community estate personal injury damages shall
be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless
the court, after taking into account the economic
condition and needs of each party, the time that has
elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual
of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case,
determines that the interests of justice require another
disposition. In such a case, the community property
personal injury damages shall be assigned to the
respective parties in such proportions as the court
determines to be just, except that at least one-half of the
damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the
injuries. As used in this subdivision, "community estate
personal injury damages" means all money or other
property received or to be received by a person in
satisfaction of a judgment for damages for his or her
personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the
settlement or compromise of a claim for the damages, if
the cause of action for the damages arose during the
marriage but is not separate property as defined in
Section 5126, unless the money or other property has
been commingled with other assets of the community
estate.
(5) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (c),
educational loans shall be assigned pursuant to Section
4800.3 and liabilities subject to paragraph (2) of
subdivision (b) of Section 5122 shall be assigned to the
spouse whose act or omission provided the basis for the
liability, without offset.
(c) The debts for which the community estate is liable
which are unpaid at the time of trial or for which the
community estate becomes liable after trial, shall be
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confirmed or divided as
(1) Debts incurred by
spouse before the date of
without offset to the spouse
marriage shall be '--'"'-'H
who incurred the debt.
(2) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of
marriage but prior to the date of separation shall be
divided as set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b). To the
extent that
debts exceed total community
and quasi-community
excess of debt shall be
assigned as the court
just and equitable, taking
into account factors
as the parties' relative ability to
pay.
(3) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of
separation but before entry of a judgment of dissolution
or legal separation shall be confirmed as follows:
(A) Debts incurred
either spouse for the common
necessaries of life of
spouse or the necessaries of
life of the minor children of the marriage, in the absence
of a court order or
agreement for support or for
the payment of these
shall be confirmed to either
spouse according to
respective needs and
abilities to pay at
debt was incurred.
(B) Debts
incurred
by
either
spouse
for
nonnecessaries of that
or minor children of the
marriage shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse
who incurred the debt.
(4) Debts incurred
spouse after entry of a
to termination of the
judgment of .......""v•u
parties' marital status or
of a judgment oflegal
separation shall
offset to the spouse
who incurred
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), all separate
debts, including those debts incurred by a spouse during
marriage
before
that were not
incurred
community, shall be
confirmed
spouse who incurred the
debt.
(e) The
to order reimbursement
in cases it
for debts paid after
separation
1
96

160
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1
(f) The court may make such orders as it deems
2 necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
SEC. 4. Section 4800.7 of the Civil Code is repealed.
3

0
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Date of Hearing:

SB 1341

August 19, 1987
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
ELIHU M. HARRIS, Chairman
SB 1341 (Hart) - As Amended:

August 18, 1987

PRIOR ACTIONS
Sen. Com. on JUD. 6-0

Sen. Floor 21-4

SUBJECT: This bill revises the factors to be considered in granting temporary
use of the family home under the Family Law Act.
DIGEST
Existing law:
1)

Provides that the respective interests of the husband and wife in the
community property during the existence of the marriage relationship are
present, existing, and equal.

2)

Requires that in proceedings for dissolution of marriage
separation, except upon written agreement of the parties
of the parties in open court, the court shall divide the
property and the quasi-community property of the parties
otherwise specified.

3)

Permits the court to make a "family home award," rather than ordering the
sale of the family home in order to achieve equal division. The "family
home award 11 is the temporary use of the family home given to the party
having custody of minor children in order to minimize the adverse impact
of dissolution or legal separation of the welfare of the children.

or for legal
or on stipulation
community
equally except as

This bi 11:
1)

Renames the family home award to 11 deferred sale of home order 11 (DSHO) and
specifies factors that must be considered in determining whether to make
such an order.

2)

Requires a DSHO be made in favor of custodial parent if a determination is
made that such an order will minimize the adverse impact of dissolution or
legal separation on the child.

3)

Provides that the value of a DSHO may be considered to constitute
additional child support.

- continued SB 1341
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4)

Authorizes the creation of a lien against the noncustodial parent's
interest in the family residence upon the recording of the DSHO. This
lien is to secure any support obligation arrearages which may arise prior
to the sale of the family residence.

5)

Authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a
party requesting a DSHO in any case in which the court finds that the
other party has disputed issues relating to the physical custody of a
child primarily for that party's economic interest and not because of the
best interests of the child.

FISCAL EFFECT
None
COMMENTS
1)

The source of this bill is the Senate Task Force on Family Equity.
According to the author, this bill requires judges under certain
circumstances to defer the sale of the family home in divorces involving
minor children. Further, the author states:
This measure was recommended by the Senate Task Force on Family Equity
who were concerned that such deferrals, while permitted under current
statute and actually required pursuant to case law in the Duke
decision, were not being widely implemented. They (the Ta~orce)
felt (there) was lack of clarity in the law as to under what
circumstances deferrals were supposed to occur •.. In response, the
Task Force members developed guidelines to be used by the courts,
guidelines which are oriented to the children's needs ...
Maintenance of the family home can provide some semblance of
continuity and stability otherwise missing from the child's life.
Proponents assert that divorce is a traumatic experience for children.
Both the loss of a parent and the loss of their home compound the negative
emotional effects of divorce. They state that this bill would provide the
extra protection needed for children during these times. According to
supporters, minor children and their caretakers require the support
provided by neighbors, friends, classmates, and familiar surroundings
during and after a divorce.

- continued SB 1341
Page 2
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2)

In Duke, the court found that in marital dissolutions the courts have the
authority to award temporary use of the family home to the party having
custody of minor children in order to minimize the adverse impact of the
dissolution on the welfare of the children. The award delays the sale of
the home and division of the proceeds during the period of the temporary
use. In making a "Duke" award, the court is to weigh the economic,
social, and emotional benefits of the award against the economic
detriments to the party temporarily denied his or her share of the
proceeds of the family home (which may be the only substantial asset of
the marriage).
AB 2739 (Isenberg) - Chapter 419, Statutes of 1984, codified the decision
(Civil Code Section 4800.7) and clarified the Duke decision which had been
inconsistently interpreted by subsequent decisTOnS.
The California Law Revision Commission, the sponsor of AB 2739, concluded
after studying the law that the courts should be afforded broad discretion
in making the home award because of the differing economic, social and
emotional circumstances in each marriage. Any statutory standards might
restrict the existing flexibility the court has to fashion an award that
is appropriate under the circumstances of each case where such an award is
justified.

3)

The Judicial Council and the California Judges Association (CJA) oppose
this bill because it substantially restricts a court's discretion with
respect to the disposition of the family home and to the award of
appropriate attorneys' fees.
CJA states that "the court must weigh the economic detriment of the
non-custodial parent with the psychological benefit to the children.
is too complex and subtle a matter to fit statutory 'litmus tests'."

4)

This

Factors which the court is to consider in making the determination to
order a deferred sale of the family home under this bill include:
a)

Whether there are sufficient assets to award the family home to a
custodial parent when equally dividing the community property.
Should this not be the threshold issue which must be determined by the
court prior to the court making any determination regarding DSHO?

b)

The length of time the child has resided in the home.

c)

The child's placement or grade in school.

- continued SB 1341
Page 3
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d)

The accessibility and convenience of the home to the child's school
and other services or facilities used by and available to the child.

e)

Whether there may be significant psychological detriment to the child
associated with a change in residence.

f)

The extent to which the home location facilitates the custodial
parent's work considerations, including child care.
The author suggests that the court will be able to consider whether a
parent may be forced to leave an area due to lack of available/
affordable housing and in doing so have to leave a job.

g)

The financial ability of each parent to obtain suitable housing.
Should not the court also consider the ability of the parent making
the deferred home request to financially afford to maintain the
mortgage and residence, prior to making such an award?

h) Whether the custodial parent is capable of exercising a right of first
refusal in the event of a proposed sale of the family residence.
Is not this factor irrelevant to a determination of the minor's
current welfare?
i)

Whether the home has been adapted or modified to accommodate any
physical disabilities of a custodial parent or child.
The DSHO is for the benefit of the child. Are not the physical
disabilities of a custodial parent more relevant with respect to
spousal support determinations?

j) Any other factors the court deems reasonable and just.
How is the court to apply and weigh each of these factors?
5)

Existing law permits the court to make a family home award on behalf of an
adult child who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means. Should not this bill include such an adult child within
its protections?

6)

The Family Law Section of the State Bar, states in opposition:
a)

This bill unnecessarily mandates payment of attorneys' fees and costs
as a sanction against a parent who disputes issues relating to
- continued SB 1341
Page 4
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physical cus
of a child primarily for economic reasons, rather
than the child's best interests.
Attorneys fees are presently available under existing law against
parties who do not deal in good faith (Civil Code Section 4370.5 and
Civil Procedure Code Section 128.5)

7)

a deferred home sale are already factors considered by

b)

The factors
the court.

c)

The support lien is already available under existing law.

Other critics have raised the following concerns:
a)

The sanction provision may encourage parties to seek a deferral of the
home sale in order to obtain payment of attorneys fees and to avoid
possible assessment of such sanctions.

b)

Under this bill, sanctions may be imposed against a parent whose
primary purpose in disputing the home sale deferral may be based on
valid economic considerations (e.g. the desire to afford proper
housing to exercise custodial and other parental responsibilities).
This sanction may foreclose a party's right to seek an equal division
of the community property at the time of the dissolution.
In contrast, the bill recognizes economic motives as appropriate for
the custodial parent in seeking a DSHO.

c)

This bill dilutes the existing provision which specifies that the
family home award is for "temporary use" of the family home to the
party having custody of minor children.

d)

This bill deletes the rebuttable presumption that further delay in the
sale of the home and division of the proceeds is no longer an
equitable method of minimizing the adverse impact of the dissolution
on the child's welfare when the party with temporary use remarries or
there is a change in circumstances affecting the economic status of
the parties or children.

e)

The bill fails to address the issue of the cohabitation/remarriage of
the parent in-residence as a basis for terminating the DSHO. The bill
may encourage custody disputes between parents and discourage the
courts from awarding joint custody.

- continued SB 1341
Page 5
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f)

8)

The bill does not
the sale deferral
receiving the use
use of equity for

require the court to consider the economic impact on
on either parent, particularly the parent not
benefit of the home who may be subject to loss of
18 years.

Committee staff is advised the the author is willing to (a) retain
existing law with respect to the rebuttable presumption upon remarriage or
change in economic status and (b) delete Section 1 of the bill, which
provides for special sanctions against the party disputing custody for
that party's economic interest rather than the child's best interests.

Support

Opposition

Commission On the Status of Women,
Judicial Council
Los Angeles
Family Law Section, State Bar
Women Lawyers of Sacramento
California Judges Association
Committee On Moral Concerns
Family Law Coalition
California Home Economics Association
Single Parents United 'N Kids
Women For:
California NOW
Queen's Bench
United Service Employees, Local 616
California Minority Women's Legislative
Roundtable
Lutheran Office of Governmental Ministry
California
San Luis Obispo Business & Professional
Women Older Women's League, Santa Cruz Chapter
San Mateo County NOW
El Cajon Republican Women's Club
Amador-Calaveras NOW
Sisterhood of Temple Bat Yahn
Marin Abused Women's Services
San Diego Chapter of N.A.F.M.W.
Contra Costa County Advisory Committee on the
Employment &Economic Status of Women
Children's Rights Advocate - Grandparents

D. DeBow
445-4560
ajud
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December 8, 1987
Assemblymember Elihu Harris
Chair, Assembly Judiciary Committee
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Elihu:
Enclosed is a mock-up of my bill relating to the disposition
of the family home in divorce proceedings. Since the bill was
analyzed by your staff in August, it has been amended in response
to concerns raised by members and staff in meetings held during
the interim. The following is a brief description of the
amendments.
1. I have added intent language to indicate that while the bill
leaves to the courts a final determination as to whose needs
prevail, it is our intention that the needs of the children come
first. The needs of the parents and the needs of the children
are, of course, often interrelated. This interrelationship is
recognized in various provisions in the bill.
2. I have added language on p.2 (c) of the mock-up which
substitutes for factor (1) on p. 3 of the printed version of the
bill. Factor (1) was thought to be inadequately worded and
inappropriately placed. The new language says that the courts
may order a deferral even when there is sufficient property to
make an award; and that the courts may make an award when the
community estate is sufficient to accomodate one, regardless of
findings made under this section which may indicate a deferral to
be appropriate.
3. On p.3 of the mock-up I have inserted a threshhold
requirement to be considered by the courts prior to proceeding
with a consideration of the needs of the children. This
basically tells the courts that if the deferral is not
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"affordable" it is not in the interest of anyone and should not
be further considered.
4. The remaining two amendments on p.3, lines 19 and 31 are
technical in nature.
5. On p.4, I have in (e) of the mock-up amended out the mandate
to make a deferral; the bill now merely provides guidelines or
factors which the court must consider when deciding on a request
for a deferral.
6. Also on p.4, I have at line 35 amended back into the bill the
rebuttable presumption that on remarriage the need for the
deferral terminates.

7. In (i) on p.4 of the mock-up I have amended the bill to
mandate rather than authorize the courts to reserve jurisdiction
to consider any matters that arise regarding the deferral. This
addresses the concern regarding potential tax consequences that
become apparent; unanticipated maintenance needs; and any other
matters relating to the home that have a financial impact on one
or both owners.
8. On p.2 I have amended out the mandatory attorneys' fees
provision.

I'm looking forward to discussing the mock-up of SB 1341
with the members of the Committe in the interim hearing on
December 14. Please don't hesitate to contact my office should
you or your staff have questions regarding the enclosure.

RT

-

GKH:mm
cc: Assemblymembers Phil Isenberg, Terry Friedman, Maxine
Waters, Lloyd Connelly
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MOCK-UP

AME~DED

IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 18, 1987

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JULY 8, 1987
AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 5, 1987

SENATE BILL

No. 1341

Introduced by Senators Hart and Watson
March 6, 1987

An act to amend Section 4800 of, to add Sections 4370.7 and
4700.10 to, and to repeal Section 4800.7 of, the Civil Code,
relating to family law.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 1341, as amended, Hart. Family law.
Existing law provides that the respective interests of the
husband and wife in the community property during the
existence of the marriage relationship are present, existing,
and equal. Existing law requires that in proceedings for
dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, except upon
the written agreement of the parties, or on stipulation of the
parties in open court, the court shall divide the community
property and the quasi-community property of the parties
equally, except as specified. Under existing law, a court,
rather than ordering the sale of the family home in order to
achieve equal division, may make a "family home award," in
which temporary use of the family home is given to the party
having custody of minor children in order to minimize the
adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the
welfare of the children.
This bill would revise the law relating to the making of a
family home award to, among other things, rename this award
a ..deferred sale of home order," specify factors that must be
considered in determining whether to make such an order,
require such an order if a specified determination is made,

- 140 -

SB 1341

-2-

(a)

be

The Legislature finds that there is a lack of guidance in law
as to what constitutes the needs of children for purposes of
implementing the mandate to the ourts in In Re M~~!J~ji~~
Duke, regarding the disposition of the family home in divorce.
It_1_s the intent of the Legislature, in proposing the following guidelines, that the needs of the children be the primary
concern of the courts when making decisions regarding the
disposition of the family home and that the economic needs
of the parents as individuals be secondary.

1--'

+'

1--'

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Code, f
4370.7. In a
oceeding pursuan~
a court shall award r
able
a party requesting a de~
le of home order in any
case in which th
t finds t
e other party has
elating to physical c
of a child
disputed ·
p
or that party's economic intere
use of the best interests of the child.
SEC.'\ I. Section 4700.10 is added to the Civil Code, to
read:
4700.10. ( t+ As used in this section:
(1) "Custodial parent" means a party awarded
physical custody of a child.
(2) "Deferred sale of home order" means an order
that temporarily delays the sale and awards the
temporary exclusive use and possession of the family
home to a custodial parent of minor children, or children
for whom support is authorized under Section 196 or 206,
whether or not the custodial parent has sole or joint
custody, in order to minimize the adverse impact of
dissolution or legal separation on the welfare of the
children.
(c)'--:;---:-:-;;------;-;;,.--r-24
i3t "Fi'im&ry ~ tfftH!! ffteftft!l tt efttM ftfltl tt ~
25 w#ft f'A' !tie&l ettstaey ef +he eM!&:
26
~ ltuttty ettSe ffi wlrHeft Mtef'iHtre iHsttffieieHt ~ te

r---------------__ Nothing herem
shall be construed to limit the court's
discretion pursuant to ~4800 to divide the community estate
of the parties equally, nor shall it be construed to limit
the court's discretion to make a deferred sale of home order
when a division of the community assets pursuant to ~4800
could be accomplished by awarding the family home to one party.
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1 tlWftPd the fMftily heme te & ettsteEii&l ~ pttrsttMtt te
2 sttetli..·isieft -fet ef Seet:ieft li8QQ; the eetlft shtHl Eletermifte
3 whether te fftftlfe & EleferreEI 9ftle ef heme erftet. IBttrsttaftt
seetieft. Itt tftakiftg 9tleft ft EletePfftift&til1ft,
4
(d) In any case in which one of the parties has
5
6 requested a deferred sale of home order pursuant to this

7 section,riliii 6iiiiuJII;; iB Jiiislfi•8' 11 irtlillilliiBsif 8111
8 re<j'"11'6t; l)pQII QOBSidot gil gf 'AS (elht"'iRg:

8111

lliat

rthereareinsuflicienta
e
9 familvhometo
tt
bd" . .
'10
.
rsuan osu IVJSJOn
1-'H
,
IOn 4800·
.
•
.
.
12
(].) The length of bme the ch1ld has restded m the
13 home.
I

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

fBt
(~

f3t

.

The ch1ld's placement or grade in school.

(3) Theaccessibilityandconvenienceofthehometo
the child's school and other services or facilities used by
and available to the child,
-f4t \\'het;her the ettstedi&l ~ ep & eftiM hM
physie&l Elis&Bilities.
( 41 Whether the home has been adapted or modified
to accommodate any physical disabilities of a custodial
24 parent or child.
25
~=Ate
( r} Whether there may be significant psychological
26
27 detriment to the child associated with a change in
28 residence.

".

29
~
( ~ The extent to which the location of the home
30
31 facilitates the custodial parent's rl';iW8iiili:~~=ee;t;p~ti~·e~ft~s----------------,,
employment·
32 QQPSi"eadians1 ioelusliiiS oll:ilsl tan.
33
f1t
34
( 1 The financial ability of each parent to obtain
35 suitable housing.
36

-f8t

37
( s) Whether the custodial parent is capable of
38 exercising a right of first refusal in the event of a proposed
39 sale of the family residence.
40
-f9T

.

.

.

.

the c;:ourt shall dXSt cons1der. whe~her 1 t 1s econom1cally
feas1ble for the par~nts to ma1nta1n the trust. deed payme~tS 1
property taxes, and H~surance for the hom~ dur11;g the pe~1od
the sale of the home 1s deferred.
In mak1ng th1s determ1nation, the court shall consider the resident parent's income,
the availability of spousal and/or child support", and any
other sources of funds available to make those payments.
It is the intent of this requirement to avoid the likelihood of possible default and resulting foreclosures
thereby jeopardizing both parents' equity in the home. After
such a determination is made, the court in making a
determination on a request for a deferred sale of home
order 1 shall consider all of the following:
including child care.

SB 1341
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1--'

..pN

::t>
I

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29
30
31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
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( 9 •) Any other factors the court deems just and
equitable.
(e) Upon a determination pursuant to s;:.u:.:::b:;::d::..;iv:.:i::;si:.:::o.:.:n~(l,-d..L)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ is necessary in order to
that a deferred sale of home order ..W.Immimize the
adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the
may
child 61" #te priHutry ifttttHy tift#, the courtlliil.al make
such an order to a custodial parent and shall specify the
duration of the order. The order shall include the legal
description and assessor's parcel number of the real
property which is subject to the order and shall be
recorded in the office of the county recorder of the
county in which the real property is located. Such. an
order may be considered to constitute additional child
support pursuant to Section 4728.5.
\
nonresident
(f) The court may order a lien against ·.the
nsu 11hM'ia!lparent's mterest m the family residence to
secure any support obligation arrearages of the
_____ (l)A deferred sale of home order may be modified or terminated
noncustodial parent existing at the time of sale of the
family residence. The lien authorized by this subdivision
at any time at the discretion of the court.
(2)If the party awarded the deferred sale remarries, or
is created by recording a certified copy of the order
there is otherwise a change in circumstances affecting
containing the legal description and assessor's parcel
the status of the parties or the children pursuant to
number of the real property with the county recorder of
subdivision (d), a rebuttable presumption, affecting
the county in which the residence is located. The lien
the burden of proof, is created that further deferral
recorded against •h.l iii ••• 1 tcitiiiJ parent's interest in the
of the sale is no longer an equitable method of
family residence pursuant to this subdivision attaches to
minimizing the adverse impact of the dissolution or
the residential real property upon recordation and is
legal separation on the welfare of the children.
subject to Article 2 (commencing with Section 697.310)
of Chapter 2 of Division 2 of Title 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
( ~) The court may specify a dollar limit on the amount
of the expenses of maintenance of the residence to be
paid solely by the party granted a deferred sale of home
order.
( t) ExceE_t as otherwise a~eed to by the 2arties in
1
writingJa i86erreiii 8M8 el hMile erfaer iRa, he41neflined
Sf t?fliliii&,IUJ llt llRY time ll' •&.a MiUPl!aiSR af 'hi lUll t
shall
( :i.) In makin an order ursuant to this section the
court
. reserve juris iction to determine any and all
_deferred sale of fiiu;~ily home order
issues that arise with respect to the fiQI@. ef Uils llama
d th
including, but not limited to, thq tax consequences to
__maintenance of the home an
e
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1 each party.
2
( j) This section is applicable regardless of whether
3 the deferred sale of home order is made before or after
4 January 1, 198 .
5
SEC. 2 .Section 4800 of the Civil Code is amended to
6 read:
7
4800. (a) Except upon the written agreement of the
8
or on oral stipulation of
parties in open court,
9
provided in this section and Section
court shall,
in its judgment of
11
of
in its judgment decreeing the
parties, or at a later time if it
reserves jurisdiction to make such a property
the community estate of the parties
~ •.,. . . . ,""" of making this division, the court
assets and liabilities as near as practicable
excent that,
30 days' uuo_ncc;
to
the court for
nru·tion of
assets
and prior to
to
an
awision ot the community estate of
......., ... ~->.,.., in an equitable manner.
the
of division and in confirming or
of the parties for which the
is Hable, the court shall characterize
liabilities as """~'n .......,. or community and confirm or assign
to the parties
accordance with subdivision (c) .
As used in this
"community estate" includes
community
quasi~community assets and
30 liabilities of the parties.
31
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may
32 divide the community estate as follows:

SB 1341
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1 interest of the other party in the community estate.
2
(3) If the net value ofthe community estate is less than
3 five thousand dollars ($5,000) and one party cannot be
4 located through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
5 court may award all such property to the other party on
6 such conditions as it deems proper in its judgment
7 decreeing the dissolution of the marriage or in its
8 judgment decreeing the legal separation of the parties.
9
( 4) Community estate personal injury damages shall
be assigned to
who suffered the injuries ._... '"""""
11 the
into account the economic
condition and
party,
time that
13 elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual
of the cause of
and all other facts
the case,
15 determines
of 1m:tic:e
disposition.
a case, the 'l.:v:uu.uuJtu
shaH

26
29
30
31

mJury damages" means aU money or
..... ...,... .......,....., received or to be received by a person
of a judgment for
for his or
injuries or pursuant to an
settlement or compromise of a claim
the damages, if
cause of action for the
arose during the
marriage but is not separate
as defined
Section 5126, unless
money or
property has
been commingled with other assets
the community
estate.
{5) Notwithstanding
subdivisions
shall be ass1gm:~a
to

-7-

SB 1341

l confirmed or divided as follows:
2
( l) Debts incurred by either spouse before the date of
3 marriage shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse
4 who incurred the debt.
5
(2) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of
6 marriage but prior to the date of separation shall be
7 divided as set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b). To the
8 extent that community debts exceed total community
9 and quasi-community assets, the excess of debt shall be
10 assigned as the court deems just and equitable, taking
11 into account factors such as the parties' relative ability to
12 pay.
(3) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of
14 separation but before entry of a judgment of dissolution
15 or legal separation shall be confirmed as follows:
16
(A) Debts incurred by either spouse for the common
17 necessaries of life of either spouse or the necessaries of
18 life of the minor children of the marriage, in the absence
19 of a court order or written agreement for support or for
20 the payment of these debts, shall be confirmed to either
21 spouse according to the parties' respective needs and
22 abilities to pay at the time the debt was incurred.
23
(B) Debts
incurred
by
either
spouse
for
24 nonnecessaries of that spouse or minor children of the
25 marriage shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse
26 who incurred the debt.
27
(4) Debts incurred by either spouse after entry of a
28 judgment of dissolution but prior to termination of the
29 parties' marital status or after entry of a judgment of legal
30 separation shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse
31 who incurred the debt.
32
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), all separate
33 debts, including those debts incurred by a spouse during
34 marriage and before the date of separation that were not
35 incurred for the benefit of the community, shall be
36 confirmed without offset to the spouse who incurred the
37 debt.
38
(e) The court has jurisdiction to order reimbursement
39 in cases it deems appropriate for debts paid after
~0 separation but prior to trial.

SB 1341
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1
(f) The court may make such orders as it deems
2 necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
3
SEC. i. Section 4800.7 of the Civil Code is repealed.

0

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 17, 1987
AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 5, 1987

No. 1306

SENATE BILL

Introduced by Senators Morgan and Seymour
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Allen, Farr, Filante, Harvey,
La Follette, Mojonnier, Moore, Speier, Statham, and
Tanner)
March 6, 1987

An act to amend Sections 4600, 4600.5, 4607, and 4608 of the
Civil Code, relating to family law.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 1306, as amended, Morgan. Custody.
Existing law provides that custody of a child should be
awarded in a specified order of preferences according to the
best interests of the child. The first order of preference is to
both parents jointly or to either parent. In making an award
of custody to either parent the court is required to consider
which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. Existing law
establishes a presumption that joint custody is in the best
interests of a child where the parents agree to such an award.
Under existing law, the court may in its discretion award joint
custody subject to the best interests of the child.
This bill would revise and recast the above described
provisions relating to child custody to, among other things,
eliminate the required consideration described above when
making an award of custody to either parent; declare that it
is the public policy of the state to assure a child of frequent
and continuing contact with both parents after a dissolution
of the parents' marriage or after a parental separation if it is
in the best interests of the child; rather than the above
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described presumption regarding joint custody, provide a
presumption that an agreement of the parents as to the
custody of a child is in the best interests of the child; speeify
faders ~ fflt::J:M ee eoflsielerea a,. ~ eetift •.,._,rftefl malftftg ftfl
arnara ef jeiffi eustoely up6ft ~ applieatiofl ef either pareflt
require the court, in its discretions, in awarding custody,
rather than joint custody, to consider not only the best
interests of the child but, in addition, to consider a list of
specified factors; and specify additional factors that must be
considered in making an award of jeiffi physical custody with
respect to an infant aged 3 years or less.
The bill also would provide that in making a determination
of the best interests of a child the court shall consider, in
addition to factors required to be considered by existing law,
which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and
continuing contact with the other parent where contact is in
the best interests of the child.
It also would make related changes with regard to the goals
and effects of mediation proceedings.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9,

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

SECTION 1. Section 4600 of the Civil Code is
amended to read:
4600. (a) In any proceeding under this chapter
where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the
court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at
any time thereafter, make such order for the' custody of
the child during minority as may seem necessary or
proper. If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason
so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the
court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of
the child in making an award of custody or modification
thereof. In determining the person or persons to whom
custody should be awarded under paragraph (2) or (3) of
subdivision (b), the court shall consider and give due
weight to the nomination of a guardian of the person of
the child by a parent under Article 1 (commencing with
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38
39
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Section 1500) of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of Division 4 of the
Probate Code.
(b) Custody should be awarded in the following order
of preference according to the best interests of the child
pursuant to Section 4608:
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5
or to either parent. In making an order for custody to
either parent, the court shall not prefer a parent as
custodian because of that parent's sex.
The court, in its discretion, may require the parents to
submit to the court a plan for the implementation of the
custody order.
(2) If to neither parent, to the person or persons in
whose home the child has been living in a wholesome and
stable environment.
(3) To any other person or persons deemed by the
court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and
proper care and guidance for the child.
(c) Before the court makes any order awarding
custody to a person or persons other than a parent,
without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding
that an award of custody to a parent would be
detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is
required to serve the best interests of the child.
Allegations that parental custody would be detrimental
to the child, other than a statement of that ultimate fact,
shall not appear in the pleadings. The court may, in its
discretion, exclude the public from the hearing on this
issue.
SEC. 2. Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code is amended
to read:
4600.5. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that it
is the public policy of this state to assure minor children
of frequent and continuing contact with both parents
after the parents have separated or dissolved their
marriage where it is in the best interests of the child, and
that parents should be encouraged to share the rights and
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this
policy.
(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption, affecting
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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the burden of proof, that an agreement of the parents as
to the custody of a child, whether in open court or
otherwise, is in the best interests of the child, subject to
Section 4608.
(c) Upon the application of either parent, jetftf
CHstedy ffiftY cilstody shall be awarded in the discretion
of the court, subject to Section 4608 and consideration of
all of the following factors:
(1) The past and present abilities of the parents to
cooperate and make decisions jointly.
(2) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing
of love, affection, and contact between the child and the
other parent.
(3) The geographic proximity of the parents as this
relates to the practical considerations of joint custody.
(4) Any history of child abuse, spousal abuse, or
parental kidnapping.
(5) The extent to which the conduct of each parent
has promoted or frustrated the policy of the law to
encourage cooperation in the resolution of child custody
matters, insofar as the conduct has affected or may affect
the best interests of the child.
(6) The age and emotional maturity of the child. In
detel'ffiifl:iftg vilietfter te a:wa-Pd jetftf physical eHstedy ef
awarding the physical custody ofan infant ege& age three
years or less, the court shall consider, in addition to the
other factors specified in this subdivision, all of the
following:
(A) The ability of the parents to communicate
frequently about the child's daily. routine and the
willingness of the parents to maintain similar
childrearing routines.
(B) The flexibility of the child including, but not
limited to, the child's developmental capacity to adjust to
repeated separations from each parent, frequent moves
from one home to the other, and different patterns of
parenting and caregiving, where those differences exist.
(C) Each parent's child care arrangements and the
ability of the parents to communicate about these
arrangements on a regular basis.
- 148 -
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(D) The benefit to the child of maintaining frequent
and continuing contact with both parents and the
detriment to the child of the absence of this contact.
For the purpose of assisting the court in making a
determination whether an award of joint custody is
appropriate under this subdivision, the court may direct
that an investigation be conducted pursuant to Section
4602.
(d) Whenever a request for joint custody is granted or
denied, the court, upon the request of any party, shall
state in its decision the reasons for granting or denying
the request. A statement that joint physical custody is, or
is not, in the best interests of the child shall not be
sufficient to meet the requirements of this subdivision.
(e) For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Joint custody" means joint physical custody and.
joint legal custody.
(2) "Sole physic~l custody" means that a child shall
reside with and under the supervision of one parent,
subject to the power of the court to order visitation.
(3) "Joint physical custody" means that each of the
parents shall have significant periods of physical custody.
(4) "Sole. legal custody" means that one parent shall
have the right and the responsibility to make the
decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of
a child.
(5) "Joint legal custody" means that both parents shall
share the right and the responsibility to make the
decisiqns relating to the health, education, and welfare of
a child.
(f) In making an order of joint legal custody, the court
shall specify the circumstances under which the consent
of both parents is required to be obtained in order to
exercise legal control of the child and the consequences
of the failure to obtain mutual consent. In all other
circumstances, either parent acting alone may exercise
legal control of the child. An order of joint legal custody
shall not be construed to permit an action that is
inconsistent with the physical custody order unless the
action is expressly authorized by the court.
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(g) In making an order of joint physical custody, the
court shall specify the right of each parent to the physical
control of the child in sufficient detail to enable a parent
deprived of that control to implement laws for relief of
child snatching and kidnapping.
(h) In making an order for custody with respect to
both parents, the court may award joint legal custody
without awarding joint physical custody.
(i) In making an order of joint physical custody or joint
legal custody, the court may specify one parent as the
primary caretaker of the child and one home as the
primary home of the child, for the purposes of
determining eligibility for public assistance.
(j) Any order for joint custody may be modified or
terminated upon the petition of one or both parents or on
the court's own motion if it is shown that the best
interests of the child require modification or termination
of the order. The court shall state in its decision the
reasons for modification or termination of the joint
custody order if either parent opposes the modification or
termination order.
(k) Any order for the custody of a minor child of a
marriage entered by a court in this state or any other
state may, subject to the jurisdictional requirements set
forth in Sections 5152 and 5163, be modified at any time
to an order of joint custody in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
(l ) In counties having a conciliation court, the court or
the parties may, at any time, pursuant to local rules of
court, consult with the conciliation court for the purpose
of assisting the parties to formulate a plan for
implementation of the custody order or to resolve any
controversy which has arisen in the implementation of a
plan for custody.
(m) Notwithstanding any other provision of law~
access to records and information pertaining to a minor
child, including, but not limited to, medical, dental, and
school records, shall not be denied to a parent because
that parent is not the child's custodial parent.
SEC. 3. Section 4607 of the Civil Code is amended to·
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read:
4607. (a) In any proceeding where there is at issue
the custody of or visitation with a minor child, and where
it appears on the face of the petition or other application
for an order or modification of an order for the custody
or visitation of a child or children that either or both such
issues are contested, as provided in Section 4600,4600.1 or
4601,. the matter shall be set for mediation of the
contested issues prior to or concurrent with the setting of
the matter for hearing. The purpose of the mediation
proceeding shall be to reduce acrimony which may exist
between the parties and to develop an agreement that is
in the best interests of the child, as determined pursuant
to Section 4608. The mediator shall use his or her best
efforts to effect a settlement of the custody or visitation
dispute that is in the best interests of the child, consistent
with the considerations required by Section 4608.
(b) Each superior court shall make available a
mediator. The. mediator may be a member of the
professional staff of a fainily conciliation court, probation
department, or mental health services agency, or may be
any other person or agency designated by the court. In
order to provide mediation services, the court shall not be
required to institute a family conciliation court. The
mediator shall meet the minimum qualifications required
of a counselor of conciliation as provided in Section 1745
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(c) Mediation proceedings shall be held in private and
shall be confidential, and all communications, verbal or
written, from the parties to the mediator made in a
proceeding pursuant to this section shall be deemed to be
official information within the meaning of Section 1040 of
the Evidence Code.
(d) The mediator shall have the authority to exclude
counsel from participation in the mediation proceedings
where, in the discretion of the mediator, exclusion of
counsel is deemed by the mediator to be appropriate or
necessary. The mediator shall have the duty to assess the
needs and interests of the child or children involved in
the controversy and shall be entitled to interview the
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1 child or children when the mediator deems such an
2 interview to be appropriate or necessary.
(e) The mediator may, consistent with local court
3
rules,
render a recommendation to the court as to the
4
5 custody or visitation of the child or children. The
6 mediator may, in cases where the parties have not
7 reached agreement as a result of the .mediation
8 proceeding, recommend to the court that an
9 investigation be conducted pursuant to Section 4002, or
10 that other action be taken to assist the parties to effect a
11 resolution of the controversy prior to any hearing on the
12 issues. The mediator may, in appropriate cases,
13 recommend that mutual restraining orders be issued,
14 pending determination of the controversy, to protect the
15 well-being of the children involved in the controversy.
16 Any agreement reached by the parties as a result of
______ 17_ mediation-Shall be reported to the court and to counsel
18 for the parties by the mediator on the day set for
19 mediation or any time thereafter designated by the court.
(f) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the mediator
20
21 from recommending to the court that counsel be
22 appointed pursuant to Section 4606. t9 represent the
23 minor child or children. In making any such
24 recommendation, the mediator shall inform the court of
25 t:Gc reasons why it would be in the best interests of the
26 minor child or children to have counsel appointed.
SEC. 4. Section 4608 of the Civil Code is amended to
27
28 read:
4608. In making a determination of the best interests
29
30 of the child in any proceeding under this title, the court
31 shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider
32 all of the following:
(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child.
33
(b) Any history of abuse against the child. As a
34
35 prerequisite to the consideration of allegations of abuse,
36 the court may require substantial independent
37 corroboration including, but not limited to, written
38 reports by law enforcement agencies, child protective
39 services or other social welfare agencies, courts, medical
40 facilities, or other public agencies or private nonprofit
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organizations providing services to victims of sexual
assault or domestic violence. As used in this subdivision,
"abuse against the child" means child abuse as defined in
subdivision (g) of Section 11165 of the Penal Code.
(c) The nature and amount of contact with both
parents.
.
(d) Which parent is more likely to allow the child or
children frequent and continuing contact with the other
parent, where contact is in the best interests of the child.
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SUBJECT:
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This bill amends the custody and visitation statutes of the Family

DIGEST
Existing law:
1)

Provides that custody of a child should be awarded in a specified order of
preferences according to the best interests of the child. The first order
of preference is 11 to both parents jointly or to either parent. 11 In making
an award of custody to either parent, the court is required to consider
which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing
contact with the noncustodial parent.

2)

Establishes a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a
child where the parents agree to such an award.

3)

Permits the court, in its discretion, to award joint custody subject to
the best interests of the child.

This bill revises the above provisions relating to child custody to, among
other things:

•

1)

Eliminate the required consideration (as to which parent is more likely to
allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial
parent) when making an award of custody to either parent .

2)

Declare that
frequent and
the parents'
interests of

3)

Provide a presumption that an agreement of the parents as to the custody
of a child is in the best interests of the child.

4)

Delete the specific discretion of the court to award joint custody, when
the parents have not so agreed, based on the child's best interests

it is the public policy of the state to assure a child of
continuing contact with both parents after a dissolution of
marriage or after a parental separation if it is in the best
the child.

- continued SB 1306
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standard. Instead, custody shall be awarded, in the court's discretion,
subject to the best interests of the child and consideration of a list of
specified factors.
5)

Specify additional factors that must be considered in making an award of
physical custody with respect to an infant aged three years or less.

6)

Delete the reference in the definition of joint custody that it shall be
shared by the parents so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing
contact with both parents.

7)

Delete as a purpose of the mediation proceeding the requirement to develop
an agreement assuring the children's close and continuing contact with
both parents.
It is replaced by the provision that such agreement shall
be in the best interests of the child, upon determination by the court of
the child's best interests.

8)

Provide that in making a determination of the best interests of a child
the court shall consider, in addition to factors required to be considered
by existing law, which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent
and continuing contact with the other parent where contact is in the best
interests of the child.

FISCAL EFFECT
None
COMMENTS
1)

The source of this bill is the Senate Task Force On Family Equity.
According to the author:
"This bill moves the phrase 'frequent and continuing contact' in the
child custody law from the legislative intent section to a factor to
be considered in determining the best interest of the child. Many
believe that the inclusion of this phrase in legislative intent
language has created a presumption in favor of joint custody.
"SB 1306 will change this presumption and make the child's best
interests the primary consideration in joint custody awards. This
bill also identifies other factors to be considered in custody awards,
including the parents' ability to cooperate, ability of each parent to
encourage the child's love and contact with the other parent,
geographical proximity of the parents, history of child abuse, spousal
abuse or parental kidnapping, the age of the child."
- continued SB 1306
Page 2
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2)

The factors the court is to consider in making a custody award include
following:
a)

The past and present abilities of the parents to cooperate and make
decisions jointly.
Is this factor intended to be used to deny joint custody on the basis
that one parent has not or will not cooperate with the other parent?
Critics have asserted that, if parents had such abilities to
communicate and cooperate, they would likely have remained married.

b)

The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love,
affection, and contact between the child and the other parent.

c)

The geographic proximity of the parents as this relates to the
practical considerations of joint custody.
Critics are concerned that this provision will encourage a pa
relocate in order to defeat a joint custody arrangement.

d)

Any history of child abuse, spousal abuse, or parental kidnapping.
The courts currently have the authority to order restraining orders
and neutral transfer points or third persons for the exchange of
children, if there is a risk of continuing abuse between spouses.
Critics are concerned that this factor will increase the motivation
for false accusations of abuse.
Should not this provision require that there be substantive
independent corroboration of any incident of child abuse, spousal
abuse, or parental kidnapping? Should not child abuse, spousal
and parental kidnapping be defined?
Should not the court be limited to considering a pattern of frequent
and continuous spousal abuse with demonstrable impact on children?
Similar provision is contained in SB 377 (McCorquodale), which is
to be heard on August 19, 1987.

e)

so

The extent to which the conduct of each parent has promoted or
frustrated the policy of the law to encourage cooperation in the
resolution of child custody matters, insofar as the conduct has
affected or may affect the best interests of the child.
- continued SB 1306
Page 3
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This prov1s1on was suggested by members of the Santa Clara County
family law bench in order to address their concerns that, without this
provision, the bill "would encourage •stonewalling• by parties and
make it more difficult for judges to resolve custody disputes by
diluting the law's present policy of encouraging frequent and
continuing contact between children and both parents."
f)

The age and emotional maturity of the child. When awarding physical
custody of an infant age three years or less, the court is also to
consider:
i)

The ability of the parents to communicate frequently about the
child's daily routine and the willingness of the parents to
maintain similar childrearing routines.
Critics object to this provision as unrealistic, particularly
since persons in intact marriages probably do not do as required
herein. Further, they also question the ability of the court to
determine whose routine is the better.

ii)

The flexibility of the child including, but not limited to, the
child's developmental capacity to adjust to repeated separations
from each parent, frequent moves from one home to the other, and
different patterns of parenting and caregiving, where those
differences exist.
Critics raise the concern that this may require a mental health
expert in every case where custody is disputed for a child aged
three or under.

iii)

iv)

Each parent's child care arrangements and the ability of the
parents to communicate about these arrangements on a regular
basis.
The benefit to the child of maintaining frequent and continuing
contact with both parents and the detriment to the child of the
absence of this contact.
The same Santa Clara family law bench members suggested this
provision because the bill had been 11 inappropriately weighted
against joint custody" with respect to the very young.

3)

The Family Law Section of the State Bar states, in support of this bill
that it "will encourage courts to take a more thoughtful approach to joint
custody orders and mediation agreements instead of adopting a 'cookie
cutter• approach to the needs of children in family law actions."
- continued SB 1306
Page 4
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4)

Opponents of this bill, including a number of mental health professionals
and attorneys have raised stated the following concerns:
a)

The policy statements regarding custody need to be maintained as the
centerpiece of all custody processes, including that relating to joint
custody, in order to reduce manipulation by the parents to gain
leverage.
The relocation of the frequent and continuing contact language
substantially dilutes encouraging parents to share their children.

b)

This bill is contrary to the large and growing body of research on
children of divorce. Further, longitudinal studies under the existing
six year old law are not yet completed, but preliminary reports are
positive as to the impact of existing law.

c)

The current legislative directives toward frequent and continui
contact, (including the requirement that the court is to consi
which parent is most likely to allow the child frequent and continui
contact with the non-custodial parent in the event of awarding sole
custody), are important tools to encourage the parties to have a more
healthy, sharing relationship with their children. This bill
substantially dilute these directives, in that it does not promote
equality of rights between parents nor encourage the fullest shari
of custody.

d)

This bill conveys a not-so-subtle message about how to defeat joint
custody, in contrast to existing law's message that parents are
expected to continue as joint custodians. It may encourage the parent
who seeks sole custody to make unilateral decisions regarding the
children; to refuse to cooperate with the other parent pertaini
custody or other child related issues; to create geographical barri
to maintaining joint custody; and to make false allegations of s
and child abuse.

e)

The loss of joint custody is really a disaster for the woman, for
is most often the one who must carry the burden of children whose
lives have been traumatized by being excessively deprived of
parent.
Enforced separation of child and parent is always and inevitably
traumatic for the child and likely to lead to pathological
consequences. Both parent-child bonds are equally powerful bonds
are essential to normal and health development of children.
- continued SB 1306
Page 5
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f)

There is no need to take the drastic measures proposed by this bill
until the issues have been clearly studied and exposed to a careful
consideration.

g) Studies have demonstrated that joint custody has encouraged compliance
with support obligations, whereas this bill may discourage it.
h) Joint parenting/custody should not be denied based on the arbitrary
obstacles the factors stated in the bill create, such as geographic
distance, parental cooperation, age of the child, parental
interaction, whether or not decisions are made jointly, differences in
style of communication, different patterns of caregiving, etc.
Parents are be able to comply with joint custody orders without regard
to the above factors. The factors are not necessarily relevant to the
award of joint custody.
i)
5)

This bill reduces the policy requiring frequent and continuing contact
to one of a number of coequal factors to be considered by the court.

The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts has stated in opposition
to this bill that:
a) The deletion of the preamble statement of policy to encourage frequent
and continuing contact with both parents and moving it to the joint
custody paragraph, Undermines one of the crucial benefits of"
existing law, which has been in effect for six years. The effect of
this preamble is to encourage parents to cooperate in raising
children.
11

b)

A signal is sent to parents that only if they consider joint custody
do they need to cooperate.

c) Additional litigation may be encouraged, which will be lengthened by
the requirement of the court to consider each of the factors.
d) The consideration of the factors will likely detract from the focus on
the needs of the children. In particular, the factor requiring
consideration of abuse and kidnapping is overbroad and will lead to
lengthy and strategic maneuverings among family law litigants.
6)

According the Frank Williams, M.D., Director, Family and Child Psychiatry,
at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, there is no ideal situation for children
after divorce, but years of sole custody has wreaked havoc on children. 11
Further, the work with children and parents of divorce at the Center has
shown that:
11

- continued SB 1306
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a)

Traditional sole custody has played a significant role in the later
development of chronic depression in children.

b)

Structured shared joint custody has a better chance of achieving some
level of cooperativeness between warring parents than unilateral sole
custody. Parents can learn to cooperate and joint custody is a
preferable milieu for such learning.

c)

Unless an evaluation indicates otherwise, joint custody should be
preferred.

d)

Continuing and frequent contact with both parents is emotionally
life-saving for most children.

Support

Opposition

Parents Without Partners, Inc.
California
Family Law Section, State Bar
Children Under Shared Parenting

Equal Rights For Fathers, Inc.
Family Law Coalition
Dads Against the Discriminating
System
The Joint Custody Association
Concerned Parents For Children's Rights
Association of Family &Conciliation
Courts, California Chapter
Coalition of Free Men (national)
Parents For Equal Custody
Fathering Education Services (Illinois)
American Journal of Family Therapy

D. DeBow
445-4560
ajud
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MEMO
TO:

Colleagues

FROM:

Senator Becky Morgan

RE:

SB 1306 -- Joint Custody

I want to clear up possible misconceptions about this
important legislation.

There appears to be a mass letter writing

campaign indicating that SB 1306 eliminates joint custody.

Many

of the people participating in this campaign have never seen the
bill and are receiving their information and directives from a
third party.
SB 1306 does not eliminate joint custody.

It clarifies the

law so that joint and sole custody are considered on an equal
basis by the judge who awards child custody.

SB 1306 also lists

factors to be considered in making custody decisions, such as the
geographic proximity of the parents, history of child abuse, the
parents' ability to cooperate, and the age of the child.
SB 1306 is designed to insure that the child's best interest
is the primary standard to be used in awards of custody in
California.

This bill is sponsored by the Senate Task Force on

Family Equity and endorsed by the Family Law Section of the State
Bar Association.

I have attached the letter of support from the

State Bar for your further consideration.
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LONGER-TERM ADJUSTMENT IN CHILDREN OF DIVORCE:
CONVERGING FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Joan B. Kelly, Ph.D.
Since 1974, the number of divorces in the United States
has exceeded one mi I 1 ion each year. While the di.vorce rate
has declined in the past two years after climbing steadily
since 1960, more than one mill ion children each year
experience-the divorce of their parents.
It is estimated
that 33 percent of American children born in the 80's will
spend some time in a single parent family before they reach
the age of 18 <GlicK, 1979). Substantial numbers of these
youngsters may experience remarriage and, in some instances,
the redivorce of at least one of their parents.
In response to this significant social phenomenon,
practitioners and social scientists turned their attention to
the nature of the divorce experience itself, and to the
immediate ar.d longer-rar.ge impact of divor·ce on children,
adolescents, and adults. The divorce 1 iterature of the past
two decades reflects the diversity of those who have
considered the multiple facets of divorce, and is uneven in
it~. usefulnes~..
The clinical liter·atur·e has cor.tair.ed
reports of children and families who have sought therapy
after separation or divorce for difficulties assumed to be
related to divorce. As expected, this literature has
emphasized pathological findings more so than indications of
adaptive coping, and has led many mental health practitioners
to generalize these findings and observations to the larger,
normative divorcing population.
The divorce research conducted by clinicians and social
scientists have also shared substantial methodological and
conceptual 1 imitations including smal 1, mostly white and
middle class non-representative samples; retrospective and/or
cross-sectional designs, rather than prospective and
longitudinal studies; absence of control or,comparison groups
for evaluating child adjustment after divorce; failure to
differentiate between children of different ages and sex;
nearly exclusive concentration on mother custody fami 1 ies;
restricted focus on one or two rather than multiple relevant
variables, insufficient data and statistical controls
regarding socio-economic, situational, and ~arent adjustment
factors; and failure to use rei iable, valid, and repeated
measures.
The resultant intermingling of ~ound ~ata, unreliable
data, clinical observation, social myth, and unsubstantiated
or irrelevant theory has created confusion~ strongly voiced
opinion, and unevenness in information available to parents,
clinicians, schools, lawyers, courts, and .the media.
Fortunately, the more recent interest of social scientists,
In Press, Journal of Family Psychology
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particularly child developmental psychologists, in divorce
outcomes has brought an increasing methodological rigor to
divorce rese~rch. The result has been a broadened and
considerably more comp 1 ex knovJJ edge base, and the emergence
of consistent and coherent findings regarding the impact of
divorce on children.
It is unfortunate that the majority of
such studies are reported in publications not generally
familiar to the practicing mental health professionals or
others assisting families during the divorce process.
Reliable information regarding the longer-term consequences
of divorce is important, not only to enhance the
effectivene:.:. of clinical interventions. to divorcing or postdivorce families, but also to create a more rei iable databased framework for for·ensic evaluations and recommendations
regarding custody, visiting, and parenting after divorce.
There is considerable need, as well, for educational programs
designed to assist parents in making developmentally sound
decisions about their children at separation and divorce.
This paper summarizes some of the more reliable and
convergent findings regarding the longer range impact of
divor·ce on children. Situational, par·er.tal, :.ocial, and
socioeconomic variables are examined that have been
demonstrated to be sigificantly 1 inked to the social,
academic, and psychological adjustment of children postdivorce.
Some implications. for clinical pr·actice wi 11 be
suggested based upon these data.

The Heterogeneity of Divorcing Families
A prevalent stereotype of the divorcing family has
included the view that daily married and family 1 ife preseparation was characterized by considerable conflict, poor
commurtication, and lack of coc•per·ation. While this
stereotype accurately describes substantial numbers of
divorcing fami 1 ies <Emery, 1982) ~ there is evidence of
considerable variation in marriaoes that end in divorce
( Ke 1 1 >', 1 982; Ke- l l y, G i g>' S< Hau ~.;.an , 1 988; !Ala I 1 erst e i n &
Kelly, 1980).
In the 1980-'s~ the pr·e-divorce experience of
fam i I i e-s that ~-epar·a te is he ter·ogenec•us., r·a ther· than
homogeneous, and parents and children begin the divorce
process with diverse family histories of marital and parentchild relationships.
Such variation may determine the
child-'s own psychological r·esources and competencies in
dealing with the stress of the separation and divorce.
In a longitudinal study of mediated and adversarial
divorce, the r•esponses of 435 men and women to a Reasons for
Divorce Checklist indicated eight different marital
constellations leading to divorce.
Correlations between
these factor-based scores and other marital history variables
revealed that while some types of marriages were indeed
characterized by intense marital conflict, frequent childspecific conflict, and poor communication, other marriages
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ending in divorce clearly were not <Kelly, 1988a).
Substantial numbers of divorcing couples, for example, chose
to divorce b~cause there had been a gradual loss of love and
mutual regard, or a divergence in 1 ifestyles and values.
High level<;:. of anger or pc•or child-specific communication and
cooperation during the marriage were not significantly
associated with these factors.
In contrast, those who chose
to divorce because of an angry, demeaning or violent spouse,
or an emotionally unstable, substance dependent spouse were
more 1 ike 1 y to report in ten<E.e mar· ita 1 conf 1 i c t and poor
child-specific communication. Two different studies have
found that while approximately one-half of divorcing couples
acKnowledged frequent and in tense conf 1 i c t, 25~~ to 30~-:: of men
and women r·eported either· minimal or· nc• conflict in the twc•
years preceding the separation <Kelly, 1982; Kelly, Gigy, &
Hausman, 1988; Wa 11 erste in and Ke 11 >', 1980).
In the<E.e
particular families, the children may have experienced less
conflict and disharmony than youngsters in discordant
families that remain married.
Further, there is evidence that even in pre-divorce
fami 1 ies when parents enaaaed in moderate to high conflict,
there may be somewhat diif;rent behaviors regarding the
children. Overall, divorcing parents repor·ted significantly
le<E.s child-specific cc•nfl ict than mar·i tal conflict, and
significantly better cooperation at separation regarding
their· children than over·all levels of cc•oper·ation <Kel])-,
et.al, 1988). Further·, while six differ·ent aspects of
marital communication were reguarded as poor by both men and
women, adequacy of communication regarding the chi 1 dren wa:.
perceived by these respondents to be significantly better.
Thirty-eight percent of parents communicated "well" or "very
well" about the children, and an additional one-third said
child-specific communications were "adequate." Only 29%
rep or· ted their communication to be 11 poor·" or· 11 ver·y poor 11
<Kelly, et al, 1988).
It would appear· that in many
mar·r·iages., the par·entir•g functior., as. distinct from the
marital relationship, was the most positive and successful
aspect of the marriage.
Such data suggests that broad
assumptions regarding marriages that end in divorce should be
discarded and replaced by a more discriminating view, one
that is more 1 ikely to result in a hierarchy of interventions
available to families.
Children's Reactions at Separation
Although few studies have studied children;s reactions
immediately after parental separation, there is gener·al
agreement that parental separation precipitates a crisis for
most children. The vast majority of youngsters are not
anticipating divorce when it occurs, even when there has been
considerable conflict between their parents, and only those
experiencing repeated, intense conflict and family violence
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ar·e f'el ieved. The most common c:risis-engendef'ed f'eac:tions
include intense anxiety about their future well-being and
caretaking, s~dness and acute reactive depressions, increased
anger, disruptions in concentration at school, distress about
the Joss of contact with one parent, loyalty conflicts, and
preoccupation w th reconciliation CEmery, Hetherington, &
Dila11a, 1985; Kurdek & Siesky, 1980; Waldron et al, 1986;
Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980; Warshak & Santrock, 1983).
For most children and adolescents, the most acute
responses to parental separation diminished substantially
within the first six months to year after separation <Waldron
et al, 1986; Wa11er·stein & Kelly, 1980>. l..Jhile divc•rce has
been determined clearly to be a transitory stressor for
children, less apparent was whether the divorce and the postdivorce experience resulted in longer-term adJustment
problems.
Could children of divorce be distinguished in the
years after divorce from children in non-divorced and
remarried populations? If so, what particular factors or
experiences were 1 inked to psychological dysfunction as well
as healthy adjustment in children in divorced children.
longer Term Outcome for Children of Divorce
Frc•m multiple s:.tudies utilizing c•bJective, ~.tandardized
measures and adequate samples, there is converging evidence
that chi ldr·en in divorced fami 1 ies, when compar·ed tc• children
in intact families, exper·ience a dispropor·tionately gr-eater
number of social, academic, and psychological adjustment
pr-oblems.
It is important to note that these studies have
almost exclusively assessed children in mother-custody
fami1 ies whose contacts with their fathers have been
circumscribed by traditional visiting arrangements. Parallel
to these research data are reports that children of divorce
ar·e overr·epr·esen ted in r·efer·r·a 1 s to c 1 in i c popu 1 at ion~., in
private psychotherapy, and in referrals to school
psychologi-:.t-:. (Guidubaldi, Per·ry, l!< Clemin~.havJ, 1984; Kalter,
1977; z i 1 1 ' 1983) •
The longitudinal multi-method~ multi-measure study of
Hetherington et al (1982>, using matched groups of 144 middle
class white pr·esc:hool chi ldr·en, follo•.~.•ed fami 1 ies star·ting
two months after final divorce. Children in mother-custody
divorced fami I ies, when compared to those in nondivorced
families, shovJed more anti-social, acting out and impulsive
behaviors, mor·e non-compliance and aggression with authority
figures and peers, more dependency behaviors, gr-eater
anxiety, more depression, more difficulty in peer
relationships, and more problem behaviors in school. The
problems were found to be more severe and enduring for boys
than for girls. These findings were found to persist at a
second fo1lowup two years after· final divorce <Hetherington
e t a 1 , 1 982) •
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A second lonoitudinal study of 341 children from
divorced hom~s an~ 358 children from two parent families
confirmed and amplified these findings <Guidubaldi,
Cleminshaw. Perry & Mclauohl in, 1983; Guidubaldi & Perry,
1984. 1985j. This nationil ly selected random sample of boys
and ~irls in grades 1, 3, and 5 (ages 6-11) had 1 ived an
average of 4 years in a single-parent family, 90% mother
custody, at the time of the first data collection. Using a
multi-method, multi-measure design, information was obtained
from parents, children, psychologists and teachers. Children
of divorced homes performed more poorly than intact family
children in two major arenas: social-behavioral, and academic
competence. Children in intact families had superior
performance on 21 of 27 social-behavioral criterion measures,
including dependency, aggression, withdrawal, anxiety, and
peer popularity. Similar to Hetherington's findings, boys
had significantly more difficulties than girls. Differences
in socioeconomic status did not account for these socialbehavioral differ·ences. On measur·es of academic competence,
intact fami 1>' children :.cor·ed :.ignificantly better· on 8 of '7'
measures, including Wide Range Achievement scores in reading,
spelling, and math, on IQ measures, and grades. Again, boys
had more problems than girls. While the majority of the
intellectual or academic achievement group differences
disappeared when controlling for income <Guidubaldi, Perry, &
Nastasi, 1987), these findings, as wel 1 as that of
Hetherington <1982> and Zill <1983), point to consistent
achievement problems for children of divorce. Overall,
Guidubaldi found differences between intact and divorced
family children to be stronger and more pervasive for boys at
the higher grade levels.
In contrast, divorced family girls
in the 5th grade were distingui:.hable fr·om intact famil>'
girls on only a few measures.
Six years post-divorce Hetherington et al <1985) found
considerable stability of behavior over time, with
externalizing behavior problems more stable for boys, and
interr.al izing behavior:. more :.table for· girls.
Hoc.,H?ver, the
presence of earlier externalizing behaviors such as
impulsivity, acting-out, and aggression in both boys and
girls was significantly 1 inked to the development of later
internalizing behaviors including withdrawal, depression, and
anxiety <Hetherington, et al, 1985). The gr·c•up compar·isons
at this third follo~A•up of these 124 Vir·ginia families were of
the remaining intact fami 1 ies, the divorced families, and
remarried families of the original divorced family group.
Now 10 years of age, girls in divorced families were similar·
in adjustment to the non-divorced girls.
However, as before,
the boys in divorced homes showed more aggressive and actingout behaviors and less social competence than boys in the
non-divorced families. The behavior was found to be
consistent across settings, and reported by peers, mothers,
teachers, and sons. Although there was significantly less
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income in the divorced households, socioeconomic status was
not significantly 1 inked to any of the social-behavioral
findings..
·
Zill's <1983) national survey of 2161 children between
aQes 7 and 11 found that children in divorced families
r;por· ted more 1 one 1 i ness and bor·edom compared to chi 1 dren in
intact families. They felt more rejected and belittled than
children in happily married fami 1 ies, and perceived their
home environment in more negative terms. v..•hen 1 iving with
their mother without a father present. Children of unhappily
married fami 1 ies reported the most neglect and humiliation
when compared to the happily married family children and the
separated and divorced groups.
Specific Variables Associated with Post-divorce Outcomes
While the evidence is persuasive that divorced children,
and particularly boys, have a greater number of social
competence and behavioral problems, there is a substantial
population of youngsters who have 1 ived in single-parent
families for· s.ome years and v..•ho are t"'•ell adjusted in their
social, academic, and psychological adjustment <see, for
example, Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980 and Warshak & Santrock,
1983). What differentiates the experiences of those children
who have coped succes.s.ful in the year·s after divorce from
those identified to be at risk? A number of variables have
been identified thus far that rel iab]y· predict different
outcomes., including: conflict, the ad,jus.tment of the
custodial parent, the relationship with the non-custodial
parent, child-rearing practices and child care, remarriage,
and type of custody arrangement.
Conflict
When divorce has resulted in reduced conflict between
parents, children have reported this as the ma,jor positive
outcome of the divorce (KurdeK & Berg, 1983; Warshak &
Santrock, 1983). Unfortunately, some parents continue
expressing their hostilities in the years after divorce,
often embroiling their children in their struggles. While
the exact number·s are unknown, Kelb' (1988b) found that 15/.
of parents at the time of final divorce reported
"considerable" or "extreme" disagreement regarding visiting
or co-parenting arrnagements. This paralleled the finding
that 15% of men women described themselves as "extremely" or·
"very" angry at their spouses at final divorce, whereas 30/.
remained moderately angry and 55% reported 1 ittle or no
anger. Only 20% of the parents believed that they could
cooperate "not at all" or "very 1 ittle" regarding their
children at final divorce <an average of 20 months after
separation).
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Intense and frequent marital conflict has been
associated with poorer psychological adjustment among
children in intact fami 1 ies as well as divorced families
Emery, 1982). Hetherinoton (1979) found divorced children in
loc...•-c~nflict environments to be better adju!:.ted than children
in high conflict: intact fami 1 ies.
For· chi ldr·en of divorce,
the presence of high cordl ict between parents in the year·s
after· divor·ce has. been consistently 1 in~~ed tc• more
personality and behavioral problems.
Johnson et al <1987)
r·epor·t:ed more s.omat i c S>'mptoms. in chi 1 dr·en whos.e par·ents had
very high levels of conflict and were engaged in protracted
disputes, and Crosbie-Burnett (1988) found that higher
coparental conflict after divorce was associated with an
increase in psychosomatic problems and loyalty conflicts
among adolescents in remarried fami 1 ies.
Kline et al <1988)
reported a significant r·elationship beh•Jeen par·ental conflict
at a one-year followup and the :.ocial and beh;;..vic·r·al
adjustment of 93 children at a two year followup.
In
general, dir,.•or·ced children •.~-•er·e better adjus.ted when conflict
between parents was minimal after divorce <Hetherington et
a 1 , 1 982; l!Ja 1 1 erst e in & Ke 1 1 y 1 980) , a.n d decreased con f 1 i c t
between for·mer· spous.e-:. t1.Jas. s.ignificantly linked tJ.Jith better·
conduct and classroom behavior, and higher· reading grades,
particularly for boys <Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985>.
The adjustment of the custodial parent
The psychological adjustment of the custodial parent
after divorce takes on increasing significance in determining
the eventual outcome of the child. (,,lhereas dur·ing mar·r·iage,
one parent can create a buffer and balance for the other
parents/ erratic, angry, neglectful or disturbed behavior,
the child is more at risk after divorce if the custodial
parent has significant psychiatric disorders or psychological
-:.ymp toms. (,Ia 11 erste in & l<e 1 1 y ( 1980) rep or· ted that being in
the custody of a psychologically disturbed parent, or a
parent who was neglectful or minimally invested in parenting
responsibilities was significantly 1 inked to serious
deterioration in the behavioral, social and academic
functioning of childr·en five year·:. after· s.epar·atic•n. 1-<line
et al <1988) found that depression/anxiety scores of the
custodial parent at Time 1 (within 12 months of filing for
divorce) significantly predicted children's emotional and
social adjustment two years la+er <Time 3). Maternal reports
of their own functioning, including depression, lethargy, and
increased smoking were significantly correlated with maternal
ratings of their children/s symptoms <Guidubaldi & Perry,
1985, Kurdek & Burg, 1983). And mothers' self-reported
alcohol abuse predicted teacher ratings of their children/s
inattention in the classroom and social overinvolvement with
peers <Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985). Presumably such findings
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would be found among father-custod>' fami 1 i es '"''er·e father
custody su~ficiently normative to be studied in adequate
numbers.

•

Relationship

~

the non-custodial parent

The primary negative aspect of divorce reported by children
in numerous studies was loss of contact with a parent
<Hetherington et al, 1982; Kurdek & Berg, 1983; Wallerstein &
Kelly, 1980; WarshaK & SantrocK, 1983). The traditional
visiting pattern of every other weekend, most often a maximum
of four overnights spent with the father per month, created
intense dissatisfaction among children, and especially young
boys. Youngsters expressed profound feelings of deprivation
and loss, and reactive depressions were frequently observed
in young school aged
s <Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980).
Childr·en in mother·-custody families. perce-ive that the-;•'
ha•Je les.s. father cc•ntr·c.J, les.:. father· suppc•r·t, and Je-ss
father punishment compared to children in intact fami1 ies
<Amato, 1987). They also have a less positive view of the
father-child relationship over time <Nastasi, 1988).
Divorced youngsters have demonstrated this growing
peripheral i ty and loss c•f suppor·t C•f the father· after divorce
in their drawings <Isaacs & Levin, 1984), as wel 1 as in
clinical and research interviews (Amato, 1987; Wallerstein &
Kelly, 1980; Warshak, 1986>. The distress of children in
response to the abruptly delimited role of fathers in their
I ives is echoed in the distress expressed by many fathers at
becoming a substantially Jess important figure in their
chi ldr·en·'<.:. 1 ive<.:. b>' vir·tue of the vis.iting r·ole assigned to
them after divorce (Hetherington, et aJ, 1976; Jacobs, 1983,
1986; Waller·stein & Kel 1y, 1980).
Predictable and frequent contact with the non-custodial
parent has been repeatedly demonstrated to be associated with
better adjustment unless the father is very poorly adjusted
or extremely immature. This is particularly true for boys
<He:.s 1!.~ Camera~ 1979; Hetherington. et al, 1982; (..Jal Jer·:.tein
& Kell)', 1980; !Aiarshak, 1'?86).
I:.a<:o.c:. (1'7'8-)fc•und the
stability of the visit to be more predictive of child
adjustment than frequency of visits. The relationship
between visiting frequency and good adjustment in children
was particularly strong when the custodial mother approved of
the father's continued contact with the chi 1d, and rated the
relationship positively (Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985).
Behavioral scores and peer relationships were better, and
Wide Range Achievement Test spell
g and math scores
significantly higher, particularly for boys.
Several other
studies found a significant relationship between infrequent
visiting and poor academic functioning in older boys several
years after divorce, as well as poor self-esteem, depression,
and anger CHess & Camera,. 1979; Kel Jy, 1981; Wallerstein &
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Kelly, 1980). The value of the father as role model after
divorce is also suggested by Nastasi <1988), who found that
after income, the educational level of the father <but not
the mother) is the best predictor of child performance after
divorce on a majority of social and achievement criterion
measures.
One particular problem has been the significant decrease
in contacts between fathers and their children in the first
two years after separation <Furstenberg & Nord, 1985), and
the subsequent deterioration of the father-child relationship
(Hetherington et al, 1982; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980, 1982).
Kline et al (1988) repor·ted that children in maternal custody
were significantly more 1 ikely to experience paternal drop
out than children in joint custody families.
Surprisingly
1 ittle research has addressed the causes of attrition in the
father-child relationship, despite its relevance to not only
child adjustment, but continued economic support by the
father as wel 1. The 1 imi ted research focusing on factors
determining father involvement after divorce has reported a
s.ignificant 1 ink between the amount of conflict in the
marital relationship and the amount of contact with the child
after divorce <Koch & Lowery, 1984; Kurdek, in press), with
fat.her·s. in high conflict mar·riages. vis.i ting their chi ldr·en
less often, less regularly, and for smaller amounts of time.
Child rearing

practices~ child~

A number of studies have reported that custodial mothers
have considerable difficulty in disciplining their children
after divorce.
Custodial mothers report more problems with
discipline than do custodial fathers <Hetherington, et al,
1982; Maccoby, et al, 1988; Santrock, WarshaK & Elliot,
1979), and mothers with custody have more difficulty being
patient, consistent, and firm than mothers or fathers of
childr·en in dual r·esidence. The incc•r,s.istent dis.cipline and
diminished controls with children after divorce may be a
contributing factor to the increased aggression and conduct
disturbances noted in divorced children. Authoritarian child
rearing styles on the part of the custodial mother were
significantly 1 inKed to a large number of negative outcomes,
particularly for boys.
In contrast, while a permissive child
rearing style was related to negative adjustment for boys,
this was not true for girls <Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985).
Authoritative child rearing practices were significantly
related to better academic competance and fewer peer
problems.
Nastasi (1988) repor·ted that children in intact families
did more homework, watched less TV, and had more organized
home routines, and engaged in more joint activities with
their parents than children in mother custody divorced homes.
Higher levels of weekday and weekend TV viewing was related
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c ildren was elated to the type
of custody arrangeme t,
at is, whether the child was 1 iving
primarily in a sole materna , so e paternal, or joint custody
situation. Warshak and Santroc:k (1983> studied children agt>s
6 to 11 in 23 father cus
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and 19 nuclear families using matched comparison groups and
a multi-method design
Camera (1985 studied 82 children,
ages 9 to 12, in matched omp
son
s of d orced and
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Custody status alone d d no p e ct he ch ld's postdivorce adjustment in these two stud es
ma erna1 and
paternal cust
stat s
No d f erenc s were found in
children's self-esteem, anxiety, sex role typing, maturity,

independence, psychosomatic and behavior problems, and social
competence. There were no differences observed in the
quality of p~rent-child relationships among custodial fathers
when compared to custodial mothers, including scores on
measures of nurturance and involvement with child. Other
studies have reported satisfactory levels of competence of
men in rearing children as custodial parents <Chang &
Dienard, 1982; Orthner & Lewis, 1979). Men as well as women
with primary custody reported that they were closer to their
children since divorce CWarshak, 1986). Similar to the
mother-custody studies reported earlier, the adjustment of
children in father custody was related to the degree of
conf1 ict and cooperation in the co-parental relationship, and
parenting style.
In those studies comparing maternal and paternal
custody, a striKing finding was that children 1 iving in the
custody of the same sex parent were better adjusted than
children 1 iving with the opposite sex parent. Father-custody
boys and mother-custody gir1s showed significantly more
social competence, maturity, cooperativeness, and selfesteem. Father-custody girls desired more contact with their
mothers than did father-custody boys, while mother-custody
boys wanted more visits with their fathers than mothercustody girls <WarshaK & SantrocK, 1983). Camera (1985)
found that for girls in father custody a positive
relationship with the non-custodial mother was associated
with competence in peer relationships. Although these
well-designed studies utilized matched groups, the sample
sizes were small. The issue of the importance of same-sex
and cross-sex identications with custodial and non-custodial
parents in the longer-term adjustment of children is one
which deserves greater study.
While research on the impact of joint physical custody
arrangements on child adjustment after divorce is sti11
1 imited, there are indications that custody agreements that
a11ow youngsters to continue both parental relationships on a
frequent and predictable basis are beneficial for many
children. Research on joint custody has most often defined
joint physical custody as a time sharing arrangement in which
the child is spending at least 30% of the time with one of
the parents, and the remaining time with the other.
Three California studies demonstrate that when Joint
custody is a legal option available to parents for a number
of years (8 years>, the number of fami1 ies involved In such
time sharing is substantial. Between 20 and 30% of the
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Only a few stud es have compar d matched

oups of joint

physical custody versus sole cust
children. Joint custody
boys between ages 6 and 11 were reported by mothers and
teachers to have fewer emotional and behavioral problems than
materna1 custody boys (Shiller, 1986a)
Boys in joint
custody were more comfortable in acKnowledging negative
feelings toward both parents, and expressed less yearning for
close contact with the father than did sole custody boys.
Family drawings suggested that maternal custody boys were
more preoccupied with reconciliation fantasies than were boys
in joint custody <Shi 11er, 1986b>. Loyalty conf1 icts did not
differ according to custody group.
Pojman <1982) reported that joint custody boys did not
differ from boys in happily married families on measures of
self-esteem and overa11 adjustment. These joint custody and
happily married family boys were also significantly better
adjusted than boys in sole custody or unhappily married
families.
Boys in happily married families had significantly
higher social adjustment scores than either joint custody,
sole custody, or unhappily married family boys.
Fathers with joint custody were more involved with their
children one year after divorce than were non-custodial
fathers on three measures, the amount of contact with their
chi 1 dren, the degree of par en ta 1 i nvot verner• t, and sharing of
parental responsibilities (Bowman & Ahrons, 1985; Leupni tz,
1986). Father "dropout" occurred significantly more often in
sole custody arrangements compared to joint custody <K1 ine et
al, 1988). Among Leupnitz/ (1986) 43 families, one half of
the sole custody children never saw the other parent, whereas
a11 bf the joint custody chi1d~en had regular contact with
the other pa~ent.
Maccoby~s (1988) second fo11owup of 982 families found
that dual (joint> residence pa~ents reported significantly
less difficulty finding time to play or chat with their
children than did parents in primary <sole) residential
arrangements. Joint cust
mothers also reported more
respect for their former spouses/ parenting ability, and
perceived their former spouses to be more supportive and
understanding compared to maternal custody mothers <Maccoby
et a1, 1988; Shi11er, 19B6a). The majority of parents
sharing custody have reported that there was an initial
period of adjustment requiring some working out of routines,
communications, and keeping track of children~s activities
and friends.
For most, interparental communications improved
and sharing custody became smoother in the first six months
<Ahrons, 1981, 1983; Irving et al, 1984; Leupnitz, 1982).
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Discuss!
There is sti1 much to be learned about the longer-range
impact of divorce on the overall
ustment of children and
adolescents. There remains the contin ing need for large,
well-designed studies with comparison or· contr·o1 groups which
uti1 ize similar instruments in different but carefully
delineated populations, sites, and jur sdictions. The
1 iterature summarized in this paper points to a number of
important variables that nf1uence the post-divorce 1 ives of
children, and which need to be furthe examined. Among these
are the sex and age of the chi1d; the quality of marita1 and
parent-child relationships prior to separation; parent-child
relationships after divorce; variat ons In custody and
visiting arrangements; the physical and mental health of the
parentsJ the co-parental re1atlonshlp after divorce including
parental support, cooperation and conflict; social and
economic supports for the single parent family; and the
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child;s own d~v~1opm~nta1 and psychological str~ngths and
w~aknesses.
Any or all of th~se may overburden .th~ child's
normal patt~~ns of coping, or may enhance the child's
adaptation in the years after divorce
One of the inter sting questions ra sed
th s research
is what accounts for the greater diffi u ties experienced by
boys after divorce when compared to girls. Boys and girls
both often experience diminished parenta contro , some
degree of conf1 ict, the loss of parental contact and support,
and dramatic changes in family structure and economics.
Beyond these, boys may be even more burdened by several
additional factors in the typ cal divorce situation.
Independent of divorce,
have be n obs~rued to b~ more
adversely affected by conflict
en parents than are girls
(Rutter, 1970). Boys in divorced fami1 ies also appear to be
more exposed to conf1 ict than are girls <Hetherington et at,
1982; Johnston et al, 1988).
react more strongly to the
loss of daily contact with the father than do girls, and
express greater desire for more time with their fathers than
do girls after separation and divorce <Emery et a1, 1984;
Kelly, 1981; Wallerstein and Kelly, 1980; WarshaK & SantrocK,
1983). Mothers with cust
of their sons not only report
increased problems discip1 ining their
after separation,
but complain frequently that the
remind them of their
divorced spou
with whom they remain angry <Wallerstein &
Kelly, 1980)
All of these factors may serve to increase the
male child's ulnerabil ity.
ua11y important is the
evidence eme ging in the child development 1 iterature
regarding the role of the father in children's development
and psychological
ustment.
thers appear to have
important unique, as we11 as overl
ping, contributions to
make to their chi1dren;s development (
, 1981) which are
too often denied the hi1d afte d ore
Central ~mong
these are the role modeling and ide t fications related to
achievement, social competence and academic motivation.
These observations, and those rep
ed earl er, would
suggest the need for greater scrutin of the reflexive
tradition of awarding sole physical cust
and control to
mothers while severely delimiting the father's role and
influence on the ch 1d after divorce. The apriori
presumption for mother custody after divorce is not supported
by current research
ta, and may, i some nstances,
directly create negat ve ou come for youngsters. The more
positive data regarding
stment
when there is
greater contact with fathers in mother custody homes, as well
as the research on
n fathe
ust
and joint custody
homes suggests tha a11 th se
tions should be considered
more seriously. Whe women retain p mary residential
custody, the
ority of fathe sand chil
en should be
assisted to structure mor expanded and frequent contacts

within that framework.
Despite enormous social change
inc1uding the very high percentage of mothers now in the
workplace, at.titudes regarding custody after divorce have
been slow to change <Mace
, Mnookin & Depner, 1986).
The research to date points to a need to re-examine the
way in which couples divorce in our society, and the ro1e
that extended family, friends, mental health practitioners,
lawyers, the courts play in the process. Too often there is
unconscious and conscious encouragement of hostile and
destructive divorce actions which then have long term
consequences for ail family members. The surprisingly
cavalier termination of parental and other important extended
family relationships which had meaning to children prior to
the divorce should also be scrutinized. The accumulated
evidence suggests that children who are not forced to divorce
a caring parent are more 1 ikely to be better adjusted after
divorce, and that overall the impact of the fathers~
continued involvement on the child's social, emotional, and
academic competence is considerable.
In educational and therapeutic interventions with
divorcing and post-divorce fami1 ies, c1 inicians have a
central role to play which may enhance the longer-term
adjustment of children.
It is important to provide parents
with the forum and the too1s they need to separate the
unsatisfactory marital relationship from their continuing
role as parents after divorce. To the extent the newly restructured post-divorce parenting relationship can become a
business-1 ike, civilized partnership, whatever conflict
occurs will not place the child at substantial risk. While
many parents intuitive1y understand that conf1 ict can create
adverse effects on their children, the direct presentation of
data regarding the impact of conflict on their child/s
adjustment can provide a powerful incentive to high-conflict
parents to re-evaluate their behaviors and interactions.
There is considerable need to assist families in
focusing on the role of the father in the post-divorce
family. There is ample evidence that non-custodial fathers
seem to have considerable difficulty in restructuring and
maintaining their relationships with their children after
separation, and there is 1 ittle support or guidance available
to assist them <Friedman, 1982; Hetherington et al, 1976;
Jacobs, 1986; Koch & Lowery, 1984; Wa11erstein & Kelly,
1982). Fathers report contradictory expectations about postdivorce parenting from spouses, extended family, mental
health practitioners and society at large, and those fathers
who do wish to remain involved in a substantial way after
divorce have been viewed with some suspicion. The absence of
role models appears to have burdened or paralyzed the
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decision-maKing p~ocess ~o~ separated.fathe~s, with one
being that fathe~s f~equently failed to estab1 ish and
stabilize a v'isiting o~ pa~enting plan which would allow fo~
continuity in thei~ ~elationships with their child~en
(Kelly, 1981; Wal le~stein & Ke1 ly, 1980; 1982). They a~e
given 1 ittle help by their spouses, whose own need fo~ daily
contact with thei~ child~en is often in di~ect conflict with
the fathe~/s wish to maintain continuity as well. One study
found that mo~e than half of fathe~s and mothe~s had only
ve~y 1 imited o~ no discussion of thei~ plans and wishes fo~
custody and pa~enting at the time of the sepa~ation <Kelly,
unpublished data). The~e appea~s to be ve~y 1 ittle
thoughtful planning that taKes place about child~en;s needs
after divo~ce, although the~e is much 1 ip se~vice given in
the legal system to the "best interests" of the child. Until
quite ~ecently, child custody decision-maKing ~ooted in past
t~adition and ~estrictive divo~ce statutes have actively
discouraged the meaningful participation of the interested
fathe~ in the child/s 1 ife <Friedman, 1980, 1982>.
Several
studies have noted the deep sense of loss and depression
experienced by fathe~s denied f~equent access to their
children, whether by their own failu~e to assert their needs
as pa~ents, their spouses~ unilateral decision maKing o~
legal p~actices <Greif, 1985; Jacobs, 1983, 1986; Tepp, 1983;
Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980>.
~esult

Mental health p~actitioners can assist parents in
developing custody and parenting plans which will maintain
a positive relationship that the child has with both the
father and mother after divorce. When both parents love and
care about the child, one goal can be to advocate a balanced
and ~normal i:zed" relationship with each that incorporates
relevant aspects of the child's 1 ife, including school,
friends, worK time, and leisure time. Too often, visiting
arrangements seriously distort the mother/s and father/s
relationship with the child in the direction of too much or
too 1 ittle responsibi1 ity, too much or too 1 ittle fun. And
too often, the restrictive traditional visitation schedule
depletes and eventually destroys the father's longer-range
relationship with his children in the service of preserving
the mother-child relationship, even when the evidence
suggests that the majority of children need continuity in
their relationship with each parent after divorce.
In educational, therapeutic, and mediative
interventions, parents can be helped to understand that the
divorce~~ will not determine their child's adjustment,
but rather the condit ons and agreements that they create
during and after the divorce. Parents have important choices
to maKe regarding their behavior and their post-divorce
relationships with their child and ex-spouse.
If parents are
encouraged to develop post-divorce relationships which
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sustain or promote child-specific communication and
cooperation, and are provided the forums for negotiating
agreements wh.ich legitimize the child's need for both parents
after divorce, the children of divorce studied in the 1990's
may present us with more positive findings regarding longerrange adjustment.

- 179 Page -18-

Ahrons, C. <1980). Joint custody arrangements in the post-divorce
family.
Journal 2f Divorce,~. 189-205.
Ahrons, C. <1983>. Predictors of paternal involvement post-divorce:
Mothers and fathers perceptions. Journal of pivorce, 6, 55-69.
Ahrons, c. <1981). Continuing co-parental relationship between
divorced spouses. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,~ <3>,
415-428.
Amato, P. Family processes in one-parent, stepparent and intact
families: The child's point of view. Journal g£ Marriage and the
Family, 49, 327-337.
Bowman, H., & Ahrons, C. <1985>.
Impact of 1ega1 custody status on
father's parenting post-divorce. Journal of Marriage and~
Family, Hay, 483-488.
Bray, J. <in press>. The effects of early remarriage on children's
development: Pre1 iminary analyses of the development issues in
stepfamiJies research project.
In E.H. Hertherington and J.
Arasteh <Eds>., Tht impact 2f divorce. single-parenting and stepparenting 2n children. Washington, DC: NICHD.
Camera, K. <1985>. Soc i a.l knowledge and behavior of chi 1 dren In
single-parent and two-parent households. Paper presented at 62nd
Annual meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, New
York.
Chang, P., & Dienard, A.
<1982>. Single-father caretakers:
Demographic characteristics and adjustment processes. American
Journal 2f Orthopsychiatry, 52, 236-243.
Crosbie-Burnett, M.
(1988>.
Impact of joint versus sole custody, sex
of adolescent, and quality of coparental relationship on
adjustment of adolescents in remarried families.
Paper presented
at the Annual meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric
Association, San Francisco.
Emery, R. <1982>.
lnterparental conflict and the children of discord
and divorce. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 310-330.
Emery, R., Hetherington, E.H., & DiLalla, L. (1984>. Divorce,
children, and social policy.
In H.W. Stevenson & A.E. Siegel
<Eds>., Child development research and social pol icy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Fritdman, H. <1980>. The father's parenting experience. American
Journal 2f Psychiatry, 137, 1177-1182.
Friedman, H. <1982>. The challenge of divorce to adequate fathering:
The peripheral father in marriage and divorce. Psychiatric
Clinics 2f North America, ~. 565-580.
Furstenberg, F. & Nord, C. (1985). Parenting apart: Patterns of
childrearing after marital separation. ~ournal 2f Marriage and
the Family, 47, 893-904.
Glick, P.C. <1979>. Children of divorced parents in demographic
<perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 35, 112-125.
Greif, G.L. <1985>. Singlt fathers, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Guidubaldi, J., Cleminshaw, H., Perry, J. & McLoughlin, C. <1983>. The
impact of parental divorce on children: Report of the nationwide
NASP study. School Psychology Review, ~. 300-323.
Guidubaldi, J., & Perry, J.D. <1984>. Divorce, socioeconomic status,
and children's cognitive-social competence at school entry.
American Journal 2! Orthopsychiatry, 54 <3>, 459-468.
Guidubaldi, J., & Perry, J.D. <1985). Divorce and mental health

- 180 -

sequel at> for ·children: A two year follow-up of a nationwide
sample. Journal of the American AcadtomY of Child Psychiatry, 24
(5), 531-537.
Guiduba1di, J., Ptorry, J.D., & Cltominshaw, H.K. <1984). The legacy of
parental divorce: A nationwide study of family status and
seltocttod mtodiating variables on chi1drton's acadtomic and social
compettoncies. In B.B. Lahey and A.E. Kazdin <Eds.>, Advances ln
Cl inica1 Child Psychology,~ 109-151. New York: Plenum Prtoss.
Guidubaldi, J., Ptorry, J.D., & Nastasi, B.K. (1987). Assessmtont and
Intervtontion for Childrton of Divorcto: Imp1 ications of tht> NASPKSU Nationwidt> Study. In Vinctont <Ed.>, Advanctos ln FamilY
Intervention, Assessment and Theory, ~ 33-69.
Handley, S. <1985). The experience of the _latency age child ln sole
and joint custody:
report gn A comparative study. A published
doctoral dissertation. California Graduate School of Marriage
and Family Therapy.
Hess, R., & Camera, K. <1979>. Post-divorce family relationships as
mediating factors in the consequences of divorce for children.
Journal of Social Issues, 35, 79-96.
Hetherington, E.M. (1979>. Divorce: A child's perspective. American
Psychologist, 34, 851-858.
Hetherington, E.M., & Camara, K. (1984). Post-divorce family
relationships as mediating factors in the consequences of divorce
for children. Journal of Social Issues, 35 <4>, 79-96.
Hetherington, E.M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. <1976>. Divorced fathers.
Family Coordinator, 25, 417-428.
Hetherington, E.M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. (1982). Effects of divorce on
parents and children. In M. Lamb <Ed>., Non-traditional families
<pp. 233-288). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hetherington, E.M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. (1985). Long-term efftocts of
divorce and remarriage on the adjustment of children. Journal of
tht> American Ac4demy of Child Psychiatry, 24 <5>, 518-530.
Irving, H., Benjamin, M. & Tracme, N. (1984>. Shared parenting: An
empirical analysis utilizing a large Canadian data base. Family
Process, <23>, 561-569.
Isaacs, M & Levin, I. <1984). Who's in my family? A longitudinal
study of drawings of children of divorce. Journal of Divorce, 1,

e

1-21.

Isaacs, M. (198 >.The visitation schedule and child adjustmtont: A
three year study.
Jacobs, J. (1983). Treatment of divorcing fathers: Social and
psychothtorapeutic considerations. American Journal of Psychiatry,
140 (10), 1294-1299.
Jacobs, J. (1986). Divorce and child custody regulations: Conflicting
legal and psychological paradigms. American Journal of
Psychiatry, 143 <2>, 192-197.
Johnston, J.R., Kline, M., and Tschann, J.M. (1988). Ongoing postdivorcto conflict in familit>s conttostlng custody: Does joint
custody and frequent access ht>1p? Papt>r prtosenttod at the Annual
metoting of tht> American Orthopsychiatric Association, San
Francisco.
Kalter, N. <1977>. Children of divorce in an outpatient psychiatric
population. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 49, 40-51.
Kelly, J. (1982>. Divorce: The adult experience. In B. Wolman and G.
Stricker <Eds>. Handbook of Developmental Psychology. New
Jersey: Prentict>-Ha11.

- 181 -

Kelly, J. (1981>. ·Visiting after divorce: Research findings and
clinical implications.
In Abt & Stuart <Eds>., Children of
separation and divorce: Management and treatment. New York: Van
Nostrond Reinhold.
Kelly, J. (1988). Marital factors leading to divorce:
Implications
for the course and outcomes of divorce.
Paper presented at the
Midwinter Meeting of the American Psychological Association,
Scottsda1e.
(a)
Ke11y, J. <1988>. Custody agreements and parental interaction at final
divorce. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Orthopsychiatry Association, San Francisco.
(b)
Kelly, J., Gigy, L. & Hausman, S. (1988). Mediated and adversarial
divorce: Findings from a comparative longitudinal study.
In J.
Fo1berg and A. Milne <Eds>., Divorce mediation: Theory and
practice. New York: Guilford Press.
Kline, M., Tschann, J.M., Johnston, J.R., & Wallerstein, J.S. <1988).
Children's adjustment in joint and sole physical custody families.
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Orthopsychiatry Association, San Francisco.
Koch, M., & Lowery, C. <1984). Visitation and the noncustodial father.
Journal of Divorce, ~' 47-65.
Kurdek, L. (in press>. Custodial mother's perceptions of visitation
and payments of child support by noncustodial fathers in families
with low and high levels of preseparation interparent conflict.
Journal 2f Applied Developmental Psychology.
Kurdek, L., & Berg, B. (1983). Correlates of children's adjustment to
their parents' divorce.
In L.A. Kurdek <Ed>., Children~
divorce. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Kurdek, L., B1 isk, D., & Siesky, A. (1981>. Correlates of children's
Jong-term adjustment to their parents' divorce. Developmental
Psychology,
, <5>, 565-579.
Kurdek, L. & Siesky, A. (1980). Children's perceptions of their
parent's divorce. Journal of Divorce, 3, 339-378.
Lamb, M. <1981>. The role of the father 1ft child development. New
York: Wiley.
Leupnitz, D.A. <1982>. Child custody: 8 study of families after
divorce.
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Maccoby, E., Mnookin, R.,. & Depner, C. <1986>. Post-divorce families:
Custodial arranqemtnts compared. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Association for tht Advancement of
Science, Philadelphia.
Maccoby, E., Depner, C.,& Mnookin, R.
<1988>.
Family functioning in
three forms of residence: Mattrna1, paternal and joint._ Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Orthopsychiatry
Association, San Francisco.
Nastasi, B.K. (1988). Family and child stressors: Research findings
from a national sample. Paper presented at the annual meeting of
~
the American Orthopsychiatry Association meeting, San Francisco.
Orthner, D., & Lewis, K. <1979>. Single-father competence in
chidrtaring. Family Law Quarterly,~' 27-47.
Pojman, E. (1982>. Emotional adjuJtment 2f ~ ln ~ cyttody and
joint custody compared with adjsutment 2f ~ ln happy and
ynhappy marriages.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, California
Graduate Institute, Los Angeles, California.
Rutter, M.
<1970>. Sex differences in response to family stress.
In
E.J. Anthony & C. Kouptrnick (Eds>., The Child ln his family. New

- 182 -

Yor I< : Wi 1 e y • ·
Santrock, J., Warshak, R. & E11 iot, G. <1982>.
Social development and
parent-child interaction on father-custody and stepmother
fami1 ies.
In H. lamb <Ed>., Non-traditional families: Parenting
and child development. San Francisco: CA: Jossey-Bass.
Shiller, V. (1986a) Joint versus maternal custody for families with
1atency age boys: Parent characteristics and child adjustment.
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 56, 486-489.
Shiller, V. <1986b). Loyalty conflicts and family relationships in
latency age boys: A comparison of joint and maternal custody.
Journal of Divorce, 9, 17-38.
Steinman, S. (1981) • The experiences of children in a joint custody
arrangement: A report of a study. American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry, ~' 3.
Steinman, S., Zemme1man, s., & Knoblauch, T. (1985). A study of
parents who sought joint custody following divorce: Who reaches
agreement and sustains joint custody and who returns to court.
Journa1 2f ~American Academy of Child Psychiatry, 24, 5:554562.
T•pp, A. (1983). Divorce ·fathers: Predictors of continued paternal
involvement. American Journal of Psychiatry, 140, 1465-1469.
Waldron, J., Ching, J., & Fair, P. (1986). A children's divorce
clinic: Analysis of 200 cases in Hawaii.
Journal of Divorce, 9
(3), 111-121.
Wallerstein, J., & Kelly, J.B. <1980>. Surviving the breakup: How
children and parents cope with divorce. New York: Basic Books.
Wallerstein, J., & Kelly, J.B. <1982). Fathers and children. In
Anthology 2n fatherhood, Cath, et al. <Eds). L tt1e, Brown and
Company.
Warshak, R.A. (1986>. Father-custody and child development: A r•view
and analysis of psychological research. Behavioral Science ~ ~
Law, i <2>, 185-202.
War sh ak , R. A. , & San t roc I< , J • W.. ( 1
) • The i mp ac t of d i v or c e i n
father-custody and mother-custody homes: The child#s perspectiv•.
In L.A. Kurdek <Ed>., Children
Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Zi11, N. <1983>. Happr, healthy
New York: Doubleday.

- 183 -

The
Northern California

Mediation Center

December 16, 1987
Assemblyman Elihu M. Harris
Chairman, Assembly Committee on Judiciary
State Capitol
P.O. Box 942849
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
I want to thank you for the opportunity to meet with the
Assembly Committee on Judiciary yesterday.
It was an
extraordinary format for allowing thoughtful dialogue on
these very complex and important bills.
I hope that my
input was useful.
I did not say this succinctly yesterday, but want to state
now that Senator Watson's bill (1306} is not simply an attempt
to "clarify" the meaning of the current custody statute.
It
essentially imposes additional requirements on one or both
parents attempting to share custody, making joint custody much
more difficult to obtain.
It is not a gender neutral bill.
It does not require similar behavior on standards of sole custody
situations, which is most unfortunate.

•

Please note my correct address on the letterhead (100 Tarnal
Plaza, not 300) .
Sincerely,

<--llJ-W- $ ~(at/~

Joan B. Kelly, Ph.D.
Executive Director
JBK/jr
cc:

Deborah Debow

100 Tarnal Plaza
Suite 175
Corte Madera, CA 94925
(415) 927-1422
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Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg and
Senator Rebecca Morgan

FROM:
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Information re SB 1306

ROSEMARY SANCHEZ
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Hugh Mcisaac, Director of Family Court Services of the
Los Angeles Superior Court forwarded the enclosed report
for your information.

cc:

Mark Redmond
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In anticipation of the enactment of a bill
requiring, among other provisions, a survey
of all custody dispositions, Los Angeles
County in 1982 implemented a survey of all
custody dispositions in the County's Centrql
District, which handles 40% of all custody
decisions. A total of 901 surveys were tabu·
lated over a three-month period. These surveys were sent to families by the County
Clerk and the person, or party, picking up the
final divorce was required to file the completed survey.
This survey is the first detailed information of custody dispositions available that
includes all cases coming through the divorce process in the Los Angeles Superior
Court. In addition, this custody disposition
survey procedure serves as a vehicle for ad·
ditional research and evaluation, such as
answering the questions: What families and
children are best suited for joint custody?
How do families arrive at their ow~ privately
ordered decisions? What educational help
might assist them in achieving plans that is
bestforthem and their children? A number of
other administrative issues are clarified by
this survey.
Even from the limited scope of this sur·
vey, the following important obserVations
can be made.
1. Trial courts see just a little less than 5%
of all families that have children. Therefore,
this population must be very special, especially since they have had an opportunity to
resolve their disputes in the Conciliation
Court. This would account for the small
number of joint custody awards made in the
trial court, as reflected by this survey. Candidates who cannot resolve the dispute in the

Conciliation Court probably are not likely
candidates for joint custody decisions.
2. Children from the age of 5 to 12, are
over-represented in the sample, while children under the age of 2 are somewhat
under-represented. Nevertheless, a signifi·
cant number offamilies are ending their relationship where the children are under 5 years
of age. In the sample, this number is 40%, if
the child is male, and 32%, if the child is
female. This sex difference becomes less as
the children grow older.
3. The largest number of agreements arrived at were by the parents themselves, representing 62% of the sample, while the next
largest group were by the parents in consultation with their attorneys, representing
27%. This fact points out the value of our
educational program in reaching this population through our custody options seminar,
and the divorce seminars that we have put on
periodically. An educational means may be
the most cost-effective way to reach these
families and will have a prophylactic, or preventative, contribution to post-divorce dif·
ficulties and assist parents in arriving at
meaningful plans.
This survey also underscores the value
of having some research capability to look at
both the administrative policy, as well as the
broader implications contained in surveys
such as this.

Methodology- A one-page information form
was used to gather the necessary information.
Once the form was collected, information·
was fed into the computer with the following
coding:
i. DivorctJ Number- The numbers themselves.
II. .Numbor of Children - 1, 2. 3, 4, 5. or more.
Ill. Ages of Children -Male Ages of Child~n-Female
A- Under two
A- Under tWo
B - Two to five
B - Two to five
C - Five to twelve
C - Five to twelve
D -Twelve to eighteen 0 -Twelve to eighteen

•Data collection and analysis completed by Girma
Zaid, Administrative Intern assigned to the Los
Angeles County Conciliation Court by the U.C.LA.
School of Social Welfare.
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CONCIUATlON COURTS ReYlEW/VOLUME 2'1. NUMBER 2/0ECEMBER 1913

' .

V.

VI.

1.

2.
3.

ages 0-2 = 81
2-5 = 112
5-12 ... 178
12·18- 105
Total
481·
Total number of female children
ages 0..2 "" 41
2-5 ... 90
5-12 ""' 171
12-18 ... 99

jo -Joint legal and physical custody
jm -Joint legal custody with primary physical
custody to mother.
jf -Joint legal custody with primary physical
custody to father.
sm -Sole custody to mother
sf -Sole custody to father
sp -Split custody (ctlildren divided among
parents)
ss -Custody to social services
Arrangement arrived at primarily through:
a -Agreement of the parties by themselves
b -Agreement of the parties in consultation
with attorney
c
-Agreement of the parties in consultation
with private mental health professionals
d -Agreement of the parties in consultation
with Conciliation Court
e -Decision by a judicial officer in a ..:ontested
custody trial.
Rscommendation FoJJowed
y- yes
.n ·no
ResuJts of Ute SW"Vey
The total number of Child Custody. Disposition
surveyed .................................. 901
The total number of Child Custody Disposition
Survey with no children •••••••••••••••••••• 374
The total number of survey with children .•. 527
The total number of children involved •••••• 882
The total number of families
with 1 child .. • • • .. • • • • • • .. • • • .. 278 x 1 • 278
The total number of families
with 2 children ................. 175 x 2 • 350
The total number of families
with 3 children • .. • • .. • • • • .. .. • • 53 x 3 • 159
The total number of families
with 4 children • • • .. • • • .. .. • . • • • 15 x 4 • 50
The total number of families
with 5 children .. • • • • • • . • .. .. .. •
7 x 5 • 35

Total
4. The total number of male children
The total number of female children
Total
5. Total number of male children in
percentages •
Total number of female children in
percentages •

Total

17%
23%
37.5%
22.5%

10%
22%
43%
25%

401·

As the survey indicates ages of children involved
in the Child Custody Disposition appears to be high in
the 5 to 12 age group in both male and female categories:
As to the final decision regarding custody, the survey clearly indicates that sole custody to mothers appears to be the category of final decisions.

6.5%
Joint legal and physical custody 33
Joint legal custody with primary
37%
physical custody to mother
194
Joint legal custody with primary
0
physical custody to father . • •
1
48%
Sole custody to mother • . . . . . . 253
6.5%
Sole custody to father . . • • • . . • 33
Split custody (children divided
2%
among parents) . . • • .. • .. • .. 12
Other- (DPSS Protective
0
Custody) .••••••••••••••••• • __1
Total
527
7. The survey indicates that 62% of the arrangement
regarding final deci'!ion was arri·.-::o at h';' the parties themselws. Agreement reached in consultation
with Conciliation Court was 5.8%. Agreement of
the parties in consultation with attorney was 27%.
Arrangement arrived at by a judicial officer in a
contested custody trial was 5%. There were only
two decisions made in consultation with private
mental heatth profesaional wl"dch amounted to ..2%.
~ngementof~on

A- Agreement of parties by themselves.
B - Agreement of parties in consultation with
attorney
C - Agreement of parties in consultation with
private mental heatth profes.aionals.
D - Agreement of the parties in consultation with
Conciliation Court.
.
.
Decision by a judicial officer in a contested
custody trial.

882
478
404
882
54.3%

e-

45.7%
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CUSTODY

SUP.VEY

DISPOSITIO~i

Central District
Agreement Attorney
Parties

Mental Hlth.
Profusion.

Cone.

Contested

Total

1.

Court

JFa.

0

l

0

0

0

l

2

JMo.

sa

74

0

17

7

194

36

JO

16

10

2

3

l

33

6

SF a.

25

4

0

0

l

33

6

SMo.

179

47

0

s .

17

253

49

Split

8

3

0

2

0

12

3

Other

l

0

0

0

0

l

o.

327

143

2

29

26

527

TOTALS

z

62'Z

27'Z

0, 1(1.

S'Z

51

J Fa • Joint legal custody wieh primary physical custody to father.
J Mo • Joint legal custody with primary physical custody to mother.
JO ..

Joint legal and phfsical custody.

Fa • Sole leg a!. ar.d p:1ysi cal custody :c

...... -""'... .,..,-···-·

S Mo • Sole legal and physical custody to

mothe_~.

s

~:

Split• One child, or more, 'IITieh each parent.
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Based on a very large sample families, a classification system
is developed that helps the mediator to assess the nature of
the custody dispute and determine the most appropriate
course of action.

Toward a Classification
of Child Custody Disputes:
An Application of
Family Systems Theory
Hugh Mcisaac

This chapter begins by presenting some key concepts of systems theory. A
systems analysis of a typical child custody dispute follows. This analysis
focuses on the role of the family mediator in resolving the dispute. Finally,
a classification system, based on more than 35,000 families who used the
Los Angeles Conciliation Court since 1977 to resolve their custody disputes
is described. The value of this classification system and of the use of family
systems concepts is that they enhance our ability to assess the nature and
elements of a dispute, to determine the appropriateness of mediation as a
way of resolving the dispute, and to recommend the most effective course
of action.
Family Systems Theory
The value of family systems theory for the mediation of child custody disputes is developed by Saposnek (1983), who links the cybernetic
interaction of the family to functional strategies. The analysis of the family
systems begins with the identification of the component parts and proceeds
D. T. Saposnek (ed. ). Applying Family Therapy Perspectives to Mediation.
Mediation Quarterly, no. 14/15. San Francisco: Jossey·Bass, Winter 198>/Spring !987.
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to the members' needs and interests. The goal of mediation in custody and
visitation disputes is to develop a parenting plan that is in the best interests of the children and that marshals all the strengths of the family system
to achieve this task. Because families are often extremely complex after
divorce, family systems analysis provides the best way of understanding
the new family subsystems. Ironically, the new family after divorce closely
resembles extended family networks that existed prior to the industrial
revolution, and, by viewing the family after divorce from the perspective
offered by systems theory, we can begin to chart the evolution of the family
as a fragile, human network, that interacts with forces within the larger
social, political, and economic systems.
Concepts from family systems theory provide important insights
into the divorce process and into the experiences of families as they transit
that process (Anderson and Carter, 1978; Bertalanfy, 1967; Haley, 1976;
Koestler and Smythies, 1971; Watzlawick and Weakland, 1977). These concepts establish a useful theoretical base for understanding this process and
the family dynamics involved. Let us examine some of these concepts.
Systems Are Synergistic or Entropic. A system consists of a whole
made up of interrelated and interdependent parts that interact in a way
that is distinct from their interaction with other entities; this interaction
occurs over some period of time. Two notions are inherent in this definition: the notion of rules or principles of action and the notion of components, to which specific roles are assigned. Systems can be synergistic, that
is the roles can complement one another, and as a result more energy
flows from the system as a whole than from the sum of its individual
parts. Systems can also be entropic, that is, the component parts compete
with one another, and as a result the system either fails to create energy at
all or creates less energy than the sum of its individual parts.
The value of these concepts is readily apparent when they are
applied both to the family and the legal system. The rules and roles of the
legal system are spelled out in statutory and case law. The system is synergistic when the roles of client, parent, child, attorney, judge, mediator, and
evaluator complement one another and work together to help the family
resolve its conflict. The system is entropic when these roles are in conflict.
Systems Are Rule Governed. Murray Bowen (1978) observed that the
family is a rule-governed system. Families transiting the process of divorce
are in the process of reorganizing. Mediation helps families to resolve
conflict by developing new rules for future conduct. Thus, the family as a
rule-governed system takes on a new form. According to Bowen (1978),
family rules can be implicit or explicit. Implicit rules are unwritten, often
unconscious, rules about how the system operates. Actors within the system observe these implicit rules, often unconsciously, and these rules
become apparent to the trained observer only over time. Such rules can be
as simple as "Don't wake Mom on Saturday mornings" or as complex as
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"Dad is an
this is our
secret." These rules are not written
down. They are not even spoken.
the members of the family
system behave in accord with these rules, and it is the role of the trained
mental health professional to identify and help the family change these
rules when they threaten the functioning of the family system and the
family seeks help.
In mediation, the task is to create explicit rules about how the family will function in the future (Folberg and Taylor, 1984). We do this
through a written agreement. The agreement can be incorporated into a
formal court order, so that its conditions are enforceable, and the court
system can intervene in the family system in order to encourage compliance. Explicit rules are dearer and easier to change than implicit rules,
because they are open to examination and review by all members of the
family system. This fact makes mediation at the time of dissolution a very
powerful change agent, because unhealthy intrinsic rules can be modified
and made explicit; for example, the written agreement can state, "Father
agrees to seek outside professional help to deal with his excessive use of
alcohol. Father will not drink alcoholic beverages when in the company
of his minor children." Rules dealing with distributive issues, such as
property or support, are based on principles of equity and fairness to the
parties who have adverse interests. Rules dealing with integrative issues,
such as parenting after divorce, are more pragmatic, since they are concerned with what works and with what is best for the child.
Systems Are Homeosmtic. Homeostasis is another important systems
concept. All systems seek to maintain a balance or steady state. This steady
state regulates the flow of energy and exchange between the system and its
external environment and between components within the system itself.
Failure to achieve a balance will result in destruction of the system. Any
change requires adaptation and a restoration of homeostatic balance. The
most obvious example is body temperature. The body regulates its temperature to 98.6 degrees. Any deviation in excess of 10 percent results in death.
In a similar fashion, the family that transits divorce seeks a new homeostatic
balance at each stage of the divorce process. Mediation and court intervention help the family to find a new homeostatic balance and help to create a
new family system that is rooted in a new homeostatic balance.
Systems Are Micro and Macro. The concept of micro examines the
functioning of a single system, and the concept of macro looks at how
systems interact. The whole is greater than the sum of its individual parts.
In much the same way, the interaction between the divorcing family and
the court system is larger than the family and court systems combined.
Any effective analysis requires an examination of the larger context A
classic example of the conflict between macro and micro interests can be
found in the issues of confidentiality or joint custody: What may be best
on the macro level may fail when it is applied to the individual case.
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the mediator
Summary. The use of "v~'"'"'"
is an enabler, not a changer. ,..,,., •.,,.,u
family and the contexts within which it
of family
systems theory helps us to
about the effects of change and to
assess the relationship of members within the
system more realistically than we can with other
Family systems
also helps
to define crucial points of intervention where the greatest benefit may be
created. Finally, it provides a unifying context between
of human
development and the notion of law and
dispute from
Let us now consider the inner "'"'"' 1"""
the systems viewpoint and
a Clalssluc:au,on of the patterns that can
be observed in disputing .........,...,.
Child Custody: Anatomy of the D:Ui;pute

Between 11 and 15 percent of all divorce
involve a child
custody dispute. Most child
decisions are made
the parents
themselves (62 percent) or in consultation
their attorneys (27 percent)
(Mcisaac, 1981 ). To understand the role of the mediator in
such
disputes, the anatomy of a child
must be delineated and
analyzed.
Levels of Divorce.
and divorce are a
occurring over time. One of the great mtsccmc:ep,ucms
a marriage suddenly ends and a divorce
on three levels: a
a
a
level.
Psychological Divorce. The first level is that of the psychological
divorce (Jackson and
divorce involves having
one or both of the partners
to think outside the relationship
and about severing the
bond. The
becomes viewed
as a problem or
and Lederer,
1968). Psychological
and
usually one party
it without UA<"""'""'""'
mediator needs to identify who
it was initiated, and whether it has been '-V''"'""'"'·""'·
that drives a custody
is failure
divorce. As a result,
remain enmeshed.
Social Divorce. The second level is that of the social
which
has a clear set of stages through which the
members pass. Isolina
Ricci (1980) uses a
interactional
to describe the divorce
process: In stage one, both
the
traditional nuclear family. In
tension caused by some
system.
families go
through this stage, and most families oscillate between stages one and two
throughout the history of their
In
the
1s
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undergoing severe stress.
down. One of the
partners may have ""',.."''"'"
taken official steps by
During this
stage, many families seek outside
Often families in this
stage move back to stages one and two. In stage four, one of the parties
moves out of the home. Physical separation is always extremely traumatic
for everyone in the family. No matter how psychologically divorced a person may be, a change in the physical structure of the family causes enormous stress for all family members. Questions of economics, future
parenting, and the whole nature of the family compete for immediate
attention. According to Wallerstein and Kelly (1980), 80 percent of all
children experiencing divorce wake up one morning to find that one of
the most significant persons in their lives has moved out Most children
are very poorly prepared for this step in their lives, and this event creates
tremendous stress. Stage five is characterized by the establishment of two
homes and by contact with an attorney to seek legal representation if such
contact has not already been made. In stage
although two homes have
been established, general patterns of living have not been formally
adopted. This is a period both of much experimentation and of much
storm and stress. Stage six is often
with the greatest degree of
conflict and confusion in the divorce process.
of our institutional
structures and legal concepts focus only on this
of divorce, when in
reality most families move beyond it. The seventh and last stage in the
divorce process involves the creation of two new homes. Frequently, both
parents have remarried, or at least they have settled into a comfortable
routine. Parents feel satisfied with their lives, and
are able to refocus
their energies as parents. Unfortunately, many families do not arrive at
this stage, and many casualties occur
the way.
Legal Divorce. The last level is that of the legal divorce. This is the
level of divorce with which we are most familiar. The legal divorce defines
the parties' rights in relation to each other and develops a parenting plan
for the period after divorce as well as a
for distribution of the assets
of the now dissolved nuclear family structure.
Distrilrutive Versus Integrative Issues. Two distinct classes of issues
(Raiffa, 1982; Mcisaac, 1981) exist in the context of divorce. The first class
involves the distributive issues regarding property and, to a lesser degree,
support. Each spouse has adverse interest in these issues. The role of the
attorney is to represent these adverse interests in the adversary system to be
sure that the rights of his or her dient are adequately represented and
answered.
The second class of issues involves the integrative issues regarding
parenting after divorce and the parents' continuing responsibility for raising their children. Resolution of the integrative issues requires cooperation. Since the standard for decision making is the child's best interests,
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involve the
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These three concepts are valuable in del:nutng
parties must accomplish in
to shift from negative '"'""""''"
the mistakes that we have made
to have a "friendly" divorce. This
have angry feelings toward each other.
Questions to Be Asked. To ue••euJ'n
dispute, the
the important actors? What
underlying needs? What
prospects for settlement? What
Who Are the lm.hn·rtn1VJ.t
the dispute alive is not a
grandparent or ••"'"""'""""$'"'
roles are

identifying the H1nriP1rhf1
never mistake
tal rights can be elevated over children's
negative for both adults and

namely,
One Of
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the hostility
between the parties.
Is the parent afraid of the unknown? Does the parent have a realistic fear of the capacity of the other parent to be a good parent? What are
the needs of the children, both individually and collectively? The task at
this point is not to propose a solution but rather to identify basic, fundamental needs. Maslow's (1968) hierarchy of needs is a useful paradigm for
analysis: Physical, security, belonging, love, esteem, and self-actualization
define an ascending order of needs that the families transiting divorce
must meet.
What Are the Options for Mutual Gain? What arrangements would
benefit all? If conflict exists, what arrangement is best for the children,
considering their ages and stages of development? The basic focus should
be on parenting plans that can best meet the children's needs, not on who
is the better parent The process of answering these questions is similar to
the process of drafting an environmental impact study, not to a contest
between disputing adults. Such an ordering of questions is also more likely
to permit the family to preserve its autonomy and to answer such questions in the future without outside intervention.
What Are the Prospects for Settlement? An analysis of the potential
for settlement is also critical. Enormous amounts of time can be spent on
a conflict that is not ready for solution or that requires a decision-making
intervention from outside. The mediation process may require a step-up
agreement, where the parties agree about how to disagree, or about the
criteria that should be used in resolving the dispute, or about the preconditions that need to be met in order to resolve the dispute. A review of the
potential for settlement will help to address these process issues.
What Really Happens in This Family? Answering this question
involves the application of Richard Gardner's "grandma's criteria"
(Gardner, 1982): Who puts the child to bed? Who takes the child to school?
Who helps the child with homework? Who takes the child to the doctor?
How is each parent involved in the life of the child? What parenting plan
provides the child with the greatest continuity with both parents and gives
the child the parenting patterns with which he or she is most familiar?
Major Themes

In dealing with any set of data, it becomes essential to identify
patterns. After working with more than 35,000 custody disputes in the Los
Angeles Conciliation Court, I have detected seven major themes. I do not
claim that the list is definitive, only that the seven themes described here
serve as helpful guides in answering some of the question just raised.
The family constellation depicted in Figure 1 involves two people
who have decided to end their relationship and who have not become
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Kramer

Mrs. Kramer

involved in relationships with any third party. This constellation occurs
during the predivorce phase,
Both
are competent,
and both have been involved in the life
their child. Most
o£
this type occur at the time of the
ents need help in putting •v~;-..,m...
after the divorce. These families are
some form of joint CUStody Of rn.t'\n<"•r-:allUP rH<:tf,.r!U

Jane,/

In the family pattern ,,,mrr<>n
remarried, and the new spouse is co:mr»enng
ural parent. Triangles are '-"~·. . uuau
the parties always feels
of stepparent has been defined
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relationship, which means that the outcome is unsatisfactory for all concerned. A large percentage of families seen in the courts involves this kind
of dispute, which occurs after divorce. Disputes in these families are good
candidates for mediation, since both parents are competent parents, and
helping the parents to work out appropriate role behavior usually serves
to resolve the dispute.
Figure 3. Child Preference
Ellen,40

......

Harold, 45

......

John, 12

Joejr .. 17

In the type of disputes depicted in Figure 3, the child, because of
developmental needs or perhaps because of the behavior of parents, has
made a choice about the parent with whom he or she wishes to live, and
the child has declared this choice. Frequently, children in this category are
either in latency (between six and twelve) or adolescence (between thirteen
and eighteen) and choose the parent of the same sex in order to continue
the identification process. Disputes in these families are good candidates
for mediation, but involvement of the child in the mediation process is
even more essential here (Drapkin and Bienenfeld, 1985) than it is elsewhere, since the child has declared a choice that may or may not be in the
child's best interest.
Figure 4. Parent with Deficit

•
Marge, 31

Yolanda, 7
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In disputes of the type depicted in Figure 4, one of the parents has
severe deficits that limit his or her ability or capacity to parent the couple's
children. Disputes in these families are not good candidates for mediation,
although mediation may help such families to agree to pursue an evaluation. Evaluation is essential in order for the court to have the information
needed to make a decision in the best interests of the children. Disputes of
this nature are best resolved by an independent trier of fact, who makes a
decision about what is best for the child. These families are not good
candidates for joint custody. One of the parents is so severely disturbed
that he or she does not provide an adequate model for the child. Again,
psychiatric evaluation is essential in order for the court to understand the
facts of the situation and to recommend the parent to whom sole custody
should be awarded.
Figure 5. Enmeshed Parents

\

Helen. l

Harrv. 6 months

\

I

I

\

I

\
\

\

Linda. :1

1 Jane.-!

\..,_ _ _ _ _ ..J

I
1

I
Rhonda.~'

I

'--------

In disputes involving the type of family system shown in Figure 5,
both parents are involved in an ongoing emotional morass and do not
seem to be able to work through the divorce process. Children caught in
such a web have great difficulty and feel very threatened. This family
system is one of the most intractable and difficult to work with, since the
family seems to need conflict in order to survive. In fact, one of the dues
that suggests that the family with whom one is working is one of these is
that a solution disappears just as soon as it is at hand, just like a mirage
in the desert. These families paraphrase Descartes: "I fight, therefore I
am." They can consume incredible amounts of a mediator's time. Such
families may benefit from a psychiatric evaluation, and
need a firm,
fair, and final decision by some independent trier of fact. Sometimes, they
are successful in mediation. More often, they drain enormous resources
and do not use the mediation process effectively.
The family system depicted in Figure 6, involves grandparents as
well as parents in the raising of the child Recent legislation in California
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Figure 6. The Trigenerational Family
~farv,

Joe, 1'2

67

o-r--o
.
\I

\i---..------1
~Iorrie,

Deceased

Dan, 30

Candace. '29

:11

(married when Don was I)

Darrin. 5

Don,3

and other states now permits grandparents and stepparents to seek visitation with their grandchildren or stepchildren following divorce. The complex disputes arising from such family systems can often be resolved
through the mediation process. However, unresolved intergenerational
conflict that has been present in the family for generations tends to persist
in these family disputes and this can make mediation a challenge at best.
Figure 7. Change of Circumstance
Tom,38

Mary, 34

John,34

(both will move to Los Angeles)

Sherry, 3

Johnjr.,i

The family system shown in Figure 7 involves an inadvertent
change of circumstance, such as the move of one or both parents away
from the community. Disputes involving such family systems are difficult
to resolve, because both parents have an equal claim. Where both parents
have been equally involved in the life of the child, these disputes often
involve a joint physical custody agreement. In these kinds of disputes, one
needs to find "tiebreakers" or to identify key criteria, such as the child's
developmental needs, that can be used to make the decision. In developing
their parenting plan, many parents include a clause to handle such events
in the original agreement, and in the "shadow" (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979) of this agreement family members negotiate their own privately ordered solution.
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Conclusion
This chapter only scratches the rich possibilities inherent in the
application of family systems theory to the context of family and mediation. As we have seen, even the divorce process is best understood through
family systems concepts and an interactional model.
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TESTIMONY RE: SB 1306
Dear Chairman Harris:
I am submitting the following written testimony on SB 1306:
The

u.s.

Supreme Court long ago noted that a parent's right

to "the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or
her children" is an interest "far more precious " than any
property right.
1221, 73

s.

May v. Anderson, 345

ct. 840, 843 (1952).

Social Services, 452

u.s.

u.s.

528, 533, 97 L. Ed.

In Lassiter v. Department of

18, 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 102 S. Ct.

2153, 2159-60 (1981), the Court stressed that the parent-child
relationship "is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.'"

quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405

L. Ed 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).

u.s.

645, 651, 31

See also Franz v. United

States, 707 F.2d 582, 594-602 and 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(interest of non-custodial parent in consortium with child
constitutionally protected); Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 207
(7th Cir. 1987) (parental association a constitutionally protected
liberty interest).
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Seaton Hall Professor Holly Robinson has recently spelled out
this argument in detail:
Read together, the cases clearly establish a zone of
privacy around the parent-child relationship, which
only can be invaded by the state when the state
possesses a sufficiently compelling reason to do so.
As a result, when the marital breakdown occurs, both
parents are entitled to constitutional protection of
their right to continue to direct the upbringing of
their children through the exercise of custody.
Adequate protection of this parental right requires
that parents be awarded joint custody [or expansive
visitation] ... unless a compelling state interest
directs otherwise.
H. L. Robinson, Joint Custody:
Cinn. L. Rev. 27, 40-41 (1985)

Constitutional Imperatives, 54
(footnotes omitted).

It follows, therefore, that before the state, through its
family law courts, can impair a parent-child relationship through
issuance of a limited visitation/sole custody order, it must make
a determination that it has a compelling reason for doing so.
Trial courts must, as a matter of constitutional law, fashion
orders which will maximize the time children spend with each
parent unless the court determines that there are compelling
justifications for not maximizing time with each parent.
Maximizing time with each parent is the only legitimate
manner by which a parent is able to maintain a meaningful parent-
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child relationship after divorce.

While geographic distance,

school schedules and the like must be factored into the
custody/visitation calculus, trial courts faced with a
custody/visitation decision must accord appropriate
constitutional respect to maintaining a healthy parent-child
relationship by granting each parent as much time as possible
with the child under the circumstances of each case.

"No bond is

more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the
law as the bond between parent and child."

Carson v. Elrod, 411

F. Supp. 645, 649 (1976).
Application of constitutional protections to
custody/visitation rights is a necessary corollary to the Bill of
Rights because individual liberty cannot be secured unless
"certain kinds of highly personal relationships" are afforded "a
substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by
the state."

See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89

Yale L.J. 624 {1980).

Providing constitutional shelter for a

parent-child relationship simply reflects the realization that

•

individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from such
relationships and that the sanctity of family relationships is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history."

Moore v. City of East

Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494, 503 (1977).
This proposition that the parent-child relationship in a
traditional custody/visitation dispute commands constitutional
respect is only recently being recognized.

At least one federal

court found that the paucity of cases recognizing the Testimony
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constitutional sanctity of this relationship is readily explained
by the relative rarity of divorce in American society in the
past.

That court further held that the historical absence of a

strong tradition should not result in denial of the
constitutional protection
increasingly prevalent.

for such relationships as they become
See Franz v. United States, supra.

Maximizing the child's time with each parent is the
constitutional mandate absent a compelling state interest of
protecting the child from harm.
As women join the work force in ever increasing numbers and
break the shackles of gender-based stereotypes many fathers in
turn discover the challenges and rewards of being a nurturing
parent.

These social changes, coupled with the rising divorce

rate and concomitant increase in children of divorce, have forced
a critical examination of our traditional method of dealing with
child custody questions.

Research reveals new insights into how

children of divorce are affected by the custody and visitation
arrangements imposed on them by the family law

of our

nation.
The emotional stability of children of divorced parents is
directly related to the quality of their continuing relationships
with both of their parents. "We have repeatedly described the
dissatisfaction of so many youngsters who felt they were not
seeing their fathers often enough. If custody and visiting issues
are to be within the realm of the 'best interests of the child,'
then such widespread discontent must be taken very seriously." J.
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Wallerstein and J. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup, 142-143 (1980).
see also, D. Luepnitz, Child custody. A study of Families After
Divorce, (1983).
Numerous shibboleths about so-called impracticalities of
joint custody or expansive visitation arrangements have been
disproved.

The evidence is simply overwhelming that joint

custody or expansive visitation is an extremely effective way to
promote the best interests of the child in maintaining a healthy
relationship with both parents.
One common misconception about joint custody is that it is
not appropriate where the parents are hostile or non-cooperative
with one another.

While, to be sure, a children's best interests

are always furthered by cooperation between their parents,
failure of one or both parties to do so should not be cause for a
court to deny joint custody.

such a ruling would give the non-

cooperative parent veto power over a joint custody plan.
Dr. Joan B. Kelly, Director of Northern California Mediation
Center, Co-Director of California's Children of Divorce Project
(1970-1980), and co-Author of Surviving the Breakup. How Children
and Parents Cope with Divorce (1980), has observed:
I am concerned about the position that argues
joint custody should not be awarded when parents do not
agree. In these cases, it is almost always the woman
who is opposed to joint custody. Women do not need to
ask for, nor agree to, joint custody.

They are

presumed by society, lawyers, the courts, and
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themselves to have a right to
must

their care and protection. It is the

ask for joint custody and it is often in the mother's
power to agree or disagree.

The mother's position is

particularly enhanced if she knows

a refusal to

share parenting with her spouse will preclude a joint
custody order regardless of her reasons for denying
joint custody.

In these various instances,

may

no

legitimate reasons based on the father's capacity to
parent for refusing to consider joint custody.

Yet the

beneficial.
Kelly, "Further Observations on Joint

f

16

u.

if. D.

L. Rev. 762 at 769 (1983).
Indeed hostility between parents

itates in favor of joint

custody rather than against
prohibited by court order from
alternate weekends is at a

except on
a hostile

former spouse. The time between his

the

child too often becomes an indoctrination period in which the
hostile spouse works to destroy the parental relationship.
time-sharing is actually the
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where there is hostility between the parents.
As summarized by one commentator:
It is extremely questionable whether warring
parents could cooperate with any greater success in an
arrangement involving limited visitation than one where
custody is split more evenly.

Regardless of the

form of the custody decree, children can be expected to
suffer damaging effects from parental conflict and also
from the extended absence or nonavailability of one
parent. . . •

No custody arrangement can guarantee

protection against the former, but joint custody at
least prevents the latter.

In fact, noncustodial

parents easily could argue that it is precisely in the
"hostile parent" situation that they are most in need
of the legal protection afforded by joint custody.
H. L. Robinson, Joint custody:

Constitutional Imperatives, 54

Cinn. L. Rev. 27, 33-34 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, sole custody arrangements with limited visitation by
the non-custodial parent have resulted in children suffering a
broad range of emotional disorders including deep feelings of
loss and abandonment, strained interactions with both parents,
disturbances in cognitive performance, and sex role
identification problems.

Trombetta, Joint custody:

Recent

Research and Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to
custody Disputes, 19 J. Fam. L. 213, 217-20 (1980).
An important study conducted on 414 Los Angeles custody
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cases over a two year period

the

Considering that the best

children are foremost, all professionals should
recognize a strong positive indication for joint
our

custody. Unless future data
findings, the burden of

j

custody

would not be in a child's best interests should be on
the parent requesting sole custody.
Ilfeld, Ilfeld, and Alexander,
Look at outcome Data of Relitigation, Am.

J

139:1

(Jan. 1982) •
's best interests

Far too often parents
in terms of the parents wants and

are

political questions of child
reduced to questions of men versus women
attempting to retain historical
historical disadvantages.

to "serving the

best interests of the children"
secure political advantage.
custody adversaries.
power.

is to

Power is

of

Legislation

to seek

Yet, SB 1306 implicitly does

My experiences both as a family

attorney specializing in

child custody disputes and as a

of a

nine-year old daughter and seven-year
SB 1306, if enacted, will
seeks the irresistible power

son, convince me that
1

as each side
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One of the most significant contributions California has
made to the nation's approach to family law is the legislative
directive that it is the policy of this state to insure children
frequent and continuing contact with each parent after divorce.
Cal. Civ. Code§ 4600(a).

A second significant contribution is

the legislative directive that in deciding a custody dispute
courts are to favor the parent who has shown the greater
willingness to allow the children frequent and continuing contact
with the other parent.

Cal. Civ. Code§ 4600(b) (1).

SB 1306 replaces the emphasis on parental cooperation with
an emphasis on power.

This unnecessary and ill-advised dramatic

philosophical about face will only create turmoil in the custody
courts of California and the lives of our children.
Legislation has two primary purposes with respect to the
people the legislation affects: (1) behavior modification, and
(2) education.

Legislation inevitably directs people to modify

their behavior in light of the consequences stemming from the
legislative decrees affecting a particular matter.

Legislation

also has a didactic character, such as civil rights legislation
which not only encourages behavior modification but also
instructs the body politic as to what is desirable behavior in a
society concerned with equal justice for all.
By diminishing the importance of shared parenting after
divorce, SB 1306 encourages divorcing parents to seek to exclude
the other parent from meaningful participation in child-rearing
since divorcing parents will have the signal from the legislature
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that cooperation with respect
considered important.
SB 1306 simply fails to
dynamics of childhood development.

much

love from their parents whether
assumptions which underlie SB 1306 are
powerfully destructive at worst.

We can

the

insight of Daniel J. Boorstin, 1

of

Library

of Congress that "the main
but the illusion of knowledge.
SB 1306

not worthy

children deserve better.
Thank

for the

11

state of

i

-- our
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James A. Cook
President

December 9, 1987
RE:

SB 1306, Custody
Mon., Dec. 14, 1987 hearings
Assembly Judiciary Committee

Assemblyman Elihu Harris
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Assemblyman Elihu Harris:

Appellate and Supreme Court case rulings usually comprise the major guide
whether a statute needs amending legislatively.
We have, and are examining, 360 recent Appellate and Supreme Court case
rulings from 45 states, primarily on joint custody and custody-related issues.
Four initial observations emerge from this body of reference:
1. There is no significant reason or justification (judging from this
review) for any further amendment at this time of California's
"joint custody" statute (CC 4600 & 4600.5)
2. Most often, appeal from a joint custody decree is instigated by a
parent seeking sole custody sequestering of a child predicated on
petty complaints that the higher court thereupon deems insuficient
justification for terminating a joint custody decree.
Havin~ failed to achieve a sole custody reversal of a joint custody
decree, some of the parents, adamant for sole custody, occasionally
pursue an end-run around the courts by seeking legislative amendment
changes that will give credence to complaints that the court had
previously considered an insufficient justification for conversion from
joint to sole custody.

•

The justifications hinge, generally, on personal interpretations
of ''best interests"; a competition as to which parent can best
satisfy their personal definition of what amounts to "best interests."
In most such cases, both parents are good-enough parents (falling
within a 'normal' range for most psychiatric tests) and their
argument resorts to fault-finding in a no-fault era.
3. Some of the earlier appellate cases indicated that there is no basic
flaw (in custody statutes similar to California's) but that a more
thoroughly spelled-out decree by the trial court jurist will
minimize litigants returning to court for further definition.
4. Generally, there appears to be a certain dynamics taking place in
the divorce war between .the sexes which, when recognized by
legislators and jurists, helps in understanding why the current
statute needs to be upheld:
a. Increasingly, more divorce filings are now initiated by women
than men. (Reportedly as high as 85% filing by women, now, in
- 212 -

the metropolitan locations, as compared to about 505-50%
equal split at the close of the 'fault era') This observation
is not meant to imply that men are that much more worthy of
being divorced than previously, but is related to the following:
b. Guilt. There is still a slight, lingering aura of 'guilt'
with the phenomenon of divorce (although there has been much
social effort to dispell, deny or minimize guilt.) For a
divorce-initiator this leads to the following:
c. Anger. A mechanism to obliterate a personal feeling of guilt is
to generate anger. Anger, as a reason, submerges feelings of
guilt. Hence, it is not unusual that, during and immediately
following divorce, there appears to be more anger than relations
during the marriage justify. The anger-to-obliterate-guilt
generates fault-finding. That often relates to the following:
d. Weaning. An Age-old problem, most societies the world-over
have developed rituals, customs and procedures to help growing
children to gradually separate from one parent and to see both
parents, and both sexes, as unique and worthy individuals.
The pursuit of sole custody upon divorce is a mechanism to
thwart society's practice of weaning, and to curry favor by
one parent under the guise of protection.
The Assembly Judiciary Committee was the original forum which gave legislative
credence to joint custody ... and to a concept that has now gone on to over 34 states
and several foreign countries.
The concept includes the nudge of "preference" and of "rebuttable presumption."
(The statute does not include categorical presumption, merely rebutta e presumption ..
.• which has the overwhelming advantage of re~oving the burden
attack and litigation
from the shoulders of a parent willing to share and work-with the opposite parent,
while requiring a burden of proof from the parent intending to isolate a child in
captive sole custody.)
The concept of preference and rebuttable
most significant contributions to defusing
in the divorce war between the sexes.

sumption is one of lifornia•s
ucing the li
on pressure

Furthermore, the concept satisfies social, scienti
evolutions:

c

1it i ca 1

1. Repeatedly, the children of divorce who survive the best are those

who are assured of "frequent and conti
ng contact" with both
parents. "Frequent and continuing contact" 1s the
ifornia
phrase most-often repeated in other states' statutes as part of
the criteria assuring 11 best interests. 11
2. Equality ... the equality of civil rights,
relations among the races,
between the sexes ... is the major and determining political reality for
the last half of this Century. Equality is "best intere
" for
children as well as parents.
3. A rising divorce rate of the Seventies, and the present plateau, has

extended 11 no fau1t 11 in custody as well as divorce as the most rational
answer in less-than-perfect divorce.
4. For continued development of both
decree of joint custody is the best

sexes,
a custody
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SB 1306 promotes 16 unecessa
California's current custody law.

and

unduly

kling one parent

it1ca11y dangerous changes in
emphasizes "best interests"
is no lack of abilityon for their ruling.

California•s current
eight times as the criteria for
for a jurist to
"best 1

On the other hand, SB 1306 eliminates or lutes California's joint custody
statute by inserting the term "best interests" as it to substitute for or to mask
the omissions amended-out
the law by
1306
Dangerously, SB 1306 proceeds to
by inspiring arguments of:

defeating joint custody

methods

- Geographic location; a potentially uncon tutuonal limitation that
promotes deliberate
ng by a vindictive parent.
- Abuse1 allegation; increases the
indiscriminate and
unexamined allegations though s
allegations are not necessarily
indicative of relations between a parent and child.
- litigation shopping list; proposals to defeat joint custody with no
equally exha ive li of reasons for a court
decline sole custody.
- Investigations;
y for
nt custody
to determine worthiness for sole custody.

no similar investigation

agreeing parents;
- Elimination of joint c
an unwary parent into
ng
e custody as
equally within a child's best interests.

al for entrapping
solution were

- Categorical presumption against joint
; when, in fact, the
alternative of sole custody might not be in a child's best interests.
- Diminishing the parent most willing to facilitate contact; the effect of
downgrading an otherwise desirable response which current law now
encourages.
- Destroying the preamble; current law establishes a goal of joint custody
at the outset, SB 1306 removes the opening guideline and buries it
later in the statute with the implication that "best interests" could
be raised to defeat frequent and continuing contact.
SB 1306 stems not from altruism but from a purposeful intent to weaken
and diminish joint custody and to do so to the advantage of a parent pursuing
sole and exclusive isolation of a child
divorce.
Protect our curr~nt joint custody law .... widely acclaimed as the most
significant affirmative advance in family law since the advent of "no fault
divorce over a decade and a half ago.
11

1ncerely~~
214 (

James A. Cook
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JOINT CUSTODY

\COMPARE THE CONSEOU NCES

Enact legislation for the divorcing

THE

pu~-not lor "the trade".

Preference/Presumption

\}/

CUSTODY

2!:

Option

lSI preference lor join! custody,
presumed unless, etc

Raising sole
custody to
equality with
joint custody.

Presumption/Preference

Option

National trend:

Up, 1979 and since.

Down, since 1979
a pre-1978 outlook

'Frequent & continuing
contact' by child with
both parents:

Yes

No. nol necessarily

Guidance to parents:

Yes, what law expects.

No. up-lor-grabs.
Cultivates
possessive
potential

Trails cultivated:

Cooperativeness

Litigiousness

Psychological reaction:

Equanimity,
anticipates favoritism
lor forgiveness,
cooperation.

High anxiety, need
to allackldelend
to assure access

Child's reaction,
pressure on child:

Less

Unstable, possible
parentectomy.

Child encouraged
choose,

No choosing
Less guilt

Promotes joint custody

Yes

No, not necessarily

Mediation stimulus

Yes, Presumption begets
mediation

Unlikely. Focus
to "winning•

Litigation stimulus:

Less likely, unnecessary lor
for forgiving, cooperative parent

Increases
likelihood,
uncertainty breeds
attack

necessary,

Fawned on to
choose, lifetime
guilt

Uligiously.

Typified

as:

"parent not wanting divorce·,
"altruist"

·a judge's bill"
(because of option

availability)

•a lawyer's biU"
(because ol

litigation
potential)
Who promotes?:

Usually parent 'left' by mate,
Parents practicing JC, parents
reluctant to litigate/attack.

Peevish, ·
vindictive.
Believers ol truth
results from
litigation,
justifying their sole
custody.

Remunerative:

To parents & child, possibly
less expensive.
For counselors.

For attorneys,aides

Emotional scars,
resentments:

Less likely

Highly likely if
option is sole
custody

Outcome:

Everona wins something,
Balance, "fairness"

Winner/loser
Imbalance. Long
term

resentment it sole.
Appeals:

Future negotiation:

'Cleaner' issues

Less efficient
appeals

Possible because balance
power.

Unlikely it option
was winner/loser.
Winner neadn t
negot1ate.
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December 10, 1987

The Honorable Elihu M. Harris, Chairman
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
RE:

SB 1306/Repealing Joint
Custody Presumption
(OPPOSITION)

Dear Chairman Harris:
We implore you and your committee to not fall prey to a bill
that claims to be in the best interests of the children, but
is not.
SB 1306 seeks to erode delicate parent-child relationships by placing it on equal footing with joint custody and
tagging it with excessive restrictions.
As parents and spouses who have each suffered through a divorce,
our experiences with sole custody arrangements have shown it
to be a deterrent to healthy parent-child relationships. For
example, mothers become burned out by the tremendous demands
and responsibilities sole custody brings, leaving little quality
time for themselves or the children; visiting fathers lose their
parental authority and rights and are eventually ''squeezed out"
of the lives of their children; and children suffer because they
have less frequent contact with both parents as a result.
Sole
custody also makes it easier for the custodial parent to reduce
contact between a child and the non-custodial parent.
It should,
therefore, NOT be placed on equal footing with joint custody, as
prescribed by SB 1306.
The law should encourage divorced parents to perform their parental
duties jointly as in the presumption for joint custody.
Joint
custody contracts can be modified later if the situation warrants.
But the presumption for joint custody should be STRENGTHENED within
the law, not diluted.
SB 1306 is a step backward for children of divorce.
We, therefore,
strongly urge you and your committee to OPPOSE SB 1306.
Respe"lctfly,

-

I

!dt_pq~·

Dan and Lyn Kosewski, 8785 Kelsey Dr., Elk Grove, CA
cc:

Assemblyman Phil Isenberg
Senator Rebecca Morgan
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Sacramento Single Fathers
Support Group
December 15, 1987

~rK./11..--

4930 8th Avenue
Sacramento, CA 95820
(916) 736-1544

JOINT CUSTODY: IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF OUR CHILDREN
We never divorced our children. But when sole custody is
awarded to just one parent -- mother or father, the effect is
the same. And the children lose.
For the last seven years the Sacramento Single Fathers
Support Group has worked to help dads and their kids survive
in a system that treats men as second class parents and
routinely deprives children of the love and attention of
their own fathers.
Our support group is not a political action organization, nor are we in any way against women. (After all, they
are the mothers of our children.)
Nonetheless, we feel compelled to speak out against
Senate Bills 1306, 1341 and any other legislation which makes
an already bad situation even worse. Our children are the
real victims of divorce, and we believe such legislation
perpetuates and perpetrates the further victimization of our
kids.
The system which claims to be working in the best interests of our children is systematically stripping these kids
of their birthright: to have equal and loving access to both
their mommy and daddy.
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In its worst abuses, and there are many, sole custody is
tantamount to court-ordered child abandonment, a forced
divorce from own children.
The non-custodial parent (and nine times out of 10 it's
a man) has his children legally taken from him at a time in
their lives when they are most frightened and most in need of
both their parents' loving attention.
According to clinical psychologist Edward Teyber and
developmental psychologist Charles Hoffman of the California
State University at San Bernardino:
One of the strongest determinants of a child's
healthy adjustment to divorce is the extent of the
father's continued participation as a parent.
Children of divorce suffer socially, emotionally
and intellectually when their fathers are not
actively involved as parents •••• The best adjusted
children of divorce have frequent access, without
conflict, to both parents •••• The only solution is
for children of divorce to have a dependable relationship with both parents -- one allowing for
frequent, regularly scheduled and conflict-free
access to both mother and father.
Legislation like SB 1306 and the other proposed bills
undermine the most humane and sensible approach to protecting
the children of divorce -- joint custody.
We are asking you, for our children's sake, as well as
our own, to consider more rational laws which will foster
rather than restrict active parenting by both the mother and
father after divorce.
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Such legislation would include the following:
1.

We need more mediation and counseling -and less litigation. The courts should
recognize that parents who can't settle
custody in mediation are possibly committing unconscionable emotional violence on
their children. In such cases, it should
be presumed the family is in need of
immediate and if necessary, mandatory
counseling -- especially the children.

2.

In any litigation, the court must pay
much more attention to the welfare of the
kids. Children are the only parties
without lawyers in court proceedings.
They are not property. They are people
young people who are little more than
pawns in game they do not understand and
cannot win.

3.

We must create a much stronger presumption in the law that joint custody is
indeed in the best interests of the
children -- unless the parents agree
otherwise, or it is proved otherwise. In
spite of the current presumption, courts
and society still treat fathers as
inherently inferior parents, and the
children thus lose meaningful, loving
contact with their dads.

4.

The law must prevent and if appropriate,
punish capricious and vindictive actions
by either parent which are designed
solely to deprive their children of the
love and attention of the other parent.
For example: unnecessary moves over long
distances or out of state, or false
accusations of molestation or abuse.

5.

We advocate tough and equal enforcement
of all court orders: both of child support and joint custody or visitation.
California has vigorous enforcement of
child support. What it does not have is
equally vigorous enforcement of child
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custody and visitation orders. Withholding child support and withholding visitation are both crimes against children. Is
money more important than a parent's
love?
All we are asking for is reasonable and compassionate
legislation that will guarantee us the equal opportunity to
carry out all our parental responsibilities. There's more to
being a dad than child support.
We have not abandoned our parental responsibilities. We
have been prevented from carrying them out. The legislation
presently under consideration will make the tough job of
being a divorced parent even more difficult.
SB 1306, 1341 and other such laws are
interests of our children.
#

#

- 220 -

#

in the best

EQUAL KIGHTS FOR tATHERS, INC.
A nonprofit organization concerned with the rights of children, parents, and second families.

December 23,

1987

Elihu M Harris, Chairman
Assembly Committe on Judiciary
State Capitol
Sacramento, Calif.
Dear Chairman Harris,
Several of our members attended your hearing on December 14, 1987.
We wish to thank you for holding the hearing and inviting written
comments.
We were impressed with the quality of testimony of several of the
panel members and were particularly impressed with Dr Joan Kelly.
It is obvious that Dr Kelley has much meaningful research and expert
experience to share.
We remain opposed to the "package" of bills
produced by the Task Force on Family Equity and continue to believe
that the efforts of this task force are largely advocacy for a point
of view rather than a legitimate and unbiased effort.
We believe that
our familylaw policies should be carefully developed with full
participation by all experts, consider all points of view, be fair
and unbiased, and include the views of the affected public.
To that
end we share the following views.
CHILD CUSTODY
We feel that the ~lM~;RY purpose of family law is to define an expected
standard of behavior. Much is made of the inability of divorced
parents to cooperate in raising children.
It is assumed that this
is a natural and unavoidable consequence of divorce.
We propose that
the current law has much to do with this situation.
Our current
custody law is unclear as to public policy on child custody.
Some
judges read it as a no preference statute, others view it as a preference, some see it as a rebuttable presumption, and most see it as a
sole custody statute unless parents voluntarily consent to joint
custody.
Our current law leans heavily toward providing a legal arena
for parents to fight for sole custody or for mothers to oppose the
attempts of fathers to gain joint custody.
We are convinced that the
inability to cooperate is caused by current law.
A rebuttable presumption for joint custody would end most of the fighting over children.
There are several presumptions governing family law and we believe
that a presumption of joint custody is logical and appropriate.
We
were pleased to hear Dr Kelly testify that disagreements over child
rearing are seldom the cause of divorce indicating that ex-spouses
can be encouraged to cooperate.
We must have laws that encourage
cooperative parenting and out of court settlements.
If SB1306
succeeds our courts will be swamped with litigating parents.
We
are opposed to any attempt to amend current law to eliminate the
implied preference for joint custody.
Such an amendment sends a
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'
message that sole custody is the

~referred

cus

ial arrangement.

We have several chapters around the sta e and ea
jurisdiction is
different.
We have found that where a,preference r presumption is
is enforced by the local court, it work~admirably 0 get pa~ants
t o c o o per at e r a the r than 1 i t i g a t e .
0 n the o the r
d , s 0 me 1 0 c a
1
courts harbor a preference for unconsent
sole cus
y over unconsented joint custody.
Thousands of our members have
oyed
unconsented joint custody and have found ~bat mother
11 cooperate
with fathers if the judge makes it clear th~; it is
ted and
t h a t con t in u i n g s t r u g g 1 e s f o r s o 1 e c us t o d y wi i,l b e f r u
es s .
It is a myth that unconsented sole custody works bette than
sented joint custody.
We believe that the av~ lable ev'enceunconplus clinical opinion
shows
that unconsented joi~t, custttr• ( wh ere
.
.
both parents des1re phys1cal custody) works better than
t d
0
.
e
We can assure you t h at b e1ng
"
sole custody.
a "N on-ct:sto , 1 nsen
parent discourages many parents from continuing in an act e
.
ro 1 e
after d1vorce.
The opponents of joint custody have created several myths t t cannot
stand up under scrutiny.
One of the favorite arguments is ~
"stability" theory; one set of rules, one bed, one toothbru~
parent figure, etc.
Yet, most mothers (married and divorced
and place the child in the care of strangers for 10 or more 1
per day.
This person has more contact than either custodial
non-custodial parent yet this fact escapes the "stability" the
promoters.
The era of a child being raised by a non-working m
was a short lived phenomenon in 20th century Western societies
it is now over.
Most children have been raised by a number of
and the exper@ince is enriching rather than detrimental.
Custo
parents re-marry or cohabit yet there is no inquiry by the State
to whether this change will be in the child's "best interest" an
"stable".
Sole custodial parents regularly uproot their children
from enighborhoods and schools to move about the state or country,
yet no provisions are made in law to determine if these moves are
"stable" or in the child's 11 best interest".
In view of this it is
illogical for our legal and mental health system to spend so much
time trying to choose between two perfectly adequate parents as to
who will have custody based on which parent is in "the best interes
of the child".
Clearly, the stabillity theory is a hoax.
We agree
with Dr Joan Kelly that "parallel parenting" works.
The theory
about the "ability to cooperate" is also a sham.
The average child
care worker and/or stepparent is more confusing to a child than one
of their natural parents whom they already know and love.
Also,
these persons are not as likely to "cooperate" as a biological parent.
The bottom line is simple; there are no judges or mental health
professionals who can pick between parents as to
ich one should have
sole custody.
It is ridiculous to make a custody choice and then
totally ignore what happens to the child in the care of babysitters
and stepparents on the misbegotten idea that the custodial parent
selected by the court is sufficient to be in the "best interest" of
the child.
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FAMILY HOME
We agree with the testimony of the majority of the panelists that
the disposition of the family home should not be tied automatically
to the custody of the children.
Use of the family home for the
benefit of the children should be left to the discretion of the
courts using the "Duke" standards.
CHILD SUPPORT FOR ADULT COLLEGE STUDENTS
We remain opposed to "child" support for adult daughters and sons
of divorced parents who are attending college.
They are adults,
not children, and are not entitled to child support.
we also agree
with the testimony of the panelists that such a policy would have
many negative legal and psychological ramifications.
We would also
like to point out that high school is provided totally free to all
minors as a public policy but college is not free to all persons up
to a certain age (21 ?).
Therefore, it is irrational to create a
right of "support" for a benefit that is not provided at nu cost by
the government.
SPOUSAL SUPPORT
We remain opposed to SB 1296.
From the looks of the "mark up" bill
it is dead but we remain concerned.
We agree with Judges King and
Murphy.
The purpose of spousal support should be short term and
rehabilitative where possible.
Any spousal support policy must
strongly encourage employment and aim for self-sufficiency where
possible.
The idea of equalizing the post-divorce standard of
living is at odds with no fault divorce.
It also doesn't make
economic sense.
We find that wives are initiating divorce in most cases.
Our members
consistently describe that their wives divorced them for unfathomable
reasons as "desire to grow", "freedom", "the relaticnship doesn't
work any longer", etc.
All one needs to do is read the dozens of
womens "psychology" books to understand this phenomenon.
This
was discussed by Dr Joan Kelly and her research shows wives initiatir1~
divorce by a 3 to 1 ratio.
The Task Force on Family Equity created
a myth when they promote the idea that it is men who seek divorce i
almost all cases.
Who are the victims?
The
No fault divorce did not cause the "feminization of poverty".
real problem is that most men barely make enough to support one
household Jet alone two households.
It is well known that the "real"
wages of American workers have stayed constant in the past 25 years
due to increasing world competition and world trade.
It takes both
spouses working full-time to maintain an increasing standard of living.
It would be nice to turn the clock back to those halcyon days when
full-time housewifing was a career but we can no longer afford it.
The solution is for women to partcipate fully in the world of work.
Dividing the same size economic pie between two households wiJl not
solve Lhe problems.
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December 19, 1987
Douglas Henry
4040 Johnson Dr.
Oceanside, California 92056

Elihu M. Harris
Chairman, Assembly Judiciary Committee
State Capitol
P.O. Box 942849
Sacramento, California 94249-0001
SUBJECT: SB 1306, Assembly Judiciary Hearings of December 14, 1987
Mr. Harris:
I attended the Assembly Judiciary Committee Interim Hearing on
Family Law on December 14, 1987 as an individual citizen concerned
with assuring adequate protection of children's rights to maintain
meaningful relationships with both of their parents after divorce
or separation. It has been my personal experience that even the
present law does not adequately protect a child's rights to access
to her/his parents, and I oppose SB 1306 because it will dilute
that protection even further.
I strongly oppose SB 1306 because it would make a substantial
change to the public policy of the State of California regarding
the rights of children to have and maintain relationships with both
parents after separation or divorce. SB 1306 removes from Section
4600 the statement that "it is the public policy of this state to
assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both
parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their
marriage." That statement of public policy is unqualified and
states explicitly what I and many others believe to a right of
children that is self-evident, i.e., the right to have and maintain
a relationship with both parents. By definition, the only custody
award that is consistent with that public policy is an award of
joint physical custody. A review of the Civil Code definitions of
custody (attachment 1) shows that joint custody assures the child
of frequent and continuing contact with both parents while sole
custody does not. An award of sole custody is contrary to public
policy, and can be justified only as a second preference when it is
found to be in the "best interest" of the child pursuant to the
provisions stated in Civil Code Section 4608 (ref. Civil Code
Section 4600 (b)).
SB 1306 modifies the statement of public policy and ammends Section
4600.5 to read "it is the public policy of this state to assure
minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents
after the parents have been separated or dissolved their marriage
where it is in the best interest of the child." SB 1306 even
removes the assurance of frequent and continuing contact from the
definition of joint custody. Under SB 1306, the rights of children
to frequent and continuing contact with their parents after
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separation or divorce are not protected in the same manner that
those rights are protected under the present law. Under SB 1306,
the court must determine that it is in the best interest of the
child to have frequent and continuing contact with both
s,
whereas, under the present law the right of children to have
frequent and continuing contact with both parents is stated
explicitly and is unconditional. The wording of the present law is
appropriate and represents a responsible public policy on the
rights of children.
During the December 14 hearings, Senator Morgan gave an example, in
support of her bill, of one of her contstituents who moved from
Ventura county to San Mateo County and sought to change a custody
order that provided the child with contact with the other parent
one week during each month. The Superior Court in San Mateo
refused to change the order. Senator Morgan said that the order
was inappropriate under the circumstances in that, among other
things, the child was attending school. Contrary to Senator
Morgan's claim that the present law is to
blame
for
an
inappropriate order in this case, it shows that the Superior Court
in San Mateo used its discretion properly and the present law
successfully protected the child's right to frequent and continuing
contact with both parents despite one parent's effort to obstruct
this right by moving a great distance away from the other parent.
Senator Morgan s example illustrates an example of the way the law
should work to protect children's rights and provide deterents
against
actions
such
as
those taken by Senator Morgan's
constituent.
Regretably, even the present law is not always sufficiently clear
to provide children with adequate protection of their rights to
frequent and continuing contact with both parents. During the
hearings, Senator Morgan asserted that, due to the present law,
mediators are encouraging joint custody and judges feel obliged to
award joint custody. This assertion is untrue. In my personal
experience in San Diego County, I have found the opposite to be
true, i.e., the mediators recommend against joint custody and
judges oppose joint custody unless it is agreed to by both parties.
Judge Thomas Murphy of San Diego county, who presided at our
hearing on December 4, 1987, refused to grant the father's request
for joint custody despite the fact that both psychologists involved
in the case (for a total of 2 years of observation and evaluation)
testified that joint custody would be in the child's best interest.
The San Diego Family Court Services mediator (who was not a
psychologist and had never seen the child), testified that he felt
that, despite the exhaustive effort of both psychologists (one of
whom was even selected by the counselor), joint custody was
inappropriate because a three-year-old child should have one
primary caregiver. The child's mother also opposed joint custody
and Judge Murphy ordered that sole physical custody be retained by
the mother, citing, among other things, the fact that the parents
disagreed on the custody issue. In San Diego county, the court
interprets the present law so liberally that joint custody can be
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denied simply on the basis of one parent's refusal to agree.
During the December 14 hearings Judge Murphy even told Assemblyman
Isenberg that he did not award joint custody when the parents
disagreed.
While
disagreement
between
spouses
should
be
justification for the court to order joint counseling or mediation
after separation for the ultimate benefit of the children, it
should not be justification to deprive the children of frequent and
continuing contact with their parents unless it can be demonstrated
that the children would be hurt more, as a result of the
disagreement, than by the deprivation of their relationship with
one of their parents.
Judge Thomas Murphy's position is in clear conflict with the public
policy as stated under the present law. The present law, however,
is not strong enough in its assertion of children's rights to
frequent and continuing contact to prevent individual judges from
exercising discretion in this manner. Given the adversarial nature
of many divorce cases, children often become the pawns in a game of
bitter resentment between divorcing spouses. In their anger,
spouses often seek to deprive one another of contact with their
children forgetting that in doing so the children are also
deprived. Children need more protection from the hostility and
bitterness of divorce, not less. SB 1306 will allow even more
children to be deprived of relationships with one of their parents
as a result of the hostility of the other. Please vote against SB
1306.

Douglas Henry
cc: Tom McClintock
Lloyd Connelly
Terry Friedman
Phillip Isenberg
Pat Johnston
Tim Leslie
Sunny Mojonnier
Larry Stirling
Maxine Waters
Nolan Fri zelle
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ATTACHMENT 1
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE DEFINITIONS
Physical Custody
Sole Physical Custody: means that a child shall reside under the
supervision of one parent subject to the power of the court to
order visitation.
Joint Physical Custody: means that each of the parents shall have
significant periods of physical custody. Joint physical custody
shall be shared by both parents in such a way so as to assure a
child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
Legal Custody
Sole Legal Custody: means that one parent shall have the right and
responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health,
education and welfare of a child.
Joint Legal Custody: means that both parents shall share the
responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health,
education and welfare of a child.
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AMENDED IN SENATE MARCH 3, 1987
AMENDED IN SENATE FEBRUARY 23, 1987

SENATE BILL

No. 13

Introduced by Senator Morgan
(Coauthors: Senators Bergeson, Davis, Bill Greene, Leroy
Greene, Marks, Robbins, and Watson)
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Bane, Bradley, Dennis
Brown, Eastin, Harvey, Hauser, Hayden, Hughes, Kelley,
Killea, La Follette, Leslie, Molina, Moore, Polanco,
Quackenbush, Speier, and Tanner)
December 1, 1986

An act to add Section 4709 to the Civil Code, relating to
parent and child.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 13, as amended, Morgan. Parent and child.
Existing law provides that the father and mother of a child
have an equal responsibility to support and educate their
child, as specified. Under existing law, generally, this
obligation terminates when the child reaches the age of 18
years. However, existing law provides that a parent has a duty
to support an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18
if he or she is a full-time high school student and resides with
the parent until the child completes the 12th grade or attains
the age of 19, whichever first occurs.
This bill would provide that an order for child support
issued pursuant to the Family Law Act may provide, or may
be amended to provide, that child support shall continue to
be paid , as specified, on behalf of or to any l:lmB:Mrie(j eftHEi.
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wfte ts ft fulbffime student duf'ifl:g ffte tteademic ~ ifl: geeft
stttnding, ifl: ftft 8:CCf'edited institution ef ffigftCf' learning, ftS
defined, student in good standing, who is attending an
accredited institution of higher learning on a full-time basis
during the academic year, with certain exceptions, until such
time as he or she graduates or attains the age of 21 years,
whichever first occurs.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds
2 this state have a substantial
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26

27
28

the citizens of
the education of
the people of California, as evidenced by the state's
extensive system of postsecondary and vocational
education programs. The Legislature has recognized the
importance of parental support while a child is attending
school by the enactment of Section 196.5 the
Code
which provides for the continuation the parental duty
of support even though the child has attained
age of
18. If the child is unmarried, is a full-time high school
student, and resides with a parent, that duty continues
until the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age
of 19, whichever first occurs.
The Legislature finds, however,
of
parents whose marriage has been dissolved often face
disadvantages
respect to
of educational
expenses for postsecondary
age of 18
that are not experienced by children in
families.
The Legislature therefore finds and declares that the
ability of judges to award child support for educational
expenses for postsecondary studies beyond the age of
majority is necessary both to protect the children of
divorced parents from undue hardship
to promote
the state's interest in a well-educated citizenry.
SEC. 2. Section 4709 is added to the Civil Code, to
read:
4709. Notwithstanding any other
of law, an
order for child support issued pursuant to
part may
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SB 13

provide, or may be amended to provide, that support
shall continue to be paid on behalf of or to any U!l:lftMried
eftHft wfte :ffi ft full:ttime StuaeHt auring ffte ftCftaeftlie ,.etli';
ift gee& stftflaiHg, ift ftfi aeeretiitee iHstitutioH ef higher
leam:iHg, student in good standing, who is attending an
accredited institution of higher learning on a full-time
basis during the academic year. Support may continue
until such time as he or she graduates or attains the age
of 21 years, whichever first occurs. The student is not
eligible for child support if he or she marries, enters
military service, or is living separately from his or her
parent as an emancipated adult. The court may order
child support from either or both parents.
As used in this section, "accredited" means a degree or
certificate granting institution that has been assigned
accredited status by a regional accrediting association, if
located in the United States, or by a comparable public or
private accrediting institution if located
a foreign
country.
As used in this section, "institution of higher learning"
means a public or private institution providing
postsecondary education or occupational training. As
used in this section, "on behalf of" means that support
payments may be directed by the court to be made to the
educational institution or another adult or institution as
trustee.
This section does not apply to support agreements
made, or judgments entered, before January 1, 1988.
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted so as to limit
a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support
or to limit the court's power to inquire whether such an
agreement has been made.

0
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Date of Hearing:

August 19, 1987
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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
ELIHU M HARRIS, Chairman
SB 13 (Morgan) -

Amended:

August 17, 1987

PRIOR ACTION
Sen. Com. on JUD. 7-3

Sen. Floor 21-14

SUBJECT: This bill permits the court to continue child support until age 21 so
long as the adult child is a full-time student.
DIGEST
Existing law authorizes a court, under the Family Law Act, to order either or
both parents to pay for the support, maintenance, and education of the child
until his or her majority or until the child has completed high school.
Parties to a family law action may stipulate to continue support for any child
after the age of 18.
This bi 11:
1)

Permits an order for child support to provide for a
nuation of
support until age 21 or graduation from an institution of higher learning,
whichever occurs first. The court may order child support from either or
both parents.

2)

Provides that such support shall only be payable during the academic year
on behalf of or to a full-time student, who is (a) in good standing, and
(b) in an accredited institution of higher learning. The term "on behalf
of" is defined to mean that the court could order the support payable
directly to the institution or another adult or institution as trustee.

3)

Terminates eligibility for such support when the student marries, enters
military service, or is living separately from his or her parent as an
emancipated adult.

4)

Is limited to child support orders entered pursuant to the Family Law Act.

5)

Defines accredited institution and institution of higher learning.

6)

Prohibits the application of this act to those "support agreements made,
or judgments entered, before January 1, 1988."

FISCAL EFFECT
None
- continued - 231 -
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COMMENTS
1)

majority from
According to the author, "when California reduced the age
21 to 18 years, court ordered child support was eliminated for these three
years ... and it became the burden of the custodial parent to bear the full
support of these adult children ••• The present cutoff for child support
does not take into account plans for college that would have been
implemented in the absence of divorce. 11

2)

The author refers to the study by Judith Wallerstein, Ph.D., Executive
Director of the Center For the Family in Transition.
Dr. Wallerstein has studied the impact of divorce on
middle-class divorced couples (not randomly selected
in Marin County since 1971. She states that many of
not help pay for their children's college education,
group of under-educated people. Most of the parents
concludes, would have sent their children to college
divorce.

131 children of 60
and no control group)
these fathers will
which is creating a
in her study, she
if they had not

In Marin, 85 percent of high-school graduates enrolled in college compared
to only 47 percent of Wallerstein's subjects. Of those young people from
the study who entered college, one-quarter dropped out primarily for
financial reasons. She states that many of the divorced fathers were
financially able to assist their children with college expenses but chose
not to do so because they felt their obligation ended when the child
turned 18. Typically, these fathers had university educations and a
quarter of them were professionals such as doctors and lawyers.
parents do
Although the Marin County study points out that many di
not help their children through college, the researcher
rms that it is
not a random sample. Further, there (a) is no control group and (b) are
no comparable statistics provided as to the number of married parents who
also refuse to help their children through college.
3)

Presumably, the Agnos Child Support Standards Act
1984 is to be applied
in determining the amount of support payable to an adult child. Thus,
adult and minor children will be treated in the same manner for purposes
of determining the amount of support.
If an adult child is able to establish extraordinary expenses, then an
additional amount of support may be awarded to the potential detriment of
the minor children.

nued -
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Should not a parent's obligation to support any minor or disabled adult
children take priority over the educational support for an adult child?
4)

The author intends for this bill to authorize the court to provide in the
original child support order, entered while the child is still a minor,
for the continuation of the same support level beyond the age of 18.
However, the court always has discretion to modify a support order upon
good cause. The court will look at need of the student and the parent's
ability to pay the expenses of tuition, room, and board. Thus, there is
likely to be good cause for an increase in the support award. If there
are minor children also being supported by this same parent, it is likely
that their support will need to be reduced in order to meet some needs
level of the student.
Should not there be a limitation on the amount of support to be awarded to
a student? Should not the factors be specified which are to be used in
measuring the amount of support to be awarded?

5)

This bill requires, among other things, that the student be in good
standing. However, privacy laws foreclose parents from obtaining
information from the educational institution necessary to make the good
standing determination, without a written waiver from the student.
Further, if a child misrepresents enrollment, attendance, or other factors
relevant to the determination of eligibility for continued support, should
not the parent have the right to recover support paid during the period of
i ne 1i g i bil ity?

6)

This bill lacks clarity where it provides that it is "limited to support
agreements made, or judgments entered on or after January 1, 1988."
Support agreements between two parents are not necessarily court orders
and, to the extent they are not orders, are not legally enforceable.
Furthermore, if it is the author's intent that the limitation is to apply
to support "orders'' such should be clarified. Since support orders
continue to be modifiable, should not the bill specify that the court
lacks jurisdiction to modify pre-bill orders to continue child support
pursuant to this bill?
Further, it is unclear as to whether "judgment" refers to a child support
judgment or to either the judgment dissolving of marriage or the legal
separation judgment.
Should not this bill be limited to only apply to those parties who file
for dissolution, legal separation, or nullity on or after January 1, 1988?
- continued SB 13
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7)

Many of the arguments rai
applicable to this bill.
bill:

s

a)

Is vague, generalized, and
i
including i
lure to define
support; to take into consideration a chi1d 1 s aptitude; and to specify
applicable enforcement actions.

b)

Fails to incorporate arrangements
children in college, such as partial s
child, placing certain conditions on
considerations of the choice
schools.
longer be an option for divorced

c)

Fails to consider the adult child's abili
him/herself, including the child's income

d)

Fails to consider the potenti ly
be imposed upon parents who do provide
available to their children upon majority and
disincenti
to establish trust funds

e)

Forecloses parental input into decisions
child does (i.e., fails
school, lives with a person
activity contrary to the

f)

Inappropriately permits s
relationships.

g)

Creates an uncons
are similarly situated
children; children of
parents.

on i

ide for
any source.

substantial
is bill.

lial
who

Supporters argue
permissible in that they bear a
state purpose. (See 1egi sl
ve i
such support is necessary to protect
marriage has been
ved from
state's interest in a well
h)

parents and
, loani
money to the
nued support, and
These arrangements would no

Assumes incorrectly
have a college
basic human right

s 1l are
p to a legitimate
which states that

interests to
it is a
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i)

Makes no prov1s1on for a "second" family, wherein there are minor
children. Further, adult children of an intact second marriage would
not be able to enforce support for education, although a half-sibling
of the first marriage would be entitled to such support.

j)

Subjects divorced parents to a new and often unaffordable duty.

8)

The term "accredited institution of higher learning" is broadly defined to
include postsecondary education or occupational training in an institution
which grants a degree or certificate and has been given accredited status
by any regional accrediting association.

9)

Also pending before this Committee is SB 215 (Watson) which is limited to
children under age 22 who may be full or part-time students receiving
appropriate education or training. However, SB 215 limits the
availability of support by requiring the court to award support if a
parent would have provided for support during college "but for" the fact
that the parents were separated or divorced. The bill sets forth the
various factors the court is to consider in making this determination.
Further, support is to continue during summer vacation periods and may be
extended to age 23 due to illness or accident.
SB 13 provides for the continuation of support only to a child (except if
married, in military service, or living separately as an emancipated
adult) who is a full-time student, in good standing, in an accredited
institution of higher learning, until such time as the child graduates or
attains the age of 21 years, whichever first occurs. The court is given
no guidelines as to when to deny support, if at all, once a child has met
the above criterion. Thus, educational history of the family is
irrelevant.

10)

The California Family Support Council states that the district attorney
(DA) should be specifically excluded from responsibility for the
enforcement or establishment of support for any child covered by this
bi 11.
Should the DA be given exemption from enforcement and establishment of
support awards created by this bill?

- continued SB 13
1Jage5
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Support

Opposition

Commission on the Status of Women
California Federation of Republican
Women
Association of Family and
Conciliation Courts
Santa Clara County Commission on
the Status of Women
American Association of University
Women, California State Division
Single Parents United 'N Kids
Women's Economic Agenda Project
Child Advocacy Council of San Mateo
and Santa Clara Counties
California PTA

Equal Rights for Fathers, Inc.
Committee on Moral Concerns
Parents for Equal Custody

D. DeBow

SB 13

445-4560

P"age6

ajud
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AMENDED IN SENATE APRIL 29, 1987

SENATE BILL

No. 215

Introduced by Senators Watson ftft6: MM"ks, Marks, and
Morgan
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Bane, Chacon, Speier, and
Tanner)
January 21, 1987

An act to amend Sections 4351, 4700, and 7010 of,
Section 4700.8 to, the Civil Code, relating to child
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 215, as amended, Watson. Child support.
Existing law, the Family Law Act, authorizes a court, in any
proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor
child or a child who is in need and who is unable to maintain
himself or herself by work, to order either or both parents to
pay an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and
education of the child. It also authorizes a court to approve a
stipulated agreement by the parties to pay child support for
the support of any adult children or for the continuation of
child support after a child reaches the age of 18.
This bill would authorize a court, upon a finding that but for
the parents' separation or the dissolution of their marriage, a
parent would have provided support for appropriate
education or training of a child, to order the payment of
support for the costs of maintenance and education or
training of the child after the age of majority, as specified. The
bill would provide that the court fftf:l1' shall order the payment
to be made directly to the child, and authorize the seeking or
the enforcement of the order by either the child or the other
parent. The bill would provide that these provisions do not
apply to support agreements made or judgments entered
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before January 1, 1988.
The bill also would specify that in making an order for
support pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act, a court shall
apply the same standards as are applicable under the Family
Law Act in making an order for child support.
The bill also would make related changes.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27
28

29

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds that the state and
its citizens have a substantial interest in the education of
the inhabitants of California, as evidenced by the state's
extensive system of community colleges and universities,
vocational and other educational programs.
The Legislature finds, however, that the children of
parents who live apart or whose marriage has been
dissolved often face disadvantages with respect to the
payment of educational expenses beyond the age of 18
which are oftentimes not experienced by children in
intact families. The Legislature further finds that parents
who could have been expected to provide an education
for their child who has attained the age of majority absent
their separation or the dissolution of their marriage, may
not do so fullovtiag ~ a dissolution, for any number of
personal reasons.
The Legislature does not intend to create an absolute
duty of support for the educational expenses of a child
who has attained majority by parents who live apart or
whose marriage has been dissolved, but rather, to give
the courts the discretion to determine when the
provision of support for educational expenses is
appropriate. The Legislature intends support for the
purposes of educational expenses to include, but not be
limited to, monetary support. For example, support may
include extended payments for medical and dental
expenses and insurance and continued access to
transportation and housing.
The Legislature therefore finds
declares that the
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SB 215

ability of judges to
child support for educational
expenses beyond the age majority is necessary both to
protect the children of parents who live apart or whose
marriage has been dissolved from undue hardship and to
promote the state's interest in a well-educated citizenry.
SEC. 2. Section 4351 of the Civil Code is amended to
read:
4351. In proceedings under this part, the superior
court has jurisdiction to inquire into and render any
judgment and make such orders as are appropriate
concerning the status of the marriage, the custody and
support of minor children of the marriage and children
for whom support is authorized under Section 196.5, 206,
or 4700.8, the support of either party, the settlement of
the property rights of the parties
the award of
attorneys' fees and costs; provided, however, no such
order or judgment shall be enforceable against an
employee pension benefit plan unless the plan has been
joined as a party to the proceeding.
SEC. 3. Section 4700 of the Civil
is amended to
read:
4700. (a) In any proceeding where there is at issue
the support of a minor child or a child for whom support
is authorized under Section 196.5, 206, or 4700.8, the court
may order either or both parents to pay any amount
necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of
the child. At the request of either party, the court shall
make appropriate findings with respect to the
circumstances on which the order for the support of a
miBOJ:' child is based. Upon a showing of good cause, the
court may order the parent or parents required to make
the payment of support to give reasonable security
therefor. All payments of support shall be made by the
person owing the support payment prior to the payment
of any debts owing to creditors. Any order for child
support may be modified or revoked as the court may
deem necessary, except as to any amount that may have
accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of
motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke. Any
order for child support, as well as any order of
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motion or an
penalty
($100) of
occurrences
rights or at
efforts to exercise
six months prior to
Attorney's
party, upon a
to pay.
(c) When a court
payments for
minority, or
emancipated, or
a specified event
rvrrr1£>r

is
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1 authorized .........,..........

~~ft

2 the liability

3 terminates upon
4 a custodial
5 custody ef
eftiM; to nrhr....n
6 fails to notify
,.........;,,...,,A
7 payments, or the of-f.n.....u:nr
8 to pay support,
9 continues to acc:!etn stmnort
10 refund any
11 the happening
the
12 overpayments shall first be ....... ,.,....._,"""
13 payments which are then in
The court may, in
14 the original order for support, order the custodial parent
15 or other person to whom payments are to be made to
16 notify the person ordered to make
payments, or his
17 or her attorney of· record, of
of the
18 contingency.
19
(d) In the event obligations for support of a child are
20 discharged in bankruptcy, the court may
all proper
21 orders for the support, maintenance and education of the
22 child, as the court may deem just.
23
SEC. 4. Section 4700.8 is added
the Civil Code, to
24 read:
25
4700.8. (a) Upon a finding that but for the parents'
26 separation or the dissolution of their marriage a parent
27 would have provided support for appropriate education
28 or training of a child, the court may order such support
29 as is appropriate for the child's maintenance and
30 education or training after the age majority, including
31 support during normal school vacation periods. 1ft Proof
32 that the child or other family members have previously
33 received parental support for education or training after
34 the age of majority raises a presumption affecting the
35 burden of proof that support for the child's appropn'ate
36 education would have been provided but for the parents'
37 separation or the dissolution of their marriage. An
38 absence of that proof, however, supports neither a
39 presumption nor an inference that the support would not
40 have been provided.
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29
(g) Child support pursuant to this section shall be in
30 an amount that does not reduce a parent's ability to
31 provide appropriate support for any other child or adult
32 for whom a duty of support is owed if the support is
33 actually being paid.
34
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
35 child support order under this section is enforceable in
36 the same manner as an
for the support of a minor
37 child.
38
(i) Notwithstanding any
provision of law, the
39 ' district attorney may, at his or her discretion, enforce
40 child support orders under this section.
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SUBJECT: This bill permits the court to award the payment of maintenance and
education or training expenses
an adult child until age 23, as specified.
DIGEST
Existing law authorizes a court, under the Family Law Act, to order either or
both parents to pay for the support, maintenance, and education of the child
until his or her majority or until the child has completed high school.
Parties to a family law action may stipulate to continue support for any child
after the age of 18.
This bill:
I)

Authorizes a court in any child support proceeding to order support for the
maintenance and appropriate education or training of an adult child up to
age 22, which may be extended up to one academic year due to illness or
accident. The court must first determine if the parent would have provided
support for appropriate education or training but for the separation or
dissolution of marriage. The court, in making its determination, may
consider various specified factors.

2)

Provides that a presumption (that parental support for education/training
would have been paid but for the parents' separation or dissolution) is
created when the child or other family members have previously received
parental support for education or training as adults. However, an absence
of that proof supports neither a presumption nor an inference that the
support would not have been provided.

3)

Provides that either parent or the child may petition the court for such an
order or its modification, or may enforce the order. Both parents may be
ordered to provide support. Enforcement is available in the same manner as
a child support award for a minor.

4)

Requires the court to order direct payment to the child and to specify
events upon which support shall terminate or be suspended.
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Requires the support
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Provides that these provisions
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provi
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Lenore Weitzman, Ph.D .• in
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allow the courts to extend a
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Judith Wallerstein,
Family in Transition,
of 60 middle-class di
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states that many of these fathers will not help pay for their
children's college education, which is creating a group
parents in her study, she
under-educated people. Most
concludes, would have sent their children to college if they had not
divorce.
In Marin, apparently 85 percent of high-school graduates enrolled in
college compared to only 47 percent of Wallerstein's subjects. Of
those young people from the study who entered college, one-quarter
dropped out primarily for financial reasons. She states that many of
the divorced fathers were financially able to assist their children
with college expenses but chose not to do so because they felt their
obligation ended when the child turned 18. Typically, these fathers
had university educations and a quarter of them were professionals such
as doctors and lawyers.
Although the Marin County study points out that many divorced parents do
not help their children through college, the researcher affirms that it is
not a random sample. Further, there (a) is no control group and (b) are
no comparable statistics provided as to the number of married parents who
also refuse to help their children through college.
3) According to the California Commission on the Status of Women (CCSW), and
reiterated by other proponents, this bill protects the right of children to
receive additional college education or vocational training which would
otherwise be provided had the parents' separation or marriage dissolution
not occurred. Minimum requirements of most career fields and the demands
of our society as a whole merit additional educational degrees or
specialized training beyond the high school level. Further, the current
trend toward the elimination of government-sponsored student loan programs
will reduce the availability of financial aid for needy students.
4)

•

This bill provides the court with factors to consider in making a
determination to award support to an adult child who continues his/her
education or training, as follows:
a)

Relevant statements or plans made or acquiesced in by the parent prior
to, during, or subsequent to the parents' separation or dissolution of
marriage, including discussions between the child and parent concerning
the type of educational institution, the costs involved, and the type
of training or degree sought.

b)

The professional standing of the parent.

c)

The standard of living of the parent.
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d)

The child's
training.

e)

The child's past and anned
education or training.
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or any other child support gui
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b)

Coursework or other specified
or nconsistent with the
contemplated education or training.

The court is also given discretion to modify, extend, or prospectively
reinstate the order for support, upon good cause. According to the author,
these provisions permit the courts to take into consideration any lengthy
illness, work schedules, accidents, or military draft if reinstated.
7)

This bill permits an adult child to work either full or part-time towards
appropriate education or tra ning and continue to receive support. Support
may be ordered to continue during normal school vacation periods.
According to the author. she is convinced that a specific limitation on
"number of years or requirement for full-time attendance would be
especially harmful to children of working class families ... These children
may have to work and go to school concurrently, only able to carry less
than a full load, since parental contri
ions would cover less than the
full schooling cost."

8)

The bill would authorize the court to order a divorced or separated parent
to make payments for the "appropriate education or training" of his or her
child. What specific costs related to a person's education would be
included in the support award? Should 11 appropriate education or training"
be defined?

9)

Many of the arguments raised by critics
applicable to this bill. In short summary,
SB 13 argue that this bill:

(Morgan) are equally
tics of both SB 215 and

a)

Fails to incorporate arrangements common made between parents and
children in college, such as partial support, loaning money to the
child, placing certain conditions on continued support, and
considerations of the choice of schools. These arrangements would no
longer be an option for divorced parents.

b)

Fails to consider the adult child's ability to provide for
him/herself, including the child's income from any source.

c)

Fails to consider the potentially substantia1 tax liability which may
be imposed upon parents who do provide educational trust funds to be
available to their children upon majority and the substantial
disincentive to establish trust funds created by this bill.

d)

Forecloses parental input into decisions and power to control what the
child does (i.e., fails to attend classes, chooses an inappropriate
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Since support orders continue to be modifiable, should not the bill
specify that the court lacks jurisdiction to modify pre-bill orders to
continue child support pursuant to this bill?
11)

The California Family Support Council states that the district attorney
(DA) should be specifically excluded from responsibility for the
enforcement or establishment of support for any child covered by this
bill.
Should the DA be given exemption from enforcement and establishment of
support awards created by this bill?

12)

Also pending before this Committee is SB 13 (Morgan), which provides for
the continuation of support under the Family Law Act only to a child
(except if married, in military service, or living separately as an
emancipated adult) who is a full-time student, in good standing, in an
accredited institution of higher learning, until such time as the child
graduates or attains the age of 21 years, whichever first occurs. The
court is given no guidelines as to when to deny support, if at all, once a
child has met the above criterion. Thus, educational history of the
family is irrelevant, although it is significant factor in SB 215.
In contrast, SB 215 permits support to continue until age 22 (extendable
to age 23), for both part and full-time students. SB 215 limits the
availability of support by requiring the court to apply the "but for" test
with its various factors set forth above.
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